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BRITISH MEDIATION IN THE DANISH-GERMAN CONFLICT 1848-1850

PART TWO

From the November Cabinet until the
Peace with Prussia and the London Protocol
(the 2nd of July and the 2nd of August 1850)

BY

HOLGER HJELHOLT



København 1966

Kommissionær: Munksgaard

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KNUD FABRICIUS

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Preface.

As to the utilized archival sources reference is made to Vol. I published in 1965 (Historisk-filosofiske Meddelelser, published by Det Kongelige Danske Videnskabernes Selskab. Vol. 41, No.1). I have again to acknowledge the gracious permission of Her Majesty the Queen to make use of material from the Royal Archives, Windsor Castle, and the kind permission of Admiral of the Fleet, Earl Mountbatten of Burma, to examine Lord Palmerston's private papers. – Furthermore, I repeat my thanks to the institutions mentioned in Vol. I and to their officials for kindness and obligingness.

To the Directors of the Carlsberg Foundation I am very much obliged for their grants towards studies and travels, and to the Rask-Ørsted Foundation I am highly indebted for a grant towards the translation of the work, the greater part of which has been made by Mrs. HELEN FOGH, while a few chapters have been translated by Mr. NIELS HAI SLUND, M.A. To both translators I offer my best thanks.

HOLGER HJELHOLT

Abbreviations Concerning Literature.

- Bunsen. II and III = Christian Carl Josias Freiherr von Bunsen. Aus seinen Briefen und nach eigener Erinnerung geschildert von seiner Witwe. Deutsche Ausgabe, durch neue Mittheilungen vermehrt von Fr. Nippold. II (Leipzig 1869). III (1871).
- Correspond. resp. the Affairs of Denm. = Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Denmark. 1850-53. Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty. 1864.
- Gooch. II = The later Correspondence of Lord John Russell 1840-1878. Edited by G. P. Gooch. II (1925).
- Hjelholt. I and II = Holger Hjelholt: Sønderjylland under Treårskrigen. I (1959). II (1961).
- Hoetzsch. II = Otto Hoetzsch: Peter von Meyendorff. Ein russischer Diplomat an den Höfen von Berlin und Wien. Politischer und privater Briefwechsel 1826-1863. II (Berlin und Leipzig 1923).
- Krigen 1848-50 = Den dansk-tyske Krig i Aarene 1848-50. Udgivet af Generalstaben. (1867 ff.).
- Lundqvist = Bo V:son Lundqvist: Sverige och den slesvig-holsteinska frågan 1849-50. (Uppsala 1934).
- Löfgren = Erik O. Löfgren: Sverige-Norge och Danska Frågan 1848-49. (Uppsala 1921).
- Nesselrode = Lettres et papiers du chancelier Comte de Nesselrode, 1760-1856. Extraits de ses archives publiés . . . par le Comte A. de Nesselrode. VIII-IX (Paris 1911).
- Statsrådets Förhandl. II = Statsrådets Forhandlingar 1848-1863. Udgivet ved Harald Jørgensen. II (1956).
- Stockmar = Denkwürdigkeiten aus den Papieren des Freiherrn Christian Friedrich v. Stockmar. Zusammengestellt von Ernst Freiherr v. Stockmar. (Braunschweig 1872).
- Thorsøe = Alex. Thorsøe: Kong Frederik den syvendes Regering. I (1884).
- Weimar = Volker Weimar: Der Malmöer Waffenstillstand von 1848. (Neumünster 1959). Cf. Historisk Tidsskrift. 11. r. VI, p. 407 ff.
- The Letters of Queen Victoria = The Letters of Queen Victoria. Edited by Arthur Christopher Benson and Viscount Esher. II (London 1907).

Abbreviations Concerning Records.

Reference is made to what was said in Vol. I, p. 10. – The dispatches quoted, from the French Ambassadors in London (or Berlin), and the orders to them, are kept in the Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris.

F.O. = The records of the Foreign Office in the Public Record Office, London.

U.Min. = Udenrigsministeriets arkiv i Rigsarkivet (i.e. The Archives of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Danish Public Record Office).

EE. 1 (etc.) = Herzoglich Schleswig-Holsteinisches Hausarchiv. Abteilung III. Litr. EE. No. 1 (etc.) in the Schleswig-Holsteinische Landesbibliothek. Kiel.

P.R.O. 30/22 = Russell's Papers in the Public Record Office, London.

P.P. = Palmerston's Papers.

R.A.W. = Royal Archives, Windsor.

Westmorland = Correspondence of the Affairs of Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein relating to the Treaty of Peace, signed by Lord Westmorland. U.Min. England: Documents concerning Danish-German relations, belonging to the official archives of the Earl of Westmorland (d. 1859). 1848–51 (52). 6 vols.

1. The Danish Delegation to the Negotiations. Frankfurt Gives Bunsen Full Powers for the First Time.

The installation of the "Joint Government for the Duchies" on the 22nd of October was a victory as seen from a Slesvig-Holstein point of view. It meant that during the armistice the Duchies continued to be administered in a distinctly Slesvig-Holstein way, and dispatches, both from Berlin and from Bunsen, expressed great satisfaction with this arrangement.¹ They were desirous that the state of things which had been brought into existence should not be spoiled by a too aggressive Slesvig-Holstein line of conduct. My private opinion is, wrote Bunsen a month after the installation of the Joint Government, that at the moment we shall not be able to obtain as favourable a peace as public opinion in Germany demands: "Therefore we must try to let status quo last for some years as it did in Belgium. In this way a permanent state of affairs will be established which is at least more favourable for us than for Denmark". This meant that the Joint Government must not give the Danish Government an opportunity of feeling that it was the injured party.

Reedtz, who had been Secretary of Dispatches, had to retire temporarily from diplomatic activity – a victim of the unfavourable outcome for Denmark of the armistice of the 26th of August. It was he who had conducted all the relevant negotiations and, as Danish commissioner, had taken part in the installation of the Joint Government at Gottorp on the 22nd of October. Wynn commented on Reedtz's retirement – but not until the 10th of December in a letter to his colleague in Berlin² – by saying that

¹ See thus dispatch 30/11 from Berlin; 22/11 and 9/12 from Bunsen. Cf. Weimar, p. 257 f.

² Westmorland. II, p. 471 ff.

Knuth "wished to lay on his Shoulders the blame of forming a Government which has turned out so ill." Reedtz's retirement from the Foreign Ministry, continued Wynn, is "a great loss as we have not now any one with whom we can do business. Moltke is a most excellent worthy man but quite a stranger to Foreign Affairs, and too many other business on his hands to attend to them." It should be noted, however, that Moltke was supported by Dankwart, the former Director of the Foreign Department.

The violation of the conditions of the Malmö Convention by the Joint Government caused Denmark's refusal to let Als and Ærø be administered by this Government.¹ Furthermore the Danish Government informed the North Slesvigers in the middle of November that if the Joint Government did not conform to the armistice they would be denounced as rebels. This did take place by a Royal Proclamation of the 15th of December. Britain especially tried to bring pressure to bear on Denmark to get her to communicate with the Joint Government, but, nevertheless, no rapprochement was effected. In London Bunsen defended vigorously the line of conduct of the Joint Government, and Cowley's dispatches from Frankfurt expressed, on the whole, the German and Slesvig-Holstein points of view.

Count Knuth who retired as Foreign Minister when the Danish Cabinet changes took place in November, was thus exempted from attending the negotiations in London initiated to reach a final settlement of the dispute. But as early as the 18th of November Count Moltke suggested to the King that General Oxholm be sent at once to London to explain to Palmerston the reason for the delay in the peace negotiations.² He was to be given short temporary instructions which would enable him to state, in general terms, the King's view of the final arrangement. It was intended that Count Reventlow together with Oxholm and Treschow from the Danish side should conduct the negotiations, but before Reventlow's return to London complete instructions were to be drawn up.

In Oxholm's instructions it was stressed how Article 3 in the draft for the German Reich Constitution made a decisive change

¹ Cf. Hjelholt. I, p. 169 ff.

² U. Min. The armistice in Malmö, etc., Sheet 8.

in the Slesvig question. It meant that Slesvig must either be incorporated in Germany – and Denmark would not hear of this – or otherwise every administrative connection between Slesvig and Holstein must cease. As a kind of compensation for this discontinuation, and out of consideration for Germany's and Holstein's interest in the German (pro-German) part of Slesvig's population, the King would give Slesvig "tant que le permettent son étendue géographique, ses ressources et son union intime et inviolable pour tout temps avec le Danemarck, une position politique, qui non seulement mettrait à couvert les différentes nationalités . . . mais garantirait au pays une législation et une administration, locale à part, ainsi que le plus libre développement de tous ses rapports intérieurs . . ." The King was still only able to give an approximate idea of Slesvig's future status, "dont l'indépendance particulière ne devra jamais dissoudre les liens fondamentaux existant entre ce pays et le Royaume de Danemarck proprement dit et consacrés par les traités de garantie conclus avec les grandes Puissances."

Besides these instructions Oxholm was given a statement of the negotiations carried on up to that date. He was directed to investigate Palmerston's attitude regarding the possible participation in the negotiations – in the form of a congress or a conference of Ministers – of the other Powers, i. e. France, Russia, and Sweden. France especially seemed interested. Oxholm was, however, to discuss the matter first with the Ministers concerned, Beaumont, Brunnow, and Rehausen.

Oxholm arrived in London on the 27th of November after a rather difficult journey, and was met by Bielke, the Secretary to the Danish Legation.¹ The day after his arrival he spoke to Brunnow, to whom he presented the Grand Cross of the Order of the Dannebrog in appreciation of the services he had rendered the Danish cause. His talk with Brunnow, and a later talk with Beaumont, gave Oxholm the definite impression that it would be wisest to let the negotiations continue to take their present course, that is to say, with Palmerston as sole mediator and without the direct participation of the other Powers. Oxholm was also of the

¹ Concerning the following see Oxholm's letters 28/11 and 1/12 to Moltke in File U. Min. The armistice in Malmö, etc., Sheet 8, and Bielke's dispatches 28/11 and 1/12.

opinion that Denmark's and France's ministers in Paris and Copenhagen, respectively, had been, perhaps, over-zealous.

Beaumont had assured Oxholm during their conversations that France would not be offended if the mediation were again handed over entirely to Britain.¹ Germany did not wish either Russia or France as umpires, Beaumont wrote in his dispatch, but one could not omit to take them into consideration as Powers bound by their guarantees. He had said so to Palmerston, who seemed to consider this statement rather as a support than as "une gêne." Beaumont would support to the best of his ability "la cause du Danemarck, comme vous m'avez toujours recommandé de le faire, et je suis certain que rien dans cette question ne se décidera sans nous. . . ."

In the afternoon of the 30th Oxholm had a good hour's talk with Palmerston at the Foreign Office. Wynn had informed Palmerston in a dispatch of the 18th that Oxholm together with Reventlow and Treschow were to negotiate in London.² "He is," he wrote, "in the King's most intimate confidence" and had to see to it that no proposals for a division were made. The proposal which Oxholm recommended to Palmerston, was the so-called Third Plan, the proposal for Slesvig's "independence". According to Oxholm's account Palmerston was said to have stated that this plan was better than the two plans he had proposed himself, but added that he had had reason to believe that Denmark had not had special objections to these, especially not to the proposal for a division. He would not share the role of mediator with others, and he believed that threats to Germany would only delay proceedings. He promised Oxholm that he would try to promote German interest in it.

The Central Power in Frankfurt, who had decided to negotiate for peace themselves with Denmark, had not yet appointed a negotiator. Both Syndic Banks and Baron Stockmar had been mentioned, but when it came to the point, they both declined. In a letter of the 11th of November Wynn had told Palmerston that it was Frankfurt's intention to send Banks, who was in Copenhagen, to negotiate in London.³ But Banks, Wynn wrote,

¹ Beaumont's dispatch 1/12, No. 43.

² F.O. 22/164: 18/11, No. 181.

³ P.P.

was not very pleased at the prospect of a controversy with Reventlow: "They *stared* at one another in London, but I yesterday performed the first act of *your mediation* in bringing them together at Dinner, and they parted pretty good friends." But as Banks, as mentioned above, refused the post, Wynn failed to obtain the credit which he took for himself in the letter.

Stockmar, who had likewise declined to negotiate, had, however, held out prospects of semi-official services of a kind.¹ On the 15th of December, however, he wrote to Prince Albert: "the more deeply I consider the Danish-German dispute in talks with Danes, Holsteiners, and Bunsen, the more am I thrown into a state of perplexity the first result of which is complete exhaustion of my strength of mind. The only thing that has therefore become clear to me is that I dare not take any active part in this matter."² As an "adviser", however, we meet him several times in the following pages.

The result of these refusals was that Bunsen, the man who was very much a "persona ingrata" to the Danish Government, continued as Denmark's opponent at the negotiations in London. Stockmar did not either consider him to be a suitable choice. "I regret," he wrote on the 21st of December, "that he had himself elected as a deputy in Slesvig and had a state paper printed in his name in favour of the Duchies. He thereby stamped himself as a party man, while as a Minister and negotiator he should have remained officially neutral."³ In a talk with Oxholm Stockmar likewise expressed his opinion that Bunsen was an unsuitable choice as a negotiator.⁴

But this was the choice made by the Central Government in agreement with Prussia, a choice after the Slesvig-Holsteiners' own heart. On the 8th of December Berlin informed her Minister in London that the Central Power wished him to negotiate, and that his instructions would be drawn up by them. Berlin had consented to this provided that the instructions were drawn up in agreement with Prussia.

Before this information reached Bunsen, he had received the

¹ Stockmar, p. 546 ff.

² R.A.W. I 10/54.

³ Stockmar, p. 548.

⁴ Oxholm's letter to Moltke 15/12 in File U. Min. The armistice in Malmö, etc. Sheet 8.

Central Power's authority of the 5th of December, signed by Schmerling, together with a note from him.¹ In the letter of authority Frankfurt reserved to herself the right to appoint, if necessary, a co-negotiator.

Without waiting for instructions from his Government Bunsen sent back the letter of authority arbitrarily to the Central Power refusing to take on the task.² His motives were partly unwillingness to have a co-negotiator, especially if he were pro-Austrian, and partly a burning desire to become the new Germany's own Minister and, at this opportunity, get Britain to make diplomatic recognition of this Germany. The dispatches from Berlin³ stating that there could be no question of this at the present moment brought him down to earth again, and he was, in addition, reassured by the statement that Frankfurt would probably not appoint a co-negotiator. Finally on the 16th of December Schmerling was succeeded as head of the Reich Ministry in Frankfurt by Heinrich v. Gagern who represented the "Little German", Prussian solution in the German movement for unity.

Bunsen gave Berlin many explanations and excuses for his hasty behaviour.⁴ On the 19th he wrote again to the Reich Minister dwelling on his misgivings, but ending by taking on the task and accepting the authority to negotiate.⁵ He mentioned that Stockmar had offered him his "invaluable semi-official assistance," and that he would also like Banks' help, and that he definitely needed "a *Holstein business man*;" he wished specially to have Karl Samwer.⁶ On the 21st of December he informed his Government that he had complied with their wish and accepted the task from Frankfurt, as far as "my conscience allows me to." He wrote that Heinrich v. Gagern's name is "a *great guarantee*. But what if he retires?" Moreover, he emphasized that, without suggesting the prospect of a war, the negotiations would not have the slightest chance of bringing about a result.

On the 16th of December Bunsen had informed Berlin that the British Cabinet had begun their Christmas holidays, and that

¹ See enclosure with Bunsen's dispatch 8/12, No. 111.

² Bunsen's confidential dispatches 9/12 and 10/12, Nos. 22 and 23 with enclosures.

³ 8/12 and 14/12.

⁴ Bunsen's dispatch 20/12, No. 114.

⁵ Enclosure with Bunsen's dispatch 20/12, No. 114.

⁶ Cf. Weimar, p. 260 ff.

diplomatic negotiations – and especially the Danish-German ones – would have to wait until the 6th of January.¹ The Danish-German negotiations were in abeyance not only during the long English Christmas holidays of which Reventlow wrote: “la capitale est déserte et on laisse dormir toutes les affaires.”² On New Year’s Eve Bunsen received orders to proceed immediately to Berlin for talks on the question.³ Meanwhile Prince Löwenstein was to be Prussian chargé d’affaires in London. Bunsen did not return to London until the 17th of February after talks in Berlin and Frankfurt about the instructions which, for Germany’s part, were to be the basis of the peace negotiations.

Although Bunsen did not undertake the task as official negotiator in the Danish-German dispute until after his return from Germany he had to all intents and purposes acted in this capacity beforehand both during his talks with Palmerston and with the Danish negotiators, Oxholm, Reventlow, and Treschow.

Of these Oxholm, as mentioned above, had arrived in London on the 27th of November, provided with temporary instructions. Before Reventlow and Treschow left, fairly detailed instructions for the Danish delegation to the negotiations had been approved on the 1st of December.⁴ These instructions stressed, as did Oxholm’s, the wish for an international congress attended by the Three Friendly Powers. However, this wish was not to be insisted on if Palmerston was definitely averse to it. After that mention was made of the importance of a collective repetition of the guarantees of the Three Powers. It was stated that the peace basis of the negotiations must include the statement that Slesvig and Denmark formed an indissoluble unit, politically ensured in the most unmistakable terms in the constitutions of both countries with the river Ejder and the Slesvig canal as boundaries. The delegation was to “make the utmost efforts to advocate” this basis. The future status of Slesvig was a purely internal affair and no concern of any other power than the King. The King did not intend to make Slesvig a province of Denmark, and

¹ Bunsen’s dispatch 16/12, No. 113.

² Dispatch 2/1 1849. No. 1.

³ Bunsen. II, p. 484 f.

⁴ U. Min. The armistice in Malmo, etc., Sheet 3. – Statsrådets Forhandl. II, p. 18.

was prepared to ensure it a free and independent development. But Denmark was unable at present to make a detailed statement on the matter. It had to be made quite clear that Slesvig was to be separated from every connection with Holstein which could, directly or indirectly, gain influence for Germany on Slesvig's affairs. The protocol with the peace basis ought also to include the condition that the King was to instal a temporary civil administration in Slesvig. The instructions ended by stating that even if the negotiations were not successful, the negotiators were to prolong them so that Denmark would be safe from attack until the end of March. It was obviously assumed that Germany might think of breaking the armistice before it expired.

A few days later Moltke instructed Reventlow by letter to go to London by way of Brussels in order to hand to King Leopold a letter from Frederik VII and to appeal to him for support of "notre juste cause."¹ According to Reventlow's account his visit had the desired result.² Leopold stated repeatedly that he was thoroughly convinced of the justice of the Danish cause, and that he would be glad if he could serve it in some way or another. He would instruct his Minister in London in that respect. Perhaps Leopold's letter of the 10th of December to Albert was occasioned by Reventlow's visit.³ In this letter Leopold suggested a congress to put Europe's affairs in order: "Die Danish Affair kann auch nur durch die Vermittlung der 4 Mächte die draussen à part ist geschlichtet werden. Isoliert lässt sich nichts thun, das Tribunal muss durch Macht imponiren. . . ."

With reference to Reventlow's remark about King Leopold's probable instructions to Van de Weyer, mention must be made of the fact that the Belgian Foreign Minister told Reventlow during his visit that he considered his mission "comme entièrement étrangère du Gouvernement Belge, et ne devant donner lieu qu'à des rapports (sans caractère officiel) avec la personne du Roi."⁴ The Danish Government made a blunder later in not respecting this statement. In January 1849 when Reventlow gave an account of Van de Weyer's talks at Windsor with Prince

¹ Letter 3/12 in File U. Min. The armistice in Malmö, etc., Sheet 3.

² Ibid. Enclosure with the above-mentioned letter dated 15/12.

³ R.A.W. I 10/53.

⁴ The archives of the Foreign Ministry in Brussels. No. 76. Mission extraordinaire du Compté de Reventlow. Draft of letter 15/1 50 from Hoffschmidt.

Albert (and Stockmar) about the Danish question,¹ Denmark requested her Minister in Belgium to thank the Belgian Government for its support! The Belgian Foreign Minister refused to accept the thanks – Belgium was neutral – and reprimanded Van de Weyer, who, on his part, refused to accept either the thanks or the reprimand.²

Reventlow and Treschow arrived in London on the 11th of December,³ and a week later, Oxholm left London to return to Copenhagen.⁴ The King wished him to return, and the two newly-arrived negotiators did not consider his absence as a disadvantage; Germany had still not appointed a negotiator. At the beginning of January Palmerston had told Wynn: “I was highly pleased with General Oxholm, who is clearheaded, intelligent, frank, and conciliatory.”⁵

During his stay in London Oxholm had had talks not only with Palmerston and the Ministers of the Friendly Powers, but he had also had long discussions with his German opponent Bunsen and with Baron Stockmar.⁶ Oxholm stated in his reports that the latter “although invisible, is said to have considerable influence on the way our cause is treated,” and he found that he seems to me unusually impartial in his judgment of matters for a German.” On the other hand Bunsen “is and shows himself to be very biassed and extremely unfair in his views of our dispute.” Oxholm remarked that after his final visit to Bunsen: “We naturally took leave of one another without our views becoming any closer to one another.”

During this visit Bunsen wished Oxholm to consider a plan for a continued connection between the Duchies in return for certain guarantees for Denmark’s interests. Oxholm believed that this plan had been drawn up under the influence of the former Danish Minister in St. Petersburg, Count Otto Rantzau, who had arrived in London for unofficial negotiations in the interests of Slesvig-Holstein. Bunsen had, of course, submitted his new plan

¹ Reventlow’s dispatches 12/1, No. 4; 9/2 and 13/2.

² Dispatch 6/2, No. 28 to Van de Weyer, and the latter’s dispatch 10/2, No. 52.

³ Reventlow’s dispatch 12/12.

⁴ Oxholm’s letter 26/12 to Moltke in File U. Min. The armistice in Malmö, etc. Sheet 8.

⁵ F.O. 22/169: 9/1 49.

⁶ Oxholm’s letters to Moltke 8/12, 12/12, 15/12, and 26/12. U. Min. The armistice in Malmö, etc. Sheet 8.

to Palmerston, and when Oxholm paid Palmerston a farewell visit, the latter ventilated the possibility of the adoption of such a plan, a modified version of his Second Peace Proposal. Oxholm, however, repeated that it was impossible for the Danish Government to give up the least of "our present final claims."

Bunsen gave a detailed description in his dispatches of his discussions with Oxholm on the 8th and 9th of December.¹ Bunsen characterized Oxholm as "a cultured, composed, and wise man," but his proposal, regarded as an ultimatum – otherwise war would break out in the spring – he called "nicht viel mehr als ein schlechter Scherz." But: "Wo ist der Ausweg – Wie soll man zu einer Basis der Verständigung gelangen?" Bunsen found that, as stated, in a modification of Palmerston's Second Peace Proposal, but there is no reason to go into details here. Bunsen continued despondently: "Deutschland hat keinen Freund in Europa als, bis auf einen gewissen Grad, England, und in dieser Sache nur das Ministerium, nicht das Land. Niemand gönnt dem aufstrebenden Deutschland etwas Gutes. . . ." The titbit (etwas Gutes) here referred to was the incorporation of the old Danish Crown land, South Jutland, in the new Germany.

It is worth noting that Bunsen had finally realised that it was no use keeping Russia out of the negotiations for a final arrangement. When he spoke to Oxholm on the question of the succession, Oxholm mentioned Prince Christian, while Bunsen recommended the Heir Apparent of Oldenburg. But, Bunsen wrote in his dispatch, the matter cannot be settled without Russia. He continued that it was necessary to exclude Russia from the mediation in the spring on account of public feeling in Germany – he had himself been active in promoting this feeling! – "Aber es war doch ein Unglück. *Es ist nicht möglich, die politische Frage ohne Russland zu Ende zu führen; in der dynastischen aber kann man nur durch Russland zum Ziele gelangen.*" Prussia would have to try to win Russia's support, and his plan should be suggested to Meyendorff. He would himself discuss the matter with Brunnow within the next few days. This he did on the 19th of April for a few hours – and thus at least prevented Oxholm's taking personal leave of the Russian Minister.² But was this not the most important result he obtained?

¹ Dispatches 9/12, Nos. 22 and 24.

² Oxholm's letter 26/12 in File U. Min. The armistice in Malmö, etc. Sheet 8.

In a later dispatch of the 21st Bunsen again stressed the importance of winning Russia, "weil der Kaiser offenbar Dänemark in seiner Hand hat, in der politischen und noch mehr in der dynastischen Frage." The Danish proposal was impossible, a *casus belli*, Germany must keep to Palmerston's Second Proposal with modifications, or to the first, division. Oxholm had, however, stated about his plan: "*er wisse nichts anderes.*" That the Duchies should have a status as Norway's to Sweden was impossible. It would be better in that case for Denmark to risk another war of life and death.

Bunsen and Reventlow did not meet personally until the end of December – after an exchange of cards.¹ According to Bunsen's account of their talk Reventlow was said to have stated that it was not to be expected that the Danish diplomats would hasten matters as Germany was in a state of impending anarchy. Bunsen then assured Reventlow: "wir seien entfernt zu dringen, die Zukunft Deutschlands flösse uns gar keine Besorgniss ein." The first statement was correct, and he was possibly enough of an optimist to have complete confidence in the second, and to expect great results from the Central Power under the leadership of Heinrich v. Gagern.

2. Germany Adopts Palmerston's Peace Basis.

In his dispatch of the 23rd of October to Cowley Palmerston had, as shown in Vol. I (p. 231), submitted the so-called Third Plan, Slesvig's "independence", and recommended the Central Power to consider it. After Oxholm's arrival in London he had ascertained from him that the Danish Government would not make any concessions over and above this very vague plan. On the 11th of December Palmerston requested Cowley – with reference to the dispatch of the 23rd of October – "strongly to press on the Central Government the expediency of adopting the third Plan for a final arrangement."² If the principle in this plan were to be approved, "all further difficulties would be reduced to

¹ Reventlow's dispatch 29/12, No. 100. – Bunsen's dispatch 30/12, No. 120.

² F.O. 30/108: 11/12, No. 184. – The French Minister, Beaumont, anticipated in his dispatch of 9/12, No. 45 this dispatch from Palmerston to Cowley and said that Palmerston "est venu à partager complètement toutes nos vues sur cette question."

questions of detail which could under no circumstances, involve any danger to the Peace of Europe.”

The dispatch continued by saying that Britain had acted to the best of her judgment last summer in proposing the two other plans: “But subsequent events and further information have led Her Majesty’s Government to think that the third Plan would be better than either of the two First.” Division seemed to meet opposition both from the Danish Government and from the population of Slesvig. Denmark had even more against the Second Plan than the First; moreover the draft for the German Reich Constitution was “a decided bar to the Second Plan.”

The principle in the Third Plan was that Slesvig “should receive a separate Constitution distinct from that of Denmark on the one hand, and from that of Holstein on the other.” By adopting this plan Germany would achieve the end for which she went to war, the prevention of Slesvig’s incorporation in Denmark. The Danish Government was willing to make this sacrifice. France, Russia, and Sweden supported the plan. Although it was a point that Cowley would have to handle carefully to avoid the appearance of threats, Palmerston believed that the Central Power “cannot entirely shut its eyes to the conclusion that if War should be renewed in Slesvig on account of the refusal of the Central Power to agree to this arrangement,” it was not improbable that the German troops would find the Danish forces supported by Russia, France, and Sweden. Finally Palmerston did not believe that a war as a result of the Third Plan would waken the same feelings in Germany as last spring, and in any case: “a second Campaign might be very different from that of the Campaign of last year.”

Westmorland received a copy of the dispatch to Cowley with the injunction “that you will consider that despatch as an instruction for your own guidance.”¹

On the 17th Cowley answered Palmerston’s dispatch by stating that on account of the Cabinet changes – Heinrich v. Gagern had, as mentioned above, succeeded Schmerling – he had not yet been able to take the desired steps.² But, he wrote, Gagern’s appointment as Foreign Minister “is not favorable to an amicable solu-

¹ F.O. 64/284: 18/12 (!), No. 261. The date, the 18th, must be incorrect, as Westmorland answered the dispatch on the 18th.

² F.O. 30/116: 17/12, No. 339.

tion of the matter. It is a question upon which he unfortunately holds, as Your Lordship knows, most decided and unpropitious opinions." However, if negotiations in London would only begin, they could, Cowley believed, be prolonged until the present Central Power "passes into another Phasis."

A week later Cowley stated that he had now spoken to Gagern several times about what he called Denmark's plan for the final arrangement.¹ He had read the dispatch of the 11th to Gagern and supplemented it verbally. Gagern had asked for a copy of the dispatch to put it before the Cabinet, but Cowley refused this request, probably on account of the references to threats, and instead prepared a memorandum for Gagern on the basis of the dispatch. In this memorandum he omitted the account of the contents of the Third Plan and stated instead that it was Slesvig's "independence". This change brought him a reprimand later from Palmerston.²

Gagern commented on the memorandum to Cowley by saying "that he agreed mainly in all that I had stated." It was regrettable "that Germany should ever have taken up this question," but in the present situation Germany could not agree to an arrangement which did not give, as he said, Slesvig "some advantage." When Cowley remarked that this was contained in "the independence", Gagern answered that it would "turn out a fallacy." Cowley stressed that all that Palmerston wished the Central Power to do was "to accept the independence of Slesvig as the principle on which to open negotiations, but that you had not required that Denmark should settle the amount of independence to be granted. That this point might be amicably discussed in conference." Cowley ended his dispatch by stating that Gagern would hardly refuse to negotiate on the basis of "The Danish Proposition", but would probably try to make some modifications and in addition protest that Slesvig had the same succession as the kingdom.

On New Year's Eve Cowley informed Palmerston that the Russian chargé d'affaires, Budberg, had advised Gagern to accept the Danish proposal as a basis for negotiations.³ A week later he wrote that he could not obtain an answer about the basis from

¹ F.O. 30/116: 24/12, No. 351.

² F.O. 30/120: 2/3, No. 68.

³ F.O. 30/116: 31/12, No. 363.

the Central Power; the reason was partly the Government's insecure position, partly that they were expecting a visit from Bunsen with whom they would confer "before taking any decision."¹ The Berlin Government, added Cowley, "appears again desirous to take a lead in the settlement of the question."

The Berlin Government mentioned here was the Cabinet formed by Count Brandenburg at the beginning of November. This Cabinet postponed the meetings of the Prussian National Assembly, and then transferred them to the Provinces to remove them from the revolutionary influences in Berlin. Opposition to the Government was repressed, on the 5th of December the National Assembly was disbanded, and, moreover, a democratic draft for a constitution was drawn up. In the Brandenburg Cabinet Hans Bülow, the Under-Secretary of State, took charge of the Foreign Ministry.

As mentioned above, Westmorland had been directed by Palmerston to consider his (Palmerston's) dispatch of the 11th of December as also addressed to him. On the 18th he informed Heinrich Abeken, the Legation Counsellor, of the contents, but was told that Prussia still preferred the proposal for division.² A few days later when he informed Bülow himself of the dispatch, Bülow read to him a dispatch from Bunsen which showed that he (Bunsen) "entirely disapproves of it" (the Third Plan).³ Bülow, for that matter, could not comment on the plan before he had received further information about it from Frankfurt. On the other hand he stated that he had suggested to Hanover that Slesvig be incorporated in Germany, and that the Duke of Augustenborg's son be appointed as the successor to the whole monarchy. These suggestions of Bülow's appeared grotesque, but Westmorland promised to let Palmerston hear of them although he did not believe they would be accepted.

It was beyond all doubt that Denmark would not approve of such a plan. Wynn wrote to Westmorland⁴ on the 5th of January that he had already given him his opinion on Bülow's plan: "The Enemy must be at the Gates of Copenhagen before it would

¹ F.O. 30/122: 7/1, No. 4.

² F.O. 64/290: 18/12, No. 442.

³ *Ibid.* 21/12, No. 444.

⁴ Westmorland. II, p. 499 ff.

be taken into consideration and *not then*. The prolongation of the Armistice is only a loss of time, as if there is a possibility of settling the matter it may well be done in the period which is still unclosed. The Danes have money and Troops for the next Campaign, and with the hope (not to use a stronger term) held out by Russia and Sweden of active assistance, they cannot be expected to make further concessions. . . .”

Of course Palmerston rejected Bülow’s plan in his answer to Westmorland:¹ “. . . the Danish Government will certainly never consent to the incorporation of Slesvig into Germany, and . . . the political Part taken by the Duke of Augustenborg would probably render it very difficult to induce the King of Denmark to make any new arrangement in favour of the Duke’s son. . . .” Other reasons, too, could be given for rejecting the plan, “when the proper time for doing so shall arrive.”

Palmerston found it natural that Bunsen objected to the Third Plan as he had publicly advocated another. But it was Palmerston’s opinion that Bunsen “is too much of a statesman not to be able to give up even a favourite scheme if he finds that the course of events has opposed insurmountable obstacles to the accomplishment of it.” This was certainly the case with the arrangements proposed by Bunsen: “They could now be brought to bear only by a war, and a war undertaken to carry them into effect would in all human probability lead to an entirely opposite result.” It must therefore be hoped that Bunsen would be willing to “when the negotiation is resumed to take into consideration, and ultimately to agree to the principle of the Third Plan.” Once the principle had met with approval, it would probably not be difficult to agree on details.

On the 28th Westmorland was able to state that the Prussian Government had decided to recall Bunsen to Berlin “for the purpose of consulting him upon the whole of this question,” and that Prince Löwenstein was to be sent to London as *chargé d’affaires*.² Bülow had not yet made up his mind about the Third Plan, and he would not do so, Westmorland wrote a week later, before Bunsen’s arrival.³ But Bülow is of the same opinion as

¹ F.O. 64/284: 27/12, No. 270.

² F.O. 64/290: 28/12, No. 446.

³ F.O. 244/99: 4/1, No. 3.

Palmerston that Bunsen "is too much of a statesman not to be able to give up even a favourite scheme if he finds that the course of events has opposed insurmountable obstacles to the accomplishment of it."

It was not only the Slesvig-Holstein question which the Government in Berlin, and especially the King, wished to discuss with Bunsen, but also the German, that is to say, Prussia's, attitude to Frankfurt and the latter's efforts for a German Reich Constitution. As pointed out above, Bunsen was an enthusiastic supporter of such a constitution under the leadership of Prussia, and was very active in promoting the idea.

Bunsen did not leave London until the 6th of January. On the 5th he informed Palmerston of his imminent departure, writing from Windsor Castle, where he had gone "to take Her Majesty's orders."¹ Palmerston answered him from Broadlands on the 6th with the following temperamental and witty effusion.² After regretting that he had been unable to see Bunsen before he left and expressing a hope that his advice will be of benefit in Berlin, he remarked with reference to the latest events there that the people in Berlin seemed to be "always in extremes and nothing long." "But certainly the sooner they can get decently out of the Extreme of Democracy into which they last made their plunge, the better both for the King and for his People."

The letter continued by saying that the Slesvig-Holstein question "is now as stale as a Christmas Pantomime in July. Pray do your best to persuade the good People to lay that Toy aside, now that they have so many more real, and more really interesting and important matters to deal with. It was all very well for Germany to bully and worry the poor Danes when there was no other vent immediately at hand for German energy and activity, but now Germany has better and nobler things to think of and to do."

Bunsen reached Berlin on the 11th³ and had discussions both with the King and the Ministers. Meyendorff got the better of his dislike for "this learned man" and also had talks with him.⁴ On the 24th Bunsen left for Frankfurt for negotiations with the Cen-

¹ F.O. 64/306.

² Copy in P.P.

³ Bunsen. II, p. 484 ff. — F.O. 244/99: 11/1, No. 9.

⁴ Hoetzsch. II, p. 138 and passim.

tral Power, on the 11th of February he was again in Berlin for further discussions, and finally arrived back in London on the 17th. For more than two months the Danish negotiators, ready with their instructions, had waited there for the peace talks to begin. It was very natural that Reventlow, as the French Minister stated in a dispatch of the 6th of February, was much alarmed about “des retards apportés à l’ouverture des conférences.”¹

With what authority did Bunsen arrive back in London?

Notes,² presumably made several months later by Bunsen, gave an account of his negotiations in Berlin and Frankfurt: the agreement with the King and Ministers was: “Mein amtlicher Auftrag war Schleswig. Hierüber hatten meine Vorschläge ungetheilten Beifall gefunden. Ich sollte meine Instruction von Frankfurt erhalten, aber die k. Regierung sollte damit einverstanden sein. Zu dem Zwecke legte ich einen allgemein gehaltenen Entwurf bei, den ich dem Grafen Bülow vortrug, und mit Meyendorff durchsprach. Seine Ausarbeitung sollte in Frankfurt stattfinden. . . Das Ergebnis sollte dann weiter in Berlin besprochen werden. Dabei war Vieles in meine Hände gelegt. . . Meine Stellung selbst war eine redliche, offene, kühne: ich blieb preussischer Gesandte, aber meine Weisungen kamen nur von Frankfurt, an welchem Orte Preussen seinen Einfluss auf sie ausüben musste. Redliche Männer waren auf beiden Seiten, das Uebrige musste sich finden. Niemand konnte, wie die Sachen einmal lagen, die Verhandlung führen ausser mir.”

In this account the remark “Meine Stellung . . . war eine . . . kühne” is the one in which one puts most trust. It seems beyond doubt that Bunsen, in spite of his correspondence with Berlin, in December, still wished to officiate as the new Germany’s Reich Envoy and to make Prussia accept Frankfurt’s (or his own) views on German foreign policy – here especially regarding the Slesvig question. Westmorland’s dispatches, among other sources, provide evidence that Bülow’s views were not a little different from Bunsen’s. As we shall see below, Berlin did not either share the opinion that by letting Bunsen accept authority from Frankfurt she herself was giving up her right to give him orders, but at this point she was reluctant to make a breach with

¹ Dispatch 6/2, No. 5.

² Bunsen. II, p. 491 ff.

the Central Power. It was easy enough to write "das Uebrige musste sich finden," but Bunsen, in spite of his intimate knowledge of the Bible, forgot that no man can serve two masters.

The British Minister does not appear to have taken an active part in the negotiations which Bunsen carried on in Berlin during his first visit.¹ Perhaps he only saw Bunsen on one occasion. When Brandenburg mentioned to Westmorland that Bunsen wished to bring the question of the succession into the peace talks, Westmorland advised him not to include "so many different questions." Westmorland's account of Bülow's, Bunsen's – and Meyendorff's – views on how to bring about "a satisfactory settlement," showed that these views were obviously divergent, and that it was difficult to put forward a definite plan.

Westmorland reported in his dispatch of the 23rd of January that Bülow had instructed Bunsen to persuade the Central Power in Frankfurt to place Austria's, Holland's, and Denmark's German provinces in a looser relationship to the Central Authority by provisions in the Reich Constitution. In this way, Westmorland wrote, Holstein's obligations towards Germany would "be so limited as not to prevent the Union of that Duchy with Slesvig upon nearly the same footing as it existed before the present War, and more particularly that Holstein should not be required to enter into the German Customs Union," for this would bring about a customs boundary between Holstein and Slesvig.

These ideas were referred to in the Prussian circular letter of the 23rd of January, which was, for that matter, very favourably disposed towards Frankfurt's efforts for a united Germany – efforts for which Bunsen gave himself a good deal of the credit.² The extreme Slesvig-Holsteiners were dissatisfied with this passage in the letter.³

In spite of Bülow's warnings Bunsen's negotiations in Frankfurt resulted in a demand from the Central Power that both Slesvig and Holstein be incorporated in the German Customs Union. Bülow pointed out once more to Bunsen afterwards that it was difficult to believe that Denmark would agree to this, and that if they made such a demand they must be prepared to

¹ F.O. 64/297: 18/1, No. 10, and 23/1, No. 16. – Westmorland. II, p. 515.

² Bunsen. II, p. 490. – Stockmar, p. 581.

³ Hjelholt. I, p. 176.

withdraw it in order that the peace negotiations would not break down on this point.¹

Bunsen felt much more at home in Frankfurt than in Berlin: "Hier war ich ein Deutscher unter Deutschen, ein Bürgerlicher unter Bürgerlichen, ein Patriot unter Patrioten. Zum ersten Male in meinem Leben fühlte ich mich als deutscher Staatsmann, und in Geschäften als Deutscher und in Deutschland."²

After his arrival in Frankfurt he went to see Cowley on the 26th,³ as he wanted Cowley to tell him what Britain's views were on the proposed basis, as he had understood in London from Oxholm "that the independence of Slesvig . . . was very differently interpreted by the Danish and German Governments." Cowley then quoted the words in Palmerston's dispatch, remarking that Denmark's interpretation was not so important; the Central Government was not requested to accept the Danish view "but merely to enter into negotiations for peace, the independence of Slesvig being the basis of that negotiation." Cowley also referred to his memorandum to Gagern, which he said Palmerston had approved (cf. above!). In the dispatch in question Cowley wrote that he believed that the Central Power would immediately declare themselves willing to negotiate on the basis of the Third Plan.

In the dispatch Cowley remarked that it was unfortunate that the deputies from Slesvig and Holstein were opposed to the plan and that Gagern, whom they supported, had to consider them.⁴ I leave open the question as to how true Bunsen's statements were to Cowley about the "very satisfactory assurances" he was said to have received in Berlin from Meyendorff "as to the way in which the Russian Government understood the third proposition."

On the 31st Cowley was able to inform Palmerston that Gagern had just told him that, at a Cabinet meeting that morning which Bunsen had attended, a decision had been made to accept Slesvig's "independence" as the basis for the negotiations in London.⁵ They had intended to attach certain conditions to their acceptance but Cowley's "remonstrances" had, he wrote, "so far

¹ Bülow's dispatch to Bunsen 21/2.

² Bunsen. II, p. 493.

³ F.O. 30/122: 29/1, No. 36.

⁴ Cf. Bunsen. II, p. 494.

⁵ F.O. 30/122: 31/1, No. 40.

prevailed as to obtain that the acceptance shall be pure and simple, and that any points which the Central Power is desirous of obtaining shall be consigned to a second confidential note for communication to Your Lordship, and shall not be made conditions." Cowley continued by stating that Gagern wished the basis for peace kept secret; it had been difficult to get the Council to accept it "and he is afraid that if it becomes known, it may be made the pretext for further troubles in Germany."

In a note of the 3rd of February Gagern informed Cowley that the Reich Ministry had decided to accept "die Unabhängigkeit Schleswigs als Grundlage der in London zu eröffnenden Friedensunterhandlung," and requested him to inform the British Government.¹ Gagern's note stated correctly that the Third Plan, suggested by Britain, proposed that "Schleswig eine abgesonderte Verfassung erhalten solle, verschieden von der dänischen Verfassung auf der einen Seite und von der holsteinischen auf der anderen." But when the note continued by saying that Britain described this plan as "Slesvig's independence", this expression, as pointed out above, was not taken from Palmerston's dispatch but from Cowley's memorandum.

In a note the following day Gagern expressed a wish that the armistice be prolonged by six months [i. e. the period of time during which the Danish sea power could harm German trade and shipping] that the Danish King meet the Joint Government, that the Danish troops on Als be reduced, and that Denmark recognize a neutral flag for the Duchies.² Gagern also sent Cowley a confidential memorandum (of the 3rd) signed by him but drawn up by Bunsen, stating the Central Power's interpretation of the word "independence". When Cowley sent Palmerston this he remarked that presumably there was nothing in it which would prevent a favourable result of the negotiations under Palmerston's mediation. Cowley thought that the memorandum had been written to calm the feelings of the opponents of the peace basis, but that Palmerston's possible proposal "will in the end be agreed to." It would probably be wise, though, to await the dissolution of the National Assembly which was expected in a few weeks, "before any such proposal is made."

¹ F.O. 30/123: 4/2, No. 47 with enclosure.

² Ibid. 4/2, No. 49 with enclosure.

When Bunsen seemed to want to take the credit for the present decision of the Central Power, Cowley did not find this quite just. He had known for some time that Gagern's "mind was made up to adopt Your Lordship's proposition," but Gagern had met much opposition before it was adopted. Bunsen's presence had been an advantage, among other things to overcome opposition among "some of the Northern deputies;" by these were probably meant the Slesvig-Holsteiners.

In the confidential memorandum Gagern (Bunsen) elaborated the Central Power's interpretation of the basis. There were three points: the Constitution for Slesvig must ensure it an independence "at least not inferior to that which Norway possesses in respect to Sweden." Denmark ought to guarantee that the succession remained the same for the kingdom and both Duchies. Finally a protest was made against an interpretation of the basis as if "a cessation of that union in administration and commerce, which existed and was recognised in the Duchies before the war, could ever arise from it." As soon as possible the Central Government – in agreement with the Prussian Government – would produce a more detailed statement of these points of view at the negotiations in London.

It was evident from Bunsen's private letter of the 5th of February to Palmerston that he considered that he had played a large part in the decision of the Central Power.¹ You will, he wrote, see "that I have not been for nothing here and at Berlin. I have endeavoured to act in such a way as you, as Mediator, and morally Umpire, must wish Germany to act." However, he was also loud in his praise of Gagern who had made the matter a Cabinet question and had shown that he was a true statesman.

Bunsen continued: "We now throw ourselves upon your powerful assistance. I have already drawn up, in English and German, the Memorandum which is to serve as commentary to the Confidential Note or short Memoir on the sense in which we propose to apply the Basis . . . to existing circumstances. This Memorandum will be examined thoroughly in the Cabinet, in my presence, so that when it passes (as I have no doubt it will) the Central Power is committed fully to all what I shall have to propose." He would go from Frankfurt to Berlin to arrange all

¹ P.P.

the formalities. "This being done, I shall travel day and night straight to London." He expected to arrive there about the 18th.

As Germany had now accepted "*pure et simpliciter*" the basis proposed by Palmerston and approved by "all the other powers" Bunsen assumed, he wrote, that Palmerston would "assist us in bringing about the *Armistice* and the peaceable *statu-quo arrangement* [the uninterrupted continuation of the Joint Government!] in the Duchies." He ended his letter by emphasizing "the friendly assurances I have received, at Berlin from Meyendorff, and here from his colleague. They find our three points fair and equitable."

How far this remark was the expression of Bunsen's own interpretation of his talks with the Russian diplomats, or whether it was rather intended to influence Palmerston must remain undecided. It is certain that on his return to Berlin from Frankfurt he had a sharp dispute with Meyendorff because the relationship between Norway and Sweden was put forward as a model in Bunsen's "memorandum".¹ This meant war, Meyendorff said, to which Bunsen replied that in Nesselrode's dispatch to Budberg of the 28th of October the Swedish-Norwegian Union was put forward as a model.²

That the Danish Government was in no mind to follow this example can be seen from the instructions which had been given to the peace negotiators. Denmark had also done what she could to explain to Britain and to the Friendly Powers that it was impossible for her to agree to anything of that kind.³ You must, ran a dispatch of the 30th of November to Bielke in London, state very definitely by word of mouth your objections to the admissibility of this comparison: "we must naturally claim besides a common Court, representation abroad, an army, representation in the National Assembly, furthermore common finances, customs and trade and a common flag." As a result of the protests against the "pattern" Moltke was later able to inform Reventlow that the interpretation which Nesselrode gave "the well-known expressions in the instructions to Baron Budberg" in truth left nothing to be desired. There was less satisfaction with the statements made by the Swedish Cabinet, but complete

¹ Bunsen. II, p. 497.

² Löfgren, p. 83.

³ Ges. ark. London. Orders: 17/11, No. 91; 30/11; undated, No. 97; 22/12, No. 98. - Cf. Löfgren, p. 99 ff.

satisfaction with France's attitude. Palmerston himself, in his dispatch of the 11th of December, to Cowley, had avoided – “with a statesman's shrewdness” – committing himself to any formula and – as he emphasized several times – he had not used the expression “independence.”

On the same day (the 14th) that Bunsen had his argument with Meyendorff, he dined with Westmorland, and left Berlin late at night. That evening and on the following day Westmorland sent Palmerston information about the negotiations he had had with Bunsen on the basis of Gagern's memorandum of the 3rd and letter of the 4th to Cowley.¹ According to his dispatches Westmorland had stressed in these talks that to ensure Slesvig “an independence as complete from Denmark as that of Norway from Sweden would meet with considerable difficulty,” and that a settlement of the question of the succession at the present moment would greatly delay matters. But Bunsen “was anxious the question should be at once decided.” Westmorland could not either believe that Denmark would agree to Slesvig's admission to the German Customs Union. With reference to Gagern's wish that the armistice be extended by six months, Westmorland remarked that the Danish Government “was so much displeased with the manner in which this Armistice had been carried in execution . . . that they would hardly consent to its extension unless its provisions were altered, and their observance secured.” But Bunsen hoped for an arrangement, and Westmorland's argument that the preservation of peace was so important for Prussia's material interests has hardly made a very deep impression on a man who was such a Reich enthusiast. In his dispatch to Palmerston Westmorland mentioned that the Swedish Minister had informed him that the Danish Government “will find it almost impossible to resist the general feeling of the Country for the recommencement of hostilities,” if a peace basis had not been reached by the 26th of March so that a partial disarmament was possible.

When Westmorland wrote to Wynn on the 16th, he stated that Wynn would see from his dispatch to Palmerston that he had not done more than “point out to him (Bunsen) the Subjects on which he would meet with the greatest difficulty and that I

¹ F.O. 64/297: 14/2, No. 39, and 15/2, No. 42.

rested satisfied with such modifications as I could obtain.”¹ Actually it is not evident that he obtained “modifications” from Bunsen. On the other hand Brandenburg and Bülow informed him of their views both on the settlement of the succession question and on the admission of Slesvig to the German Customs Union (cf. above p. 28) – views which differed from Bunsen’s – and of the needlessness of such a long armistice.

In a letter, also of the 16th, to the British chargé d’affaires, Buchanan, in St. Petersburg, Westmorland also prided himself on the modifications he had obtained.² He therefore hoped “that peace may be possible, but the Chambers and revolutionary party in Slesvig Holstein are very difficult to manage, and the Central Power and the St. Paul’s Church which have arisen from a revolutionary movement are also very unwillingly submissive to the voice of their Leader M. de Gagern. When delicate questions such as those relating to the Duchies have to be treated of in popular Assemblies it is difficult to foretell what will be their fate.”

In spite of all reservations which in reality were connected with the acceptance of Palmerston’s peace basis by Germany – accepted “pure et simpliciter”, Bunsen wrote! – one thing was definite, the abandonment of the political incorporation of Slesvig in Germany. Nevertheless the deputies from Slesvig remained in St. Paul’s Church! Bunsen then gave up his seat as a result of the new position, and Frankfurt refrained from electing any one else.³

Before he left Berlin Bunsen was said to have called himself “*the Messenger of Peace*”⁴ in a letter to his friend the King. He knew that these words sounded sweet in the ears of Friedrich Wilhelm. But even Meyendorff, the sceptic, was of the opinion that: “S’il y a dans Bunsen une étincelle de probité, il faut croire qu’il a réellement le désir de faire la paix.”⁵

¹ Westmorland. II, p. 675.

² Ibid., p. 671.

³ F.O. 30/122: 14/1, No. 16.

⁴ Westmorland. II, p. 663 ff.: Westmorland’s letter 16/2 to Cowley.

⁵ Hoetzsch. II, p. 155: dispatch 13/2.

3. Bunsen's Return to London.

Palmerston's Draft for a Protocol of the 23rd of February. Denmark Gives Notice to Terminate the Armistice.

Palmerston was said to have told Brunnow that he considered the negotiations suspended until Bunsen's return, and until "the present crisis in Frankfurt had blown over."¹ When Reventlow complained to Palmerston about the lull on the 29th of January – the Danish negotiators had been ready for a long time to resume talks – Palmerston said that they would have to wait until "friend Bunsen" returned.² When Reventlow asked if any conclusions had been reached in Frankfurt, Palmerston replied: "on my word of honour, I don't know." Reventlow thought that then there could be no prospect of a settlement; the present state of affairs was unbearable, only the rebels and Denmark's enemies had any benefit of it, and he remarked that he did not believe that the Government would prolong the armistice. In his dispatch to Moltke he expressed his private opinion that it ought not to be renewed.

A good fortnight later Reventlow had another talk with Palmerston and described the conditions in the Duchies, which Denmark considered deplorable.³ It did not seem to make an impression on him, Reventlow wrote: "He kept on repeating, whatever subject was brought up, that until he saw what instructions Bunsen had brought with him there was no good discussing anything."

Reventlow noted that during the talk Palmerston was very abstracted; his thoughts were probably occupied with affairs in Italy – the attempt by the Western Powers to mediate between Austria and Sardinia. On this question, as on the Danish matter, the Court held views which were opposed to Palmerston's. In a dispatch of about the middle of February,⁴ Reventlow referred to a statement made to him by a diplomat who was in touch with the Royal Family: the Queen found Palmerston more unpleasant every day, Windsor disliked everything about his politics and only John Russell's statement that he could not do without Pal-

¹ Reventlow's dispatch 12/1, No. 4.

² Reventlow's dispatch 30/1, No. 7.

³ Reventlow's dispatch 16/2, No. 11.

⁴ 13/2 (confidential).

merston's assistance in the Commons allowed him to retain his position.

Reventlow's statements that Denmark was disinclined to extend the armistice agreed entirely with Wynn's reports to the Prime Minister from Copenhagen. Public feeling there almost certainly will not allow a prolongation, wrote Wynn on the 8th of January,¹ and on the 26th he reported that the Danish Government "already contemplate the recommencement of hostilities", and will be unable to let the armistice continue until the 26th of April.² Moltke had complained to him that the negotiations had not yet begun although the Danish negotiators had been ready and waiting for six weeks. It was only too obvious, said Moltke, that "delay was the Policy their Opponents wished to adopt."

On the 6th of February Wynn dined at Court, and after dinner had a long talk with Frederik VII³ who said of the pro-Danish Slesvigiers that "He could no longer as a Sovereign or Honest Man leave (them) undefended. There were Duties incumbent on Him, which He was determined to perform whatever might be the result." Wynn advocated conciliation, but added that although he had not heard from Palmerston, he believed that he "recognized the Impossibility of His Majesty's consenting to a Prolongation of the Armistice."

A few days later Wynn's belief was shattered. In a dispatch of the 6th of Februar Palmerston enjoined him – prompted by his account of the 26th of January – to say to Moltke that Britain "must protest solemnly and earnestly against any notion of such a renewal."⁴ Bunsen was expected in a few days [he did not, however, arrive until the 17th], the negotiations could then begin, and the party "which should break the Truce and begin hostilities again would place itself so completely in the wrong that it would do irreparable injury to its cause." When Wynn told Moltke of Palmerston's statements he tried to counteract their severity by suggesting a plan for the occupation of North Slesvig by a Swedish corps for the protection of the North Slesvigiers after the termination of the armistice.⁵

¹ F.O. 22/171: 8/1, No. 3.

² *Ibid.*: 26/1, No. 16.

³ *Ibid.*: 7/2, No. 23.

⁴ F.O. 22/169: 6/2.

⁵ F.O. 22/171: 13/2, No. 29.

Like its predecessor the November Cabinet attempted to obtain a Four Power declaration "sur l'indissolubilité des liens qui unissent le Slesvic au Danemark."¹ About the middle of January the Danish negotiators in London, according to their instructions, addressed a circular letter on the matter to the Ministers of Russia, France and Sweden. In a private letter from the middle of January Wynn foresaw that the negotiations in London would become as difficult, indeed as fruitless as formerly if England "does not join the other Great Powers in the decisive language they are inclined to hold."² But as Brunnow said to Reventlow, Palmerston would not sign it. He notified both Brunnow and Rehausen to this effect at the end of March.

We have seen that Bunsen, rightly acknowledging that Germany could not settle the Danish-German dispute regardless of Russia, brought himself to call on and negotiate with Brunnow in London and with Meyendorff in Berlin. The revolutionary wave had culminated. The power and prestige of conservative Russia was increasing. So far Brunnow had kept himself in the background, but it was as if he now came forward into the limelight. Not formally, but certainly in reality, he began to take part in the negotiations.

At the beginning of February Brunnow drew up an "Aperçu de l'état actuel de la négociation relative aux affaires du Slesvic" (dated the 5th of February), which he sent Meyendorff, and a copy of which he delivered on the 11th to Palmerston.³ The purpose of the survey was to provide Meyendorff with information, and he received it before his argument (referred to above) with Bunsen on the latter's return to Berlin from Frankfurt.

The survey mentioned firstly Britain's proposal for a peace basis, and that Britain had reached a temporary agreement with the Danish Government upon a plan by which the Duchy of Slesvig "sous une administration distincte, resterait politiquement uni à la couronne de Danemark et séparé du Holstein." The parties must realize what they wanted and what they did not want, and they had to have confidence in one another. The first

¹ Reventlow's dispatches 15/1, No. 5; 20/3, No. 26. – The French Legation's dispatch 18/1, No. 57. – Löfgren, p. 109 ff.

² Wynn to his brother 17/1. The National Library of Wales. MSS. 2806 D.

³ F.O. 65/374. – Reventlow's dispatch 13/2, No. 10.

point on which agreement should be reached was that Slesvig "devra rester politiquement lié à la couronne de Danemark." This was of European interest, important for the balance of power, and this principle was recognized by Russia, Britain, France and Sweden. The second point on which there was agreement was to the effect that Slesvig with regard to "son administration intérieure" should not be incorporated in Denmark. The more detailed practical consequences of this principle would be the subject of negotiations. Brunnow remarked that he had not full knowledge of the instructions held by the Danish negotiators, but he stated what he presumed they were.

At the end of the survey Brunnow mentioned what Meyendorff had told him in a letter about his confidential talks in Berlin with Bunsen.¹ Bunsen was said to have three objects in view; (1) that Slesvig's non-incorporation became a reality; (2) the retention of certain joint institutions for Slesvig and Holstein; (3) that the peace treaty should contain a provision that discussions on the question of the succession be resumed with Britain as mediator. Brunnow thought that the Danish negotiators would be able to discuss the first two points, but hardly the last one without further instructions. It should be left to Denmark to take the initiative in the matter of the succession.

The Danish negotiators whom Brunnow informed of his "aperçu" expressed their gratitude and had only a few minor corrections to make.² Palmerston was also said to have commended it.

During his talk on the 14th with Reventlow Palmerston confirmed that the Central Power had accepted his Third Proposal in their note of the 3rd to Cowley "with some remarks which we shall get over."³ But, as mentioned before, negotiations could not begin until Bunsen's return.

Bunsen returned on Saturday the 17th. On the Monday Bunsen exchanged a few words with Palmerston, and also spoke to Brunnow, who found Bunsen's delivery "clearer and more concise than usual."⁴ In his report to Berlin of his talk with Brunnow

¹ Cf. Bunsen. II, p. 491 and F.O. 64/297: 23/1, No. 16.

² Reventlow's dispatches 6/2, No. 9, and 13/2, No. 10.

³ Reventlow's dispatch 16/2, No. 11.

⁴ Reventlow's dispatch 20/2, No. 12. — Bunsen's dispatches 19/2, No. 15, and 20/2, No. 16.

Bunsen has hardly been able to give a clear and concise expression of the Russian diplomat's standpoints, but seems to have twisted them drastically to agree with the German views. Bunsen heard from Palmerston that no steps had yet been taken to prolong the armistice. Palmerston believed, however, Bunsen wrote, that this was to be taken for granted, but he (Palmerston) did not think that it was possible to obtain more than an extension of two months, even if it were definite that the armistice was not to be terminated during the London Conference.

At Palmerston's request Bunsen wrote on the 19th a note dealing with the acceptance of the peace basis and the prolongation of the armistice with the retention of status quo [the Joint Government!] in the Duchies.¹ The note stated that the negotiations would need "some months, even with the most zealous endeavours to accelerate their termination."

At the Queen's reception on the 22nd Palmerston suggested to Reventlow that the armistice be extended by three months.² Reventlow mentioned all the Danish objections to this prolongation unless the King's authority be re-established at least in Slesvig. Palmerston replied according to Reventlow's dispatch: "The state of Europe, the safety of trade demanded a prolongation, and as he had obtained for us the peace basis we wanted (which indeed, we shall first like to see), we would also have to do something for him, or he would be turned out of the Commons."

The next day Bunsen had his first talk with Palmerston after his return.³ While Palmerston considered the prolongation as definite, there was strong disagreement on other points. Palmerston was unwilling to embark upon talks on the succession, a question which Bunsen was very eager to discuss, and when Bunsen demanded that Slesvig be accepted into the German Customs Union, Palmerston said that this was equal to a declaration of war. As mentioned above (p. 28), this demand came from Frankfurt and not Berlin.

In a note of the 22nd Reventlow, referring to their talk at the reception that morning, informed Palmerston that according to news just received from Copenhagen it appeared likely that notice

¹ F.O. 64/306: 19/2.

² Reventlow's dispatch 23/2, No. 13.

³ Bunsen's dispatches 23/2, No. 18, and 23/2, No. 4 (confidential).

had now (the 22nd) been given of the termination of the armistice.¹ But he stressed the fact that this should not give cause for alarm regarding the success of the negotiations, if the Central Government were just as conciliatory and interested in peace as the Danish Government.

On the 23rd Palmerston sent Bunsen and Reventlow a draft for a protocol, stating that the Central Power had approved Britain's peace basis: that Slesvig "should receive a separate Constitution, Administration and Legislature under the King of Denmark as Sovereign-Duke, without being united with the Duchy of Holstein."² The armistice was to be prolonged until the 26th of June. Als and Ærø were to remain under the former [Danish] administration. In an accompanying note Palmerston entreated the two countries to agree to a prolongation "such being an indispensable preliminary to any useful negotiation."³

For Bunsen's part this request was unnecessary. However, on the 24th when he told Palmerston this, he thought he could add two conditions to his acceptance of the point concerning Als and Ærø: (1) that the Danish Government recognized the Joint Government as lawful and (2) that it accepted ships from the Duchies which were flying the flags of their respective ports.⁴ The same day he sent Palmerston a long memorandum stating the views of the Central Power on the arrangement of Slesvig's constitution on the basis of "the Proposal of the Autonomy of that Duchy," which Frankfurt had recognized in principle.⁵ On the 26th Palmerston recommended Reventlow to include in the protocol the additions Bunsen wished.⁶

The Danish negotiators Reventlow and Treschow – Oxholm did not return to London until the 28th – were wholly agreed "that we can in no way accept the protocol."⁷ It was obvious that much less could they accept Bunsen's additions. On the 26th

¹ F.O. 22/175: 22/2.

² The French Minister Cecille said in his dispatch of 19/2, No. 9, that Palmerston had informed him that he would not use the word "Independence" (Gagern's expression) about Slesvig in the protocol, as this could be interpreted as going beyond both Britain's and Denmark's views of the future status of Slesvig.

³ F.O. 22/175: 23/2. – F.O. 64/306: 23/2. – Reventlow's dispatch 24/2, No. 14.

⁴ F.O. 64/306: 24/2.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ F.O. 22/175: 26/2. – Reventlow's dispatch 27/2, No. 16.

⁷ Reventlow's dispatch 24/2, No. 14. – Concerning Treschow see also Kjeld Winding: Treschow (1951), p. 189 ff.

they answered Palmerston with a letter approved by Brunnow.¹ They had, they stated, no authority to agree to prolongation, but were, on the contrary, to demand, when the peace basis had been accepted, that a civil and military administration be set up in the Duchies in accordance with this basis. The main point in their instructions regarding the peace basis was that the status intended for Slesvig should be consistent with its "l'union politique perpetuelle et indissoluble" with the kingdom, and that this arrangement was an internal affair which the sovereign decided without the interference of foreign powers. They believed that this was also Palmerston's implied interpretation of the peace basis, and therefore they were of the opinion that there was nothing to prevent the opening of the peace negotiations for which they had waited two months in vain.

It is an open question whether Palmerston did not really read this note at once or whether he has wished to ignore it.² On the 27th he sent Reventlow a copy of Bunsen's memorandum of the 24th and requested his opinion on it.³ Reventlow wrote home that the memorandum had strengthened his suspicions of the perfidious interpretation Bunsen wished to give Palmerston's peace basis. The Danish negotiators were of the opinion that it was the King – and not Bunsen – who should decide the future constitution of the Danish Duchy.

In order to terminate the armistice it was necessary to send a communication to the opponent on the 26th of February at the latest.⁴ On this day a Danish note, dated the 23rd, giving notice of the termination, was sent to the new Prussian Foreign Minister, H. F. Arnim. The armistice of the 26th of August had been entered into with Prussia, but in Frankfurt there was resentment that Denmark addressed herself to Berlin. At the same time as the notice of termination was given, the Danish Government sent a lengthy note with the reasons for this termination to the ministers of the Friendly Powers in Copenhagen. When Wynn sent Palmerston a copy of this note he remarked that he had only just glanced through it, but had "not been able to discover anything that does

¹ Reventlow's dispatch 27/2, No. 16. – F.O. 22/175: 26/2.

² Reventlow's dispatch 28/2, No. 17; cf. dispatch 29/3, No. 31.

³ F.O. 22/175: 27/2. – Reventlow's dispatch 28/2, No. 17.

⁴ Cf. regarding the termination Löfgren, p. 127 ff.

not bear the conciliatory character which was promised."¹ Reventlow received the note on the 28th and Palmerston received a copy from him on the same day.² Before dealing with Bunsen's and Palmerston's violent reactions to the notice of termination I shall make a short mention of the first discords in Bunsen's double position as representative both of Frankfurt and Berlin.

The difference in Frankfurt's and Berlin's views as to which of the German-Slesvig-Holstein demands could be carried through had already manifested itself in the negotiations between Bülow and Bunsen (cf. p. 28). After Bunsen's departure Bülow gave a more explicit statement of his views in a dispatch of the 21st of February so that Bunsen would be fully informed on the views of the Prussian Government. He wanted him not to put forward too extreme claims at the beginning of the negotiations, and advised him definitely not to give Palmerston a copy of the memorandum. This was exactly what Bunsen did, as we have seen; on the whole he disregarded the directions sent him from Berlin.

In a letter the next day to Bunsen Bülow stated that it was not until then (the 21st) that Frankfurt had informed him of the authority which they had given him (Bunsen). He had expected to be forwarded a draft of these orders before they were sent, and expressed his regrets that the orders had given Bunsen an official character as envoy of the Central Power, when his position should only have been a semi-official one. Bülow, however, thought that the King's approval should be sought.

On the 22nd Bülow had to retire from his position as head of the Foreign Ministry, as H.F. v. Arnim-Heinrichsdorff, a Conservative, was appointed Foreign Minister. A few days later Arnim informed Bunsen that the King would neither allow him (Bunsen) to take over a position with a diplomatic character from the Central Power nor to receive a "salary" from them.³ — Frankfurt had promised Bunsen £ 400 a month. As time was short Berlin could not demand a change in his authority from Frankfurt. Bunsen's position in relation to Frankfurt and Berlin was not really made clear. Berlin had no wish to quarrel either with

¹ F.O. 22/171: 23/2, No. 38; cf. 24/2, No. 39.

² F.O. 22/175: 28/2. — Reventlow's dispatch 3/3, No. 18.

³ Arnim's dispatch 25/2. — Cf. Bunsen's letters on the subject.

Frankfurt or Bunsen. In his note of the 24th to Palmerston Bunsen had designated himself only as the "Plenipotentiary of the Provisional Central Power of Germany," but in later communications he complied with the wishes of his Government by placing his title of Prussian Minister first; but in reality as mentioned above, he paid little attention to directions from Berlin.

When Bunsen heard from Reventlow on the 26th that the armistice would hardly be prolonged he said that the prolongation was a definite condition of his entering upon negotiations.¹ On the 27th he informed John Russell, the Foreign Office, and foreign diplomats that in the case of a termination Germany would have to send 20–30,000 men to the Holstein border "to uphold her honour and help the Duchies to defend themselves against oppression."² When Bunsen in the dispatch in question to Berlin wrote that the British Ministers had found his statement quite natural and that the main points in his proposal had been approved and recommended warmly to Denmark he must certainly have formed the British statements to suit himself – and with an eye to Berlin's judgment of his behaviour.

The next day Bunsen sent Palmerston a note in which he used such a strong expression as "the German nation's outraged honour demanded it."³ His expression hardly leaves the possibility of finding a stronger one to describe the outraged honour of other nations. "*L'Allemagne*," he wrote, "*jete sur le Danemarck, devant le monde entier, dés-à-present, toute la responsabilité, qui, dans les annales de l'histoire, sera à toujours attachée à la rejection de la médiation, à la rupture des négociations de paix, et à une déclaration de guerre aussi gratuite que grave et insultante.*"

Palmerston expressed his anger at the termination to the three Danish negotiators at a conference called by him and lasting about three hours on the afternoon of the 1st of March.⁴ "Il faut absolument," he wrote on the 28th to Reventlow, "que nous

¹ Bunsen's dispatch 26/2 (sent 27/2), No. 21. – Reventlow's dispatch 27/2, No. 16. – Van de Weyer's dispatch 28/2, No. 71: Bunsen has told me that the prolongation is "une condition *sine qua non* de la continuation de la négociation."

² Bunsen's dispatch 27/2, No. 6 (confidential).

³ Bunsen's dispatch 1/3, No. 23. – F.O. 64/306: 28/2.

⁴ Reventlow's dispatch 3/3, No. 18. – In a letter of 1/3 to Russell Palmerston wrote: "I have had the three Danes with me for two Hours, but can get them to agree to nothing. . ." Gooch. II, p. 24.

ayons sans retard une conversation très sérieuse au sujet de l'armistice"; come tomorrow at two o'clock and bring Oxholm "et votre autre Collegue, dont je ne sais écrire le nom."¹

Reventlow's report of the conference stated that Palmerston was "at one moment in a rage, the next all smiles and laughter." He overwhelmed the Danish negotiators with reproaches for terminating the armistice. It was beneath Britain's dignity to continue the mediation when such a short time was left. He had only to wash his hands of the matter and give up the task. Denmark would receive no help from Russia or Sweden and would succumb. Perhaps Britain would not allow trade to be disturbed by a blockade during a new war. What did it matter to Denmark if Slesvig had the same Government for another three months? The termination was bad repayment for his work in obtaining an agreement to a basis for peace from the Central Power and he was forced to give up the mediation.

He did not actually do this, but ended by requesting the negotiators to send a report of the conference to the Danish Government. He thought that the armistice might be prolonged by only two months. During the talk it appeared that Palmerston's interpretation of the peace basis was quite different from that of the Danes, and Reventlow thought [wrongly, cf. p. 40, Note 2] that it was not unlikely that Palmerston interpreted it as Slesvig's complete independence of Denmark, like Bunsen's proposition. At the end of his dispatch Reventlow requested on behalf of his colleagues and himself an answer from the Government on the question of a possible prolongation, the interpretation of the peace basis and the coming negotiations. The answer was a refusal to prolong the armistice, and a demand for a clear interpretation of the peace basis before the final negotiations began.²

Reventlow enclosed with his dispatch a copy of Palmerston's reply of the 2nd to the Danish negotiators' note of the 26th.³ This reply first expressed much regret that they would not sign the protocol of the 23rd, and secondly rejected the demand for a new administration in Slesvig before the prolongation of the armistice. Britain cannot "consent to waste in such a preliminary negotia-

¹ Copy of P's letter enclosed with Oxholm's letter 1/3 to Moltke. U. Min. Korr. sager. The Armistice in Malmö, etc.

² Moltke's dispatch No. 26, undated. [10/3]. - Thorsoe. I, p. 460 f.

³ F.O. 22/175: 2/3.

tion that time which might be so much more usefully employed in dealing with the main questions at issue." The demand for a more specified peace basis was likewise rejected. The negotiators were requested to receive authority from their Government for the desired prolongation, since the negotiations cannot be carried on with advantage at the same time as hostilities. They were to draw their Government's attention to "the serious responsibility which that Government would incur if it was to recommence hostilities at the very moment when the other parties to the negotiation are prepared to treat upon the very Basis which the Danish Government has itself proposed."

Oxholm wrote to Moltke that his impression of the conference with Palmerston was that "it did not offer any interesting results."¹ He stated that all the three negotiators were agreed that the armistice should not be prolonged. In the afternoon he had visited Brunnow: "He advises peacefulness, but at heart definitely does not condemn our methods."

It seems as if Palmerston has talked to John Russell about the possibility of giving up the role of mediator, for in a letter of the 1st of March² Russell wrote to him that there ought to be time until the 26th of March "to agree to the Main Points in one or two articles, and then an armistice might be founded on such an agreement. — I do not think this abrupt-termination of the negotiation on our part advisable. — You might ask the Danes what it is they are ready to sign."

When Palmerston informed Bunsen of the Danish circular letter about the notice of termination after the conference with the three negotiators, he wrote in a confidential letter that he had pressed the three Danes hard.³ He added, however, that he had understood from the talk that they did not mean badly (*böse*) and really only wanted to have a special Government established for Slesvig; the present state of affairs in North Slesvig was really unbearable for Denmark. He requested Bunsen to consider the matter.

On the morning of the 2nd Bunsen answered Palmerston⁴:

¹ See Note 1, p. 44.

² P.P.

³ Bunsen's dispatch 2/3, No. 25.

⁴ F.O. 64/306: 2/3 (Private), and the same date 1 o'clock (confidential). — Bunsen's dispatch 2/3, No. 25.

“I have *nothing more* to say to the Danes. . . Nor can I now, nor shall I ever, listen to proposals from the Danes as long as matters stand thus. – Let the consequences be on their head, and that of their Counciller, *here or elsewhere*, if they have had any but their headstrong passions and delusions.” The word “Counciller”, of course, alluded to Brunnow. But if Bunsen refused to listen to proposals from the Danes he was willing to listen to proposals from Britain and Palmerston – that is to say, if Palmerston could accept Bunsen’s suggestions as his own “or something like it.” “A *Protocol*, to be signed *on Monday* next [the 5th] is the only course which can lend to a practical result.” Every hour was valuable with regard to the German preparations for war when the armistice was terminated.

The same day at one o’clock Bunsen sent Palmerston “a plan as **you** might propose it. I am sure you will think it *very fair*, and uncommonly advantageous to the *Danes*. So does Baron Stockmar, with whom I have discussed point for point. – If you adopt it, pray keep in view, that it can be only offered **as a whole**: there must be some advantage also gained for Germany, for keeping the Danes out of a great blunder they have made.” Of course Bunsen’s plan was unacceptable to Denmark. It did not go further than admitting in case of need a special administration in some or all districts in Haderslev County (though not in the town of Haderslev or in Christiansfeld), and an investigation by commissioners (with a British umpire) into Danish complaints over the Joint Government, and it demanded that Denmark in principle should accept Germany’s (Bunsen’s) interpretation of the British peace basis. Later in the day Bunsen had a talk with Palmerston on the matter. It was hardly, though, Palmerston’s intention to act as a puppet in Bunsen’s hands.

As has been seen, Bunsen had discussed his proposal with Stockmar, who – if one dare believe Bunsen, which I hardly do – found it very advantageous to the Danes. Oxholm, who had arrived in London a few days earlier, paid that day, the 2nd of March, courtesy calls both on Stockmar, who was staying at the palace with the Queen, and on Bunsen.¹ He gave assurances of Denmark’s peaceful intentions, but Bunsen said that if the termi-

¹ Oxholm’s letter 5/3 to Moltke. U. Min. Alm. Korr. Sager. The Armistice in Malmö, etc. – Dr. Meyer to Albert (Freitag Abend, i.e. 2/3) R.A. W. I 12(?) /6.

nation notice was not recalled no negotiations could take place. Oxholm asked if Germany was prepared openly and honestly to accept "Slesvig's inseparability from the Danish Crown and immediate separation from Holstein" as a basis of the forthcoming agreement and Bunsen replied in the affirmative. When Oxholm then read Bunsen's memorandum to Palmerston of the 24th, he began to doubt whether he had understood Bunsen's reply correctly and asked him about it the same day in writing.¹ It was not until the 5th that he received a reply from Bunsen saying that his statements on Friday (the 2nd) had been as definite as answers can be to questions which need just as many hours to be answered as he had minutes, on account of the appointed conference with Palmerston! He referred to his memorandum of the 24th, and also remarked that as long as the succession for the Duchies and for Denmark was one and the same, Germany would consider Slesvig's connection with Denmark as "unumstösslich". Oxholm then, did not get a plain answer to a plain question.

4. Palmerston's Draft for a Protocol of the 13th of March.

Russia's Minister now began to take an active part in the negotiations. On Saturday the 3rd the Danish negotiators conferred with him. He suggested that in Article One of the protocol with reference to the separate constitution for Slesvig be added the words "continuant à rester indissolublement uni à la Couronne de Danemarck."² The next day Brunnow negotiated with Palmerston and handed him a confidential proposal for peace preliminaries³ consisting of five articles the first of which proposed that Slesvig remained indissolubly joined to the Crown of Denmark. The second stated that the King would give Slesvig a constitution which ensured it "une administration distincte". The third dealt with the determination of Slesvig's contribution to the expenses of the Monarchy, and the fourth proposed that Slesvig, by virtue of its constitution, would be separated from Holstein, which

¹ A copy of Oxholm's letter and Bunsen's answer of 5/3 are to be found after the draft of Bunsen's dispatch 9/3, No. 8.

² Reventlow's dispatch 6/3, No. 19.

³ F.O. 65/374: Suggestions confidential from Baron Brunnow. 4/3.

would continue to have federal obligations to Germany. The last article stated that the previous terms should serve as the basis of negotiations about the details. During these negotiations, which should not take longer than one month, both parties were to refrain from hostilities.

During his talk with Palmerston Brunnow informed him of two dispatches of the 9th of February which Nesselrode had sent him.¹ One of them dealt with Denmark's desideratum, mentioned above, for a collective declaration by the Four Powers concerning Slesvig's indissoluble connection with Denmark. Brunnow was directed to discuss this matter with Palmerston; but as Palmerston was against it, the matter was dropped, Russia, however, abiding by her guarantees. The other dispatch stated that Russia had stressed in Copenhagen the risks of a termination, but that she relied on Palmerston's attempting as soon as possible, a betterment of conditions in Slesvig. – Assurances were given repeatedly in the dispatches from the British Legation in Russia² that Russia was not behind the Danish notice of termination, but, on the contrary, had advised against it and later disapproved of it. France adopted the same attitude.³

On the 5th Palmerston informed Bunsen of Brunnow's "peace preliminaries", but in a letter of the 7th to Brunnow Bunsen refused to agree to Articles One and Two.⁴ Bunsen had sent Brunnow his memorandum of the 24th with other papers, and when Brunnow returned the documents he remarked that he did not attach any great political importance to the termination. It was aimed at allaying public feeling in Copenhagen and accelerating the negotiations. There was, he wrote, a considerable difference between the non-prolongation of an armistice and a declaration of war. – As mentioned before, Bunsen and Germany made it that it was Denmark (who had actually been attacked by Germany), who had declared war on Germany. There are many examples of the fable about the wolf and the lamb in real life.

On the 6th Palmerston summoned Reventlow to a new con-

¹ F.O. 65/374: 5/3.

² F.O. 65/363: 31/1, No. 42; 24/2, No. 61; 28/2, No. 72; 7/4, No. 120; 10/4, No. 127. – Cf. Löfgren, p. 139 f.

³ Dispatches to Cecille 20/2, No. 15, and 22/2, No. 16.

⁴ Copies of Bunsen's and Brunnow's letters 7/3 and 8/3. Bunsen's Papers.

ference and his tone had now completely changed.¹ The Danish negotiators had moreover the preceding day answered Palmerston's sharp letter of the 2nd; they gave assurances of the peaceful intentions of the Danish Government, but stated that they had to abide by their instructions regarding any addendum to the basis. They would inform their Government of Palmerston's view of the renewal of hostilities.

During his talk with Reventlow Palmerston admitted that conditions in Slesvig deserved consideration. He asked whether a Provisional Government of three members – a Dane, a Briton, and a German – would satisfy Denmark. Reventlow said that all the members ought to be appointed by the King, and that Danish troops should be used as gendarmes. Palmerston warned the Danes against Brunnow's inspiration, and considered it unimportant if the above-mentioned addendum were made to the peace basis or not; Denmark was always entitled to return to it, and Germany would not sign it. When Palmerston asked Reventlow what he thought of Bunsen's memorandum, Reventlow stated that it was a monstrous idea of Frankfurt to wish to make a constitution for a foreign country when she was not able to put her own affairs in order.

In spite of Palmerston's statements to Reventlow about the addendum proposed by Brunnow, the Foreign Office sent dispatches the same day to the Ministers in Frankfurt and Berlin directing them to urge the respective Governments to approve of the addendum.² “. . . this Slesvig question” the dispatch gives as a sort of reason, “seems to excite less interest in Germany now than it did last year.” Denmark had also, it pointed out, “received much more positive assurances of support than she had last year, from Russia, Sweden and France, with reference to the question of the permanent connection between the Duchy of Slesvig and the crown of Denmark. . .”

The next day the Holstein nobleman, Baron Otto Blome, visited Palmerston, and I shall now mention some of Blome's statements about his conversation with Palmerston. Blome had arrived in London with a letter of introduction from Westmor-

¹ Reventlow's dispatch 6/3, No. 19, and copy of the answer 5/3. – F.O. 22/175: 5/3.

² F.O. 30/120: 6/3, No. 74. – F.O. 64/294: 6/3, No. 64. – Westmorland. III, p. 29 ff.

land, and the Danish Foreign Minister had directed Reventlow not to put obstacles in the way of his activities.¹ Reventlow was not pleased by the arrival of "this talented and scheming, but untrustworthy man" and found that he should rather bring "his *supposedly* influential connections" to bear in the Duchies.

On the 13th Blome informed Westmorland that Palmerston had received him very kindly in audience on the 7th, and that he had given Palmerston somewhat different information from that given by Bunsen.² Blome remarked that Bunsen had been far from conciliatory, but had believed until then that "servir mieux les intérêts de l'Allemagne en se servant du langage du parti révolutionnaire de nos Duchés en l'appuyant par la volonté ferme du pouvoir central chargé de veiller sur l'honneur de l'Allemagne. Fort heureusement que Lord Palmerston et le Baron de Brunnow ne tiennent pas compte de ces jactances et que l'on espère arriver avant l'expiration de l'armistice à signer les préliminaires de la paix." The letter ended by saying that matters looked rather complicated at the moment.

On the 8th the Danish negotiators had a new talk with Palmerston and criticised Bunsen's memorandum sharply.³ As Reventlow said, it was only an armistice that Germany offered Denmark, since Bunsen maintained that everything would be uncertain when the male line died out. Palmerston made a new but fruitless attempt to persuade the Danes that the proposed basis must be sufficient for them, but before they left he told them of the steps he had taken in Frankfurt and Berlin. But what was to be done if these led to nothing?

On the 7th Bunsen sent Palmerston a note requesting Britain "to prevent by every means in her Power" a renewal of hostilities while the peace negotiations were being carried on.⁴ He had also put his request to John Russell, but on the 10th Palmerston replied that he must refuse.⁵ Britain could not give such a guarantee. She had undertaken to mediate "not with the view of taking a part in the differences but with the hope of settling them." He still entertained this hope.

¹ Reventlow's dispatch 27/2, No. 15.

² Westmorland. III, p. 81 ff.

³ Reventlow's dispatch 9/3, No. 20.

⁴ F.O. 64/306: 7/3. — Bunsen's dispatch 9/3, No. 8 (confidential).

⁵ F.O. 64/306: 10/3.

The weekend of Saturday and Sunday the 10th and the 11th was no quiet one for Palmerston. On the 10th he talked for at least two hours with Bunsen, whom he told the Danish demand for "Slesvig's indissoluble connection with the Crown of Denmark" to be included in the protocol.¹ He used Russia as a bogey, but Bunsen was neither to be led nor driven. There exists a private letter of the same date from Bunsen to Palmerston which almost indicates that he had deliberately misunderstood Palmerston so that the addendum lost all its significance; he expressed it as "leaving open the question as to the union of Slesvig and the Crown of Denmark in a future contingency." This was exactly the opposite of the Danish demand.

After his talk with Bunsen Palmerston wrote a letter to Reventlow, who received it early on Sunday morning.² He was, he wrote, convinced that Germany would never accept the addendum in question, and therefore he would suggest another, which he thought ought to be sufficient for Denmark and which Germany could perhaps accept. His proposal was as follows: "en laissant intacte l'union politique entre le Duché de Slesvig et la Couronne de Danemark." He asked Reventlow for his opinion on the matter, the next day at six o'clock.

Reventlow conferred with the two other gentlemen and they agreed to accept the proposal if it were changed to "que le Duché de Slesvig aura une Constitution séparée quant à la Legislation et à l'administration intérieure, en laissant intacte l'union politique qui attache ce Duché à la Couronne de Danemark." When Reventlow saw Palmerston he showed him this version, but Palmerston was able to tell him that Bunsen had already rejected his proposal in a "voluminous letter."

On the Sunday Bunsen had sent Palmerston a couple of letters and two long-winded statements; "der langen Rede kurzer Sinn" was the rejection of the proposal.³ Bunsen loved to prescribe to Palmerston his course of action. One letter (the first?) said: "Pray take the matter up without delay, it requires all your energy; it would be a pity, if the work of peace should fail, after

¹ Bunsen's dispatches 10/3, No. 9 (confidential), and 10/3, No. 29. – F.O. 64/306: 10/3 (private).

² Reventlow's dispatch 12/3, No. 21, with a copy of Palmerston's letter.

³ F.O. 64/307: 11/3 (bis) together with Memorandum and "Dates and facts. . ." – Bunsen's dispatch 13/3, No. 10 (confidential) with enclosure.

all you have done." In the other letter Bunsen wrote: "If therefore you will peace, insist upon the protocol [of the 23rd of February] being signed *as it stands*." You must state to the Danes that otherwise you must give up the mediation "and declare that its failure is their fault. Depend upon it, *they will consent*." But he was wrong there and Palmerston did not either take his advice. Bunsen would like, he added, certain peace preliminaries signed immediately after the first protocol – naturally only if these agreed with "the fair proposals" of his own memorandum.

Late on Sunday evening Palmerston had a long talk with Bunsen and tried to persuade him to accept the addendum, but the result was negative. In a couple of letters the next day to Baron Stockmar Bunsen vented his spite upon Palmerston.¹ "P. ist des Teufels," he wrote in one of them: yesterday evening between 10 and 11,30 o'clock he wanted to convince me that Germany would have to include the clause in the protocol. Europe knew nothing of a state called Slesvig; it was, like Ireland, a province. Bunsen tried to prove the opposite, but Palmerston said: "The arguments of your paper are very good and fine: but it is time to overlook all this and make peace." But Bunsen would, he said in the letter, send Palmerston new statements and documents. He ended on a despondent note: "Mit einem Manne ohne alles sittliche Gefühl lässt sich nichts machen."

In the second letter Bunsen mentioned that the British Secretary of State had referred to the antipathy which the new Austrian Prime Minister, Schwarzenberg, had to the Slesvig-Holstein rebellion.² He continued "Viele andere (nicht alle *ehrliche*) Versuche wurden vom alten Fuchs gemacht, mir Furcht einzujagen. So hat er mich denn gezwungen, ihm heute einen französischen Brief zu schreiben, der ihn *entweder* auf meine Seite bringen, *oder* ihn öffentlich bloss stellen wird." In "his arrogant ignorance" he considered it a whim on my part to regard Slesvig as a "sovereign state," Bunsen stated. – Bunsen was at least right in thinking that the whim also existed in the brains of the Slesvig-Holstein theorists.

¹ R.A. W. I 12/17 and 29.

² Not until the 12th did Reventlow send Palmerston a copy of Schwarzenberg's note of 18/12 to Moltke on the matter. F.O. 22/175.

Bunsen's prophecy of the "either – or" position in which his French note¹ would put Palmerston came to nothing. But enclosed with the note there was a new detailed statement that, according to Slesvig-Holstein theories, there existed no political union between Denmark and Slesvig. Bunsen could not accept the clause, and if Denmark insisted on it, she could do so in a note. As far as Germany was concerned he could only repeat, "*qu'elle n'a rien à déclarer davantage, qu'elle n'a rien à répondre.*" Bunsen's assertion that if the protocol of the 23rd of February (without the clause) was signed, the later negotiations would present few if any difficulties, was quite unrealistic.

On the 13th at two o'clock Palmerston again summoned Bunsen.² He told him that Frederik VII. had definitely declared that he was going to Als on the 27th to his loyal Slesvigiers, and that the war party in Copenhagen had the upper hand. Palmerston's statements were presumably based on Wynn's dispatch of the 6th of March and on his private letter of the same date.³ This letter said that he could have filled his dispatches "with foolish expressions which I fear are too truly reported to fall daily from the King. . ." Oxholm was the only person "who has any influence over him, or in whom he has any confidence for his public and private concerns." The Danish negotiators, he continued, would receive "pressing Instructions to make an immediate arrangement for the Government of Slesvig."

Palmerston also informed Bunsen that the Danish negotiators demanded the fulfilment of two conditions in order to agree to the prolongation of the armistice. The one was that the union politique be declared intact, the other that during the prolonged armistice two Governments be established, one for Holstein, appointed by Germany, and one for Slesvig, appointed by the King. Bunsen declared that it was impossible for him to agree to the first condition, whereupon Palmerston is said to have deleted it in his draft; The extension was fixed at two months in this draft; Bunsen demanded four months and Palmerston then promised to make it three.

¹ F.O. 64/307: 12/3. – Bunsen's draft 12/3 with enclosure. – Copies of Bunsen's letters of 11 and 12/3 are to be found with Franckes letter 29/3 to Harbou. EE. 28.

² Bunsen's dispatch 13/3, No. 11 (confidential).

³ F.O. 22/171: 6/3, No. 44. – Wynn to P. 6/3 (private). P.P.

Then Reventlow was summoned to Palmerston,¹ and they had a short talk lasting half an hour, between 4.30 and 5 o'clock. Palmerston showed Reventlow the new draft, but Reventlow protested strongly against the deletion of the union politique. In the draft the extension, as mentioned above, was fixed for three months, during which time Slesvig should have a Government appointed by the King from native Slesvigers and with the support of purely Slesvig troops, Holstein a Government appointed by the Central Power and with Holstein troops. Als and Æro were to remain under the present administration.

About 5 o'clock Palmerston made another, but fruitless, attempt to persuade Bunsen to agree to the clause. Late the same evening both Bunsen and the Danish negotiators received the draft of the protocol – including the clause – together with an accompanying note expressing hope that the draft would be found acceptable.²

The indignation which Bunsen felt because Palmerston did not act according to his wishes was expressed temperamentally in a letter sent by him early the next morning to Baron Stockmar – and for Albert's and Victoria's information.³ It began: "*Jetzt geht's gut, – denn menschlicher Weise, aber ohne Schuld oder Fehler, ist alles verloren! Das kann nicht sein, und so habe ich bessern Muth als je.*" When I told Palmerston why Germany should give up the British basis "da geschah, was bekanntlich beim Teufel immer geschieht, wenn man ihm die rechte Beschwörungsformel an den Hals wirft." The Danes maintained, said Palmerston, that he was not authorized to propose Slesvig's independence as a basis without the clause "und zwar mit *union indissoluble*, und sie mögen wohl Recht haben, ich schrieb die Depeche an Cowley ohne die ihrige vor mir zu haben: die Dänen sind also *nicht* gebunden durch Ihre Annahme der Selbständigkeit. Aber das Wort *indissoluble* habe ich ihnen doch abdisputiert. – *Das also war des Pudels Kern! ††† Gott behüt' uns!*"

The letter gave an account of the talks on the 13th and the result: the clause remained in the draft. Two things were quite clear, the letter said: (1) Russia and Denmark wanted to humiliate

¹ Reventlow's dispatch 13/3, No. 22.

² F.O. 64/307: 13/3. – F.O. 22/175: 13/3.

³ R.A.W. I 12/36.

Germany and (2) Palmerston "will die Schuld seines scheusslichen Leichtsinnes, für die er abgesetzt werden sollte [Albert and Victoria would have liked that!] auf *Deutschland*, und vorerst auf *mich* schieben." Bunsen would have liked Stockmar's advice at this decisive moment, but had to manage somehow by himself. "P. hat sich in mir verrechnet: arglos wie ich bin von Natur, kann ich einen Fuchs wie er ist, *leicht* durchschauen, wenn ich misstrauere: und dazu hat er mich gezwungen, vielleicht zu seinem Verderben. Er ist ein *gewissenloser* Mensch."

In his reports of the 13th and the 14th Bunsen informed Berlin of the recent events, though without mentioning the violent outbursts against the British Secretary of State.¹ I shall mention a few characteristic statements. In the first dispatch he stated his belief that the clause, which he called the Russian clause, could only be deleted by negotiations with Meyendorff. "Es ist," he wrote, "ein sehr schwerer Fall: allein ich wage nicht abzurathen, den Vorschlag, *entkleidet von der Klausel* abzuweisen; wenn man nicht Krieg *gegen Russland* machen will und kann, bleibt nichts übrig als ihn anzunehmen. Ehrenrührig ist er nicht, und die Zeit läuft *gewiss* für Deutschland."

In his two dispatches of the 14th Bunsen again stressed that the clause was quite inadmissible. What German statesman would agree to it? Certainly not I, he said: "ich werde die mir zukommenden Weisungen und Befehle treu erfüllen (denn die Klausel zu unterschreiben wird man mir nicht zumuthen)." However, the negotiations ought not to be broken off, "aber *ohne einen Zollbreit zu weichen*." He did not explain how the negotiations were then to proceed. He was, no doubt, thinking of Frankfurt when he said that time was in Germany's favour. The Federal State with Prussia as its leader must be set up forthwith, "und Preussen sich rückhaltlos in die deutsche Einheit werfe." Frankfurt and Berlin must be in harmony. — It was soon to become apparent, also over the Slesvig-Holstein question, that they were not.

On the 14th Palmerston sent Bunsen an extract of a note from Gagern to Cowley which presumably was to convince him that

¹ Bunsen's dispatches 13/3, No. 11 (confidential); 14/3, No. 32, and 14/3, No. 12 (confidential). — A copy of the dispatch 14/3 (not the confidential one) is to be found in R.A.W. I 12/37.

Frankfurt recognised a "political union." Palmerston hoped this would remove Bunsen's "difficulty, as to signing the proposed Protocol."¹ But Bunsen stated officially the same day that he could not sign the draft for the protocol with the clause, and gave his reason in a lengthy accompanying letter: "I have acted as my conscience and my instruction bid me."²

The next day Bunsen was at the Foreign Office, where he discussed with Lord Eddisbury, as Palmerston was not present, how war could be avoided, and the possibility of a fortnight's armistice at all events.³ He explained to Eddisbury what was "unbedingt unzulässig" (the clause) in the draft for the protocol and in the Danish demand, what was "unzulässig", "höchst bedenklich und schwerlich ausführbar" (new Governments in the Duchies), and what was "besonders unzulässig" (that the Danes remained on Als).

On the 15th Palmerston answered Bunsen's above-mentioned longwinded and theorizing note of the 12th by saying that at such a critical moment "when events of the greatest importance are pressing on with extreme rapidity," he would not enter into "detailed discussions upon verbal refinements or Historical Questions."⁴ He stated, however, that Bunsen's analogy of the personal union between Britain and Hanover was nonsense, and that Bunsen's historical memorandum appeared to him in many places to give rise to conclusions different from those Bunsen came to.

Bunsen loved what Palmerston found unreasonable in the tense situation. Palmerston had to put up with a new note from him of not less than twenty-eight pages.⁵ Palmerston answered it with a three page note which I shall mention below.⁶

Palmerston had had a talk with the Danish negotiators on the 14th about the draft for the protocol.⁷ He again tried to persuade them to leave out the clause, but they maintained that they "had gone as far as we possibly can with the present wording." They then asked their Government for instructions regarding the Gov-

¹ F.O. 64/307: 14/3.

² Ibid.: 14/3.

³ Bunsen's dispatch 15/3, No. 34.

⁴ F.O. 64/307: 15/3. – R.A.W. I 12/33. – Bunsen's dispatch 17/3, No. 36, with enclosure.

⁵ F.O. 64/307: 16/3.

⁶ Ibid.: 19/3.

⁷ Reventlow's dispatch 14/3, No. 24.

ernment's views on the acceptance of Palmerston's proposal for new Governments in the Duchies during the prolongation of the armistice. Reventlow gave Palmerston confidential information on this matter in a note of the 15th, so that Palmerston would not believe that all difficulties were swept aside even if Frankfurt accepted the clause.¹ On the 17th he informed him officially of the Danish declaration of a blockade from the 27th of the ports in Slesvig and Holstein which were not under the King's administration.² Palmerston had heard of this a few days before from Wynn.³ On the 8th Wynn and his colleagues had pointed out to Moltke the bad effects the declaration of a blockade would have on the negotiations. Moltke defended the declaration by saying that it was "solely directed against His Majesty's insurgent subjects, and that all mention of Germany had been avoided."

5. Negotiations in Frankfurt and Berlin.

Bunsen Persists in his Protest.

On the 6th of March Palmerston had directed Cowley and Westmorland to urge Frankfurt and Berlin, respectively, to accept the addendum concerning the "union indissoluble".

In a dispatch of the 10th Cowley stated that he had approached Gagern, but that his "overtures", as expected, "met . . . with no success."⁴ Gagern said that after Friedrich Wilhelm IV's letter to the Duke of Augustenborg the previous year [24/3 1848] "it was impossible for him to recommend or to permit a declaration to be made on the part of the Central Power which would prejudice his or any other claims." According to Cowley Gagern had declared himself willing to contribute to a solution of the question of the succession which would "unite the three independent countries Denmark, Slesvig and Holstein indissolubly under one Sovereign," but this was no favour to Denmark, to whom Slesvig was not an "independent country", either.

Cowley sent Palmerston a private dispatch together with the official one.⁵ If Palmerston could get Prussia to recognize "the

¹ Reventlow's dispatch 16/3, No. 25, with enclosure. — F.O. 22/175: 15/3.

² F.O. 22/175: 17/3.

³ F.O. 22/171: 7/3, No. 47, and 8/3, No. 48.

⁴ F.O. 30/124: 10/3 (unnumbered).

⁵ *Ibid.*: 10/3 (private).

indissoluble union, it might be possible to do something of the kind here." He had written about this last night to Westmorland, sent him a copy of Palmerston's dispatch and asked him to influence the Prussian Government. He had furthermore asked the Russian chargé d'affaires, Budberg, to write to Brunnow "to shew him the impossibility of obtaining what the Danes want from the Central Power."

Both these actions seem a little high-handed of Cowley, but, as mentioned above, he liked to take the initiative. It was evident from his dispatches that he was strongly influenced by the views prevailing in Frankfurt on the Slesvig-Holstein question.

In the letter of the 9th to Westmorland (with a postscript of the 10th)¹ Cowley stated that he had sounded Gagern and one or two of the most influential persons in Frankfurt: "As I expected nothing is to be done with them. They cite particularly the letter of the King of Prussia to the Duke of Augustenburg . . ." But if Prussia would take the initiative in recognizing "the indissoluble union" it was possible that Frankfurt would follow suit. "If you think it worth while to make the trial and succeed, I will do all I can to make your success available here." – More for the sake of curiosity it may be mentioned that Cowley stated that he had used in his talks some "military hints" from Westmorland's letter of the 6th about a coming campaign, "but what do Professors and Philosophers know about Military Strategy? You might as well talk to the wall . . .". In the letter in question Westmorland mentioned a statement of a merchant from one of the Baltic towns: "The last years suspension of Commerce cost Prussia more than Slesvig was worth to purchase."²

On the 9th in connection with his orders of the 6th Palmerston sent Cowley copies of Nesselrode's dispatches of the 9th of February to Brunnow (see p. 48).³ In his talks with the Central Power he was directed to "explain the views of Russia and, as it is understood, of France, and to point out that if this Question [Slesvig's connection with the Crown] is now left open, it will probably be the Cause of War at a future time." Cowley answered by emphasizing "the little effect that the Menace of the guarantees

¹ Westmorland. III, p. 45 ff.

² Westmorland. III, p. 25 ff.

³ F.O. 30/120: 9/3, No. 76.

has *at this moment* upon the Members of the Central Government."¹ If only Denmark would renew the armistice! Both Denmark and Russia ought to consider "that there is no organised Government to deal with here, that in the present inflammable state of Germany a very little will rekindle the excitement of last year."

In a dispatch, likewise of the 11th, Cowley mentioned that it was of no use to request Frankfurt to refrain from taking military measures as Denmark had given notice of the termination of the armistice.² He had, however, discussed a couple of plans with Gagern to obtain this: (1) three commissioners to investigate the Danish complaints, and possibly a small Swedish military detachment in the district of Haderslev, and (2) an assurance by Denmark (with a British guarantee) that hostilities would not be renewed while the negotiations were in progress or for some time afterwards. He had outlined the first plan the day before in the letter to Westmorland: "It *ought* to satisfy the Danes if they *are not bent on war*, and must be accepted here." Cowley's view of what *ought* to satisfy the Danes had nothing to do with facts.

Berlin showed more sympathy for Palmerston's proposal than did Frankfurt. Arnim stated, however, when Westmorland read the proposal to him that "he could not at present agree to such a declaration, it would be deciding the whole question in dispute."³ But he would gladly agree to a postponement of the question of the succession. He informed Westmorland of a dispatch of the 6th from Bunsen in which he polemized against the above-mentioned proposal and against one or two others of Brunnow's (cf. p. 48).⁴ Bunsen's objections, he said, appeared "in some degree exaggerated, and he will write to him tomorrow to this effect." Arnim did so.⁵ Brunnow's peace preliminaries, he wrote to Bunsen, could not be accepted in their entirety by Prussia, but it was regrettable that he refused to discuss them. It was in Prussia's interest to give Russia and her Minister an indication of her peaceful intentions; he suggested that Bunsen took up the discussion again with Brunnow. The termination of the

¹ F.O. 30/124: 11/3, No. 116.

² *Ibid.*: 11/3, No. 117.

³ F.O. 64/297: 10/3, No. 74.

⁴ Bunsen's dispatch 6/3, No. 7 (confidential).

⁵ Arnim's dispatch 11/3 (confidential).

armistice must not cause an interruption in the negotiations, but, on the contrary, ought to accelerate them.

As a consequence of Cowley's letter Westmorland had another talk with Arnim,¹ who, however, said that he could not "authorize the recognition at present of the *indissoluble* union," but thought that "with a different wording, more particularly if the word indissoluble was left out, the proposition might be accepted as the basis of future negotiation since it might then be understood to apply only to the present circumstances."

As seen above, Palmerston changed 'union indissoluble' to 'union politique' in his draft for a protocol of the 13th, after hearing that neither Frankfurt nor Berlin would accept the proposal.

He informed Cowley of this the same day and asked him to show Gagern the altered draft.² He wrote that the Danish negotiators had now agreed to a prolongation for three months, although at first they would only agree to two, and that they were willing to sign the protocol in its present form. Bunsen "appears willing to sign this Protocol with the exception of the latter Part of the proposed Article One from the words "and leaving" to the End." According to his instructions Bunsen was to deny, he had said, a political union between Slesvig and the Crown of Denmark. Palmerston had told him that such a union "seems to me to be a fact which it is impossible to dispute," but that a recognition of this union "in no degree prejudices the question of the conditions of its duration." In the dispatch Palmerston elaborated the various forms of union. How far the union concerned was indissoluble was another question. The Danish negotiators had wanted that question established, but they were "induced to give up that wording" and would accept the present wording. If Bunsen could be authorized to sign, "Peace will, for the present, at least, be maintained," and there would be time for a final arrangement. Gagern ought to send Bunsen the necessary instructions at once. Palmerston referred to statements of Gagern in a dispatch he had just received from Cowley. He did not believe that Gagern "for a verbal subtlety, or for a fanciful and forced Interpretation of plain words [would] risk the bringing

¹ F.O. 64/297: 12/3, No. 78.

² F.O. 30/120: 13/3, No. 85.

down upon Europe all the disastrous consequences which might follow a renewal of hostilities. . . . But time presses and not a day is to be lost.”

In a confidential dispatch of the same date Palmerston told Cowley that Denmark on Russia’s advice had demanded a declaration on union indissoluble.¹ He believed that as early as December Russia had urged Denmark to terminate the armistice as soon as possible. The Central Power ought to consider this, as Russia would hardly give Denmark such advice if she had no intention of giving active support. Furthermore a dispatch from Schwarzenberg, communicated to him by Reventlow, made it evident that Austria was opposed to supporting the Danish King’s rebellious subjects in Slesvig, and was in favour of Slesvig’s “being “permanently united” with the Danish Crown.” Finally Hanover’s Minister had told him that Hanover “was sick of the Slesvig and Holstein question.”

Third time lucky! On the 13th Palmerston wrote a private letter to Cowley as well as the two dispatches.² Get Gagern to overrule Bunsen’s scruples, he wrote. “I have beat the Danes out of their Union indissoluble, but that was a hard matter as the words were suggested by the Russians. The words now objected to by Bunsen were my own suggestion slightly modified by the Danes.” Then he mentioned his suggestion and the wishes of the Danes, and remarked: “This seems to me to be six and half a dozen. . . .” But the Danes were willing to sign, and “it is of the utmost importance that Bunsen should be authorized and instructed to do so.”

Cowley received these directions a few hours after he had sent Palmerston a suggestion for an addendum to the protocol which he had discussed with the Central Government, and to which he thought they would agree.³ It seems really rather naive if Cowley considered this suggestion as a concession to Denmark. It stated that Germany recognized the “indissoluble union” of Denmark, Slesvig, and Holstein under the King of Denmark and his male heirs, and that it was desired to maintain the connection between the countries in the future as well.

¹ F.O. 30/120: 13/3, No. 78.

² Copy. P.P.

³ F.O. 30/124: 15/3, No. 121 (Most Confidential).

Cowley's naive suggestion was rejected by Palmerston in a private letter of the 18th.¹ "No one disputes that the Union is indissoluble as long as the male line continues; it is only upon the extinction of that line that any practical question arises." If the gentlemen in Frankfurt, he continued, are determined "to involve Germany in war for verbal distinctions about matters with regard to which they really have nothing to do in point of right, it is not our fault and upon their heads must rest the responsibility." But would Germany obey their orders this time? "However time will show; and when the commerce of northern Germany shall have been put an end to by the Danish Blockades, and when their troops shall have been driven out of Slesvig by a combined Danish, Swedish and Russian army they will perhaps think that "le feu ne vaut pas la chandelle.""

After receiving the letters of the 13th, Cowley sent a private letter to Palmerston with all possible haste, and Palmerston received it on the 18th.² He wrote that if the protocol (of the 13th) had definitely to be adopted, Palmerston would have to get Bunsen "to sign it upon his own responsibility, for I feel sure that it will be next to impossible to induce the Central Power to send him orders to do so." The Central Power were opposed to both the point concerning Slesvig's connection with Denmark without mention of Holstein, and to the establishment of a separate Government for Slesvig. If, however, Bunsen could be persuaded to sign, "the whole matter becomes altered. The Government has then to do with a "fait accompli". – I think *then* we should be able to pull the Chevalier through." In addition Cowley remarked that he believed that if Slesvig were handed over directly to Denmark it would bring about a new revolution. His comment on Bunsen was: "I am afraid that the dignity of German Ambassador is too much and too often before his eyes and hampers his actions."

When Cowley wrote this letter Gagern was absent, and he did not succeed in speaking to him until the 18th.³ Cowley had now also received Palmerston's dispatch of the 14th requesting him "strongly to urge the adoption" of the proposal that the govern-

¹ 18/3 (copy). P.P.

² 16/3 (private). P.P.

³ F.O. 30/124: 18/3, No. 127.

ment of Slesvig should be in the hands of the Danish King during the extension of the armistice.¹ As his authority was to be re-established when peace was concluded, "there seems no good reason for keeping him out of his own territory during the continuance of the Armistice," after he had agreed to the peace basis, "and it seems evident that this is a point to which the Danish Government attach the greatest importance, and an agreement with regard to which would greatly facilitate the progress of the negotiation." As Frankfurt had answered the Danish complaint of the German conscription of sailors in Flensburg by stating that Denmark had also conscripted soldiers in Slesvig, Palmerston had written the previous day to Cowley stating that there was all the difference in the world between the two actions.² "Germany has no pretension of any right whatever over Slesvig," but the King as Duke of Slesvig was "entitled to exercise his sovereign rights in his own territory."

Cowley wrote about his talk with Gagern on the 18th: "Upon the proposal for the immediate surrender of the Duchy of Slesvig to the authority of the King-Duke, I find him quite inexorable. By no argument or persuasion could I induce him to entertain it." Cowley shared Gagern's view "that it would be impossible to restore the Danish power in Slesvig without bloodshed," and found that it was better for the Joint Government to continue. It was, however, possible that Bunsen "on finding the Central Power disposed to admit a limited interpretation of the words "indissoluble union", may have signed the second project of protocol. It is the only chance and that is but small, of seeing it adopted here." Finally Cowley drew attention to the fact that concessions from Gagern concerning the Slesvig question could create such opposition to him that his position would become precarious. This would be a disaster. — During a conference on the evening of the 21st Palmerston let the Danish negotiators read Cowley's dispatch. On behalf of them all Reventlow very definitely rejected the proposal to let the Joint Government continue.³

In a dispatch of the 19th Cowley again criticized the Danish

¹ F.O. 30/120: 14/3, No. 87.

² *Ibid.*: 13/3, No. 80.

³ Reventlow's dispatch 22/3, No. 27.

“pretensions”.¹ In another dispatch of the same date, marked ‘private’, he expressed his fear that “very little more can be done here in the Slesvig business.”² The Central Power were determined not to separate the administration of the Duchies, “until they are compelled, or until peace is concluded.” It would be better for Denmark to let the status quo continue. He suggested that the Commanders-in-Chief should agree to a fortnight’s warning before the commencement of hostilities, and he would write about the matter both to Westmorland and Wynn. “It is unfortunate,” he remarked, “that Russia should have taken so prominent a place in the discussions that have lately been going on. – It has irritated first the opinion extremely and renders all negotiation here difficult.” Did Cowley really think that Frankfurt would have been more willing to negotiate with Denmark if Denmark had not been supported by Russia? Or did he just think that Denmark would not then have dared to stick to her “pretensions”?

It appears from Cowley’s correspondence with Palmerston referred to here, that he considered Berlin more responsive to influence than Frankfurt. As mentioned above, Westmorland had received the same request as Cowley to advocate first the clause concerning “union indissoluble,” then the draft for a protocol of the 13th of March.

He advocated the last point during a talk with Arnim on the 17th.³ Arnim first wished the clause changed to “and leaving *intact* the *question* of the political union etc.,” but Westmorland assured him that the Danish Government would never agree to this, and the negotiations would then break down. After a lengthy discussion Arnim held out hopes that he would instruct Bunsen to sign the protocol, but accompanied by a note to the effect that the union was dependent on an arrangement of the question of the succession. Meyendorff, of course, recommended Palmerston’s proposal to Arnim, and informed him, in addition, that Russia had advised Denmark not to begin hostilities.

The same day Arnim informed Bunsen of the views of the Prussian Government.⁴ The clause was, admittedly, unacceptable

¹ F.O. 30/124: 19/3, No. 129.

² *Ibid.*: 19/3 (private).

³ F.O. 64/298: 17/3, No. 87.

⁴ Arnim’s dispatch 17/3 (confidential).

as the Danes interpreted it, but it could not be denied that it "den Worten nach auch in einem unverfänglichen Sinne, als die blosse Anerkennung einer gegenwärtigen Thatsache, nämlich der bisherigen factischen Union Schleswigs mit Dänemark verstanden werden kann; und es würde darauf ankommen, den Sinn so festzustellen, dass durch die Unterzeichnung unsrerseits nichts weiter ausgesprochen würde." For Palmerston's interpretation Arnim referred to his dispatch of the 13th to Cowley of which Westmorland had informed him. We are of the opinion now, continued Arnim, that you can sign the protocol if Palmerston "*Ihnen ausdrücklich erklärt, dass die beanstandete Formel nur diesen und **keinen anderen Sinn** haben solle.*" You can then issue a declaration stating why you no longer protest against the above-mentioned clause. Arnim did not think that Palmerston would oppose this and thus the last obstacle would be removed for the "so sehr wünschenswerthe Verlängerung des Waffenstillstandes, so wie dem Abschluss eines Provisoriums."

On the margin opposite the underlined words in Arnim's dispatch Bunsen wrote: "Wie kann er [Palmerston] das thun?"

On the 19th Palmerston answered Bunsen's 28 page letter of the 16th (see p. 56) and gave a more explicit formulation of his views on union politique.¹ Most of Bunsen's arguments against Article One, wrote Palmerston, seemed to him to be levelled against the wording given by the Danish negotiators not against the present wording, which was "a simple recital of the fact that there does at present exist a political Union between the Duchy and the Danish Crown, and upon a consequent declaration, that the new constitutional organisation, which is to be given to Slesvig, is understood to leave that union intact." The wording was concerned only with "the present state of things" and left the question of the succession open, "commits neither party to any concession on that point."

Palmerston rejected Bunsen's demand for more detailed information about Slesvig's Constitution: the protocol was to contain only the general principles. He realized, naturally, that the protocol of the 13th was different from that of the 23rd of February, but it had not been possible to obtain the consent of both parties to the latter. The essential difference between them was

¹ F.O. 64/307: 19/3.

that the protocol of the 13th contained a change in the administration of the Duchies. "This change seemed to me to be rendered necessary by the intervening change of circumstances." By the termination of the armistice the Joint Government would end on the 27th. It would be better then if Frankfurt appointed a Government for Holstein, and the King-Duke one for Slesvig, an arrangement to which Frankfurt could not object, having approved the peace basis.

Palmerston commented on Bunsen's statements that under the Joint Government the state of Slesvig was "one of order and tranquillity", by saying that according to his information its state was "more nearly to anarchy than to order." He could not believe that his proposal "could be for a moment regarded injurious to the honour of Germany," but peace could only be secured by concessions from both parties; "a determination of either side to have all questions decided according to their own views, must in all human probability lead to war." As Bunsen had complained that Denmark would not give the Central Power time for consideration "a sense of justice" forced Palmerston to point out that the Danish negotiators had waited two months for Bunsen.

In a confidential letter of the 15th Reventlow had informed Palmerston that a copy of his new draft for a protocol had been sent the previous day to Copenhagen.¹ He stated his satisfaction in finding that in Article One the peace basis was formulated in the way that the Danish negotiators had taken the responsibility of approving, although their instructions directed them to retain the expression "union indissoluble." With regard to the terms in the protocol about conditions during an extended armistice they had, he wrote, requested the Government to send them further instructions. In his dispatch of the 16th to the Danish Government Reventlow remarked that the negotiators had agreed in this way to point out to Palmerston that even if Article One were accepted by the opponent not all – or far from all – the difficulties were removed. Reventlow stated that Palmerston would be very much opposed to the Danish declaration of a

¹ F.O. 22/175. – Copy of letter with Reventlow's dispatch 16/3, No. 25.

blockade, from the 27th, of ports in Slesvig and Holstein which were not under the King's administration.¹

On the evening of the 22nd Palmerston had another talk with the Danish negotiators.² He let them read Cowley's above-mentioned dispatch of the 18th reporting the negative result of his talk with Gagern, and put forward a rough draft for a new protocol which among other things presupposed a Joint Government for the Duchies during the extended armistice. The Danes firmly rejected this proposal, and judging by Reventlow's report of the talk, neither did Palmerston seem to have taken Frankfurt's proposal very seriously.

The previous day Brunnow had told Palmerston during a talk that Meyendorff had informed him that Bunsen would be instructed by Berlin to sign the protocol, but at the same time to express the German view of the question of the succession in a note.³ Meyendorff wrote that Arnim had informed Gagern of this in order that the instructions of the Central Power could be in harmony with those of Berlin. "Ainsi cette affaire est en bon train d'être réglée" the letter said.

Westmorland mentioned in his dispatch of the 20th that he had spoken to Arnim who hoped that Bunsen would feel that he had sufficient authority "to conclude the arrangement for the armistice."⁴ Arnim said that he had heard from Frankfurt that they had given Bunsen instructions in the same way as he had. On the 23rd Palmerston sent Bunsen an extract of this dispatch and hoped that Bunsen would now sign the protocol.⁵ Bunsen, however, answered that he had received no instructions from Frankfurt to sign, but, on the contrary, on the 17th had been expressly forbidden to do so.⁶ On the 22nd he had written both to Berlin and Frankfurt for explanations, and he expected to receive them at the latest about the middle of next week (28th–29th).

¹ Reventlow informed Palmerston officially 17/3 of the blockade, of which Palmerston, however, had been acquainted on the 15th. F.O. 22/175 and Reventlow's dispatch 16/3, No. 25.

² Reventlow's dispatch 22/3, No. 27.

³ F.O. 65/374: [22/3]. – Cf. p. 65.

⁴ F.O. 64/298: 20/3, No. 91.

⁵ F.O. 64/307: 23/3.

⁶ Ibid.: 24/3.

In the dispatch to Berlin¹ Bunsen mentioned that the Central Power had very definitely opposed not only the article on "l'union politique", but also the whole protocol: "In diesem Widerstreit der Instructionen muss ich mich jedes entscheidenden Schrittes enthalten, und weitere vereinbarte Weisungen um so mehr abwarten, als die Dänen offenbar noch keine weitere Instruktionen erhalten hatten." Bunsen enclosed a copy of Palmerston's letter of the 19th (see above). He mentioned, furthermore, that the previous evening Palmerston had told him about the draft for a protocol agreed upon by Cowley and Gagern which did not include any Article Three, and remarked that Palmerston would only agree to declare that Germany had "ein Recht die Klausel in jenem Sinne zu verstehen" (i. e. that the question of indissolubility was left undecided).

In a confidential letter to Berlin later the same day Bunsen stated that he had got out of his difficulty regarding Frankfurt's proposal for a protocol as the Danish negotiators had stated that the separation of the provisional Governments in the Duchies was a *conditio sine qua non*.² Palmerston can have told him this after his talk with the Danes. Bunsen also gave reports of statements made by Oxholm and Reventlow which showed that they would both set definite limits for Slesvig's "independence". Oxholm thought that Slesvig's "Provincial Estates" might be furnished with considerable administrative powers, and Reventlow was said to have stated that he had overthrown [contributed to overthrowing?] the previous Government by demanding that further concessions with regard to Slesvig's independence should not be made. — If Reventlow was partly responsible for the Cabinet change in November, it would seem more, as shown above, to be due to his attitude to the idea of separation.

Arnim did not receive Bunsen's letter of the 22nd until the 26th, and he answered it the same day, saying that Palmerston's statements in his letter of the 19th to Bunsen must enable him to accept Article One and at the same time to make a declaration of his interpretation of it. Arnim also believed that it must be possible to make provisional arrangements for the Governments in the Duchies. Germany could surely not have well-founded

¹ 22/3, No. 37.

² Bunsen's dispatch 22/3, No. 13 (confidential).

claims for the maintenance of status quo, as it was a question not simply of the prolongation of the armistice, but of making a provisional arrangement in agreement with the preliminary peace articles. These presupposed Slesvig's separation from Holstein and the Central Power could not claim the right to appoint a Government for Slesvig. The argument put forward in Palmerston's letter could not be refuted.

Arnim enclosed a communication from Plessen, stating that Denmark had prolonged the armistice until the 3rd, together with a copy of the Danish counter-proposal which will be discussed below. This made him regret even more that Germany had not declared herself prepared to sign Palmerston's protocol. When Denmark would not sign this the blame would fall on her: "Dänemark würde dadurch entschieden die Rolle des angreifenden Theils übernehmen und dadurch den übrigen Mächten, namentlich Schweden und Russland, nicht nur jeden Vorwand, sondern auch die Neigung genommen werden, demselben zu Hülfe zu kommen." Arnim still hoped that Germany could hold this favourable position in the course of the week. The protocol ought to be signed. He directed Bunsen to do this ('auftragen' was underlined), and especially for the sake of the Prussian Baltic towns. The Danish affair must be brought to a definitive and satisfactory conclusion.

Arnim's dispatch, Bunsen wrote in notes made a little later, contained "the most incredible instructions concerning the Danish affair:" "Mir wurde angemuthet gegen meine Instructionen zu handeln, wie gegen meine Überzeugung und dabei doch auf meine Verantwortung."¹ In his reply of the 30th to Arnim he wrote: "Meine Stellung hier *als Bevollmächtigter der Central Gewalt Deutschlands*" is still essentially the same as when he sent off his report of the 24th, that is to say, he was not to sign the protocol. He had later received a copy of Gagern's letter of the 21st to Camphausen that Article Three was "durchaus unzulässig."

Bunsen's attitude to his two masters, Berlin and Frankfurt, was clearly shown in a dispatch of the 30th from Palmerston to Westmorland.² Bunsen "informs me," it said, "that he cannot

¹ Bunsen. III, p. 2 f.

² F.O. 64/294: 30/3, No. 89.

receive or obey any orders sent to him from Berlin on the subject of the negotiation with Denmark, and that he is on those matters acting solely and entirely under the orders of the Government of Frankfurt." Palmerston continued sarcastically: "The Prussian Government will no doubt be able to clear this matter up, and to explain what value they attach to the orders and instructions which they say they have sent to . . . Bunsen."

On the 30th and 31st, however, Bunsen received letters from Friedrich Wilhelm IV requesting him to break off relations with Frankfurt.¹ He could not act on contrary orders. Now he finally took the step, which one cannot understand he did not take much earlier. On the 1st of April he returned his credentials to Gagern pleading the contrary instructions he received from Berlin and Frankfurt respectively.² He expressed his heartfelt thanks for the confidence which had been placed in him. Until his successor arrived, he would, of course, continue to carry out the tasks with which he had been entrusted.

On the 31st he had informed the King, in reply to the latter's letter of the 27th, of his decision to send back his credentials.³ He agreed with the King in his desire for peace, but this should be obtained by Prussia's adopting a vigorous line of action: "Lord Palmerston hätte längst etwas annehmbares mit den Dänen durchgesetzt, wenn diese glaubten, Preussen werde *Ernst* machen, falls Dänemark Unmögliches und Ehrenrühriges fordern." He wrote that during the negotiations he had made many concessions – but did not mention which they were! He had discussed the matter in the most confidential way with General Oxholm, given Brunnow an opportunity of stating his opinions, and he had instilled respect for the German cause into Palmerston. But Palmerston, he stated indignantly, was indifferent as to which party had "the most right," if only the mediation was brought about. In his letter he also criticized Westmorland, whose dispatches concerning the negotiations with Arnim Palmerston had shown him. Westmorland was "quite incompetent and hostile to everything German."

At the end of his letter Bunsen made it quite clear that he

¹ Bunsen. III, p. 2 f.

² Copy of letter to Gagern with Bunsen's dispatch 1/4, No. 41.

³ R.A.W. I 11/77: 31/3 (copy).

would not sign the protocol of the 13th of March. It was against his insight and against his conscience. He would have to take the consequences of this refusal; the final one would be his dismissal, "falls Ihre Majestät Ihre dänische Politik nicht ändern."

Arnim's hopes of a definitive and satisfactory conclusion of the Danish affair at the negotiations in London in the course of the week – the last week in March – were extinguished. On the 3rd of April hostilities were resumed.

6. The Danish Ultimatum.

Even if Bunsen had declared that he was willing to sign the protocol of the 13th of March, all the difficulties would not have been surmounted as Reventlow wrote in his above-mentioned dispatch. The Danish negotiators had agreed to Palmerston's vague formulation in Article One, but they had pointed out that they would have to wait for instructions from their Government regarding the protocol as a whole.

In Copenhagen the British Minister, Wynn, tried to influence the Foreign Minister, Moltke, to postpone the resumption of hostilities as long as possible. But the Government was under strong pressure both from the King and from public opinion, which was aroused at conditions in Slesvig. On the 14th of March Wynn wrote to Palmerston that he, as well as his Russian, Swedish and French colleagues, had approached Moltke, and that they might have obtained a month's extension of the armistice "had he been able to hold his ground against the King and the general excitement which manifested itself, when it was known that there was a question of renewing the Armistice."¹ Wynn regretted stating that the former Director of the Foreign Department, Dankwart, was "among the most violent." Wynn said of him that, although not in office, he "holds Count Moltke's pen"; and he once made a remark in a letter to Westmorland about Moltke himself: "I have unfortunately to do with a very worthy but a very weak minister, unaccustomed to Foreign Affairs."²

¹ F.O. 22/171: 14/3, No. 51.

² Westmorland. III, p. 263 ff: 26/3.

Friendly and considerate as Moltke was, he seems, during his talks with Wynn, to have been more accommodating than the Government really wanted him to be. Wynn did not, however, get much result from his protests against the blockade of the ports of the Duchies, which had been notified to begin on the 27th of March.¹ Palmerston directed him on the 16th to "remonstrate urgently against this Blockade," which among other things was "injurious as tending to embitter and obstruct negotiation."²

During a talk on the 17th Moltke told Wynn, so the latter said in his dispatch, that he had authorized the Danish negotiators "to agree to any Propositions made by Your Lordship for the temporary Government of Slesvig, with the sole reservation that it shall be separate from that of Holstein."³ However, Moltke's orders of the 17th to the negotiators⁴ stated that Wynn had suggested an actual armistice on condition that the points concerning Slesvig's inseparability from Denmark and a separate administration in Slesvig be included in the protocol. Moltke asserted having stated to Wynn that negotiations on this matter must be the business of the gentlemen in London. In the orders emphasis was laid on the fact that the instructions of the 4th were not thereby altered. These stated that the choice of Slesvig's Government was to be made solely by the King, and that law and order was to be maintained there by Danish, or, in case of need, by neutral, e.g. Swedish, troops.

Whatever the reason was for Wynn's misunderstanding he sent Westmorland a copy of the dispatch in question on the 18th, and asked him to pass it on as soon as possible to Cowley.⁵ It was important, he wrote, that Cowley should know that "as soon as the *permanent union* is recognized the Danish Government puts themselves entirely in Lord Palmerston's hands, with the sole reservation that the temporary Gov^t (if one is necessary) shall be separate from that of Holstein." "It is a great point for my friends here to have Lord Palmerston on their side, which must be the case when they agree to whatever he recommends." God forbid new disappointments, he ended his letter.

¹ F.O. 22/171: 8/3, No. 48; 14/3, No. 51; 24/3, No. 57; 26/3, No. 61. – Krigen 1848–50. II, p. 345 ff.

² F.O. 22/169: 16/3.

³ F.O. 22/171: 16–17/3, No. 54.

⁴ Ges. ark. London Orders: 17/3, No. 27.

⁵ Westmorland. III, p. 175 ff.: 18/3.

On the 21st Cowley received a copy of Wynn's dispatch.¹ In a detailed letter of the 22nd Cowley then informed Gagern, who incidentally had handed in his resignation, that Denmark was now willing to accept important modifications in her terms for renewing the armistice.² She would approve "any arrangement for the temporary Gov^t of the Duchy of Slesvig, that may be proposed by the mediating Power, provided only its Gov^t is separated from that of Holstein." Cowley strongly urged Gagern to meet Denmark halfway. The interests of Germany demanded a renewal of the armistice: "At a moment when she is convulsed from one end to the other in a struggle for constitutional liberties, all her energies are wanted at home. . ." What a sentence Europe would pass on a Government "that preferred the chances and miseries of war to a compromise upon a question as to how the administration of a small Duchy should be carried on during the negotiations for a final settlement of it."

On the 25th, however, Cowley had to tell Palmerston that Gagern definitely refused to take "the conciliatory step which I had indicated."³ The Danish envoy, Dirckinck, had, in addition, received from his Government a dispatch of the 21st in which no mention whatever was made of Wynn's proposal, but which, on the contrary, directed Dirckinck to hand to the Central Power a Danish counter-proposal to Palmerston's draft for a protocol of the 13th. Cowley wrote of the demands in this that "there is not a chance of their being listened to here." Cowley, moreover, had not found that the Archduke or his Ministers expressed any desire to avoid war: the Archduke, "a good Austrian at heart, would not be sorry to see the Central Government engaged in a war that he thinks will weaken them, while his Ministers, on the contrary, cling to the idea that war against Denmark, and particularly against Russia would bring about that unity for which they have been in vain striving in Parliament."

Cowley drew Palmerston's attention to the fact that the National Assembly had now adopted the § (§ 2) in the new Reich Constitution which laid it down that a German country which had the same head as non-German countries, was to have its own Government and administration, different from that of the non-

¹ F.O. 30/124: 25/3, No. 141.

² Westmorland. III, p. 211 ff.: 22/3 (copy).

³ F.O. 30/124: 25/3, No. 141.

German countries. If Denmark could just be persuaded to wait, Cowley wrote, she would be sure of having the question of a separate Government in Slesvig decided according to her wishes.

Although both Cowley and Budberg requested Dirckinck not to inform the Central Government of the Danish counter-proposal, Dirckinck found – quite naturally – that it was necessary.¹ The Central Government rejected it unanimously on the 28th. On the 1st of April Cowley informed Palmerston that he had made a new attempt to persuade the Central Government to agree to the separation of the administration of the two Duchies; this time Camphausen had helped him, but this attempt, too, had been fruitless.²

Cowley did not receive an official answer to his note of the 22nd until the 4th of April.³ Gagern wrote that while he was replying to Cowley's note he received the Danish Government's counter-proposal, which was formed as an ultimatum, and the terms of which "are founded on a complete mistake of what is politically and morally possible for the Central Power to do." Gagern went on to give a detailed account justifying the behaviour of the Central Power during the negotiations. Cowley answered Gagern's note on the 5th.⁴ He remarked, among other things, that it would not have been dishonourable to agree to the proposal of the 22nd, seeing that "the Prussian Government (no mean judge of what is consistent with the Honor of Germany) has advised the acceptance of what must appear to Your Excellency even more adverse terms."

Cowley continued that in accordance with the adoption of § 2 in the Reich Constitution by the National Assembly Holstein *had to have* a different Government from that of Slesvig. Germany therefore had not the slightest right any longer to interfere in the internal administration of Slesvig. For whether Slesvig were a part of the Kingdom of Denmark or not, "it is certainly not a member of the German Empire." He enclosed a copy of Palmerston's note of the 3rd of April to Bunsen,⁵ which likewise referred to Frankfurt's decision concerning § 2, and which – Palmerston

¹ F.O. 30/124: 28/3, No. 150. – F.O. 30/125: 1/4, No. 163.

² F.O. 30/125: 1/4, No. 158.

³ Westmorland. III, p. 291 ff.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 327 ff.

⁵ F.O. 64/307: 3/4.

asserted – removed every ground for the war between Germany and Denmark.

At the time when the Central Power in Frankfurt had already rejected the Danish proposals (ultimatum) Frankfurt's negotiator in London, Bunsen, had not yet been acquainted with them.

As mentioned above, the Danish negotiators had on the 14th of March sent Palmerston's draft for a protocol of the 13th to Copenhagen requesting instructions about it. The draft was discussed at the Council of State on the 20th where Moltke submitted the answers to the Commissioners for discussion.¹ The next day the answers were sent to London.² While Article One of the protocol was found to be "acceptable", the Danish Government would only agree to extend the armistice until the 26th of April, and they demanded that Slesvig be occupied by Danish, or perhaps, neutral, troops. Palmerston's proposals, it was stated, although not yet giving the unconditional necessary guarantees for the attainment of a satisfactory final result, gave hopes of further rapprochements. Denmark would, therefore, postpone hostilities until the 3rd of April, although by so doing she sacrificed definite advantages for the conduct of the war in the interests of peace and for the sake of the mediating Power.

In a separate letter the Danish negotiators were requested to report immediately whether they thought that the Danish counter-proposal would be accepted: the point regarding the occupation of Slesvig was "the most important."

Wynn protested to Moltke against the short time allowed by the Danish Government to receive information from London.³ Moltke answered in a friendly fashion but rather evasively, and explained that the Government was under pressure not only from the King but from public opinion and the National Assembly. Wynn remarked on sending Westmorland the Danish counter-proposal on the 24th that Denmark had made a great concession by giving up "indissolubility."⁴ If only Bunsen were instructed to accept "political union", the other points would not be likely to give rise to many difficulties: "all the Danes require

¹ Statsrådets Forhandl. II, p. 93.

² Orders of 21/3, Nos. 28, 29, and 31.

³ F.O. 22/171: 21/3, No. 55; 24/3, No. 60; 26/3, No. 62.

⁴ Westmorland. III, p. 255 ff.

is Security not to be thrown over as they were on a former Instance. — This can in my opinion be only *tranquilly* obtained by a Swedish occupation of South Slesvig.”

In the evening of the 25th Julius Sick, Groom of the Chamber, arrived in London with the dispatches from the Danish Government.¹ The next day Reventlow wrote to Copenhagen stating that the Danish negotiators did not believe that Bunsen would sign the Danish counter-proposal. They had, however, made all speed to send it (though slightly altered) to Palmerston together with a note; Oxholm had not signed this note with the others as he had already taken leave of Palmerston, and he left for home the following day.

In the counter-plan the Danish negotiators had omitted the proposal for the possible use of Swedish troops.² In the note they expressed their hope that Bunsen would sign. His answer would have to be final, and they must be able to forward it to their Government in good time, as the King would not postpone the reestablishment of his lawful power in Slesvig later than the 2nd of April. They would like an answer from Palmerston before the 29th. They were prepared to give him verbally any explanations he wished.

On the 27th Reventlow informed both the Russian and the French Ministers about the note and the draft for a protocol.³ The Danish negotiators had not discussed the note beforehand with Brunnow,⁴ who now discussed the consequences it could have, and expressed his regret at the extreme Danish step, and especially at the short time allowed for an answer. Reventlow interpreted Brunnow's regrets “as a reservation he owed his position.”

As the Danish negotiators did not receive any answer from Palmerston before the expiry of the time limit, Sick left London on the morning of the 29th and arrived in Copenhagen on Monday morning the 2nd of April.⁵ The Council of State decided the

¹ Reventlow's dispatch 26/3, No. 28.

² F.O. 22/175: 26/3. — Reventlow's dispatch 27/3, No. 29.

³ See also Cécille's dispatch 27/3, No. 17.

⁴ Hoetzsch, II, p. 178 ff.: Brunnow to Meyendorff 27/3.

⁵ Reventlow's dispatch 29/3, No. 31. — Orders 4/4, No. 39. — Statsrådets Forhandl. II, p. 106. — Weimar's statement p. 324, that the envoy cannot be expected until between the 10th and the 15th must be due to a strange misunderstanding.

same day that hostilities and the blockade should begin without delay from midnight on the 2nd.

Palmerston had good reasons for being prevented from answering. He had not seen the dispatch of the 26th. When Reventlow said to Palmerston at the Queen's reception on the 29th that he regretted having to send the envoy back without receiving a reply to the note of the 26th, Palmerston asked "quelle note?"¹ Reventlow explained that he had sent the note by a trustworthy messenger to the Foreign Office (cf. below). Palmerston then enquired about the contents of the note. On hearing them, he explained that when Bunsen had been unable to accept his, Palmerston's, proposal he would have been far less able to accept the Danish one. He emphasized that Denmark was exposing herself to great danger by renewing hostilities.

Reventlow believed that Palmerston was perfectly aware of the note of the 26th, but, irritated by its contents, pretended to have no knowledge of it.² This appears in itself rather unlikely. In a letter of the 8th of April from Westmorland to Wynn mention is made of the explanation which the expert on the Slesvig-Holstein question at the Foreign Office, Mellish, (cf. I, p. 12) had sent Westmorland.³ On the 29th when Palmerston had heard about the note from Reventlow "he applied afterwards to Mellish and the Clerks in the Office for the Note, and as it was not there the servants in his house were examined and the Note found." Westmorland added that "the blame is thrown upon Ld. P. of which he is quite innocent." – Though he must have been to blame for his untidy desk!

The matter was raised in the House of Commons on the 19th of April by Mr. Hume,⁴ who mentioned that rumour had it that

¹ Reventlow's dispatch 29/3, No. 31.

² Reventlow's dispatch 29/3, No. 31 and dispatch 31/3, No. 32. – In dispatch 29/3 Reventlow said that a statement by the Belgian Minister, van de Weyer, confirmed his opinion. This impression can also be obtained from Weyer's dispatch 28/3, No. 118, which recorded that on the 27th [!] Reventlow had stated to Palmerston that the Danish Government had decided to occupy Slesvig with Danish troops, and if the parties did not approve of this, hostilities would be resumed on the 3rd of April. This statement had offended Palmerston very much, continued W., and assurances were given that Russia had not approved it beforehand. – Weyer's report, due to a slight misunderstanding, must be based on the account, given by either the French or the Russian Ministers, of the negotiations on the 27th with Reventlow where they were informed of the note.

³ Westmorland. III, p. 355 ff. – F.O. 519/159: Mellish to Cowley 3/4.

⁴ Hansard's Parliamentary Debates. CIV. 3d Series (29/3 49–7/5 49), p. 457.

an envoy had arrived from Copenhagen on the 26th of March with an important dispatch for Palmerston but it remained “unanswered and unattended until too late to prevent the hostilities . . .” Palmerston admitted in his reply that Reventlow’s note was sent on the 26th but added: “it was not made in the usual official way, and it was, by accident, mislaid.” He had not been able to tell Bunsen of its contents until the 29th. The result, however, would have been the same as “the proposal was one which it was quite inconsistent with his instructions to accept.”

Palmerston’s statement that the dispatch was not sent “in the usual official way” probably referred to the fact that the note – in spite of Reventlow’s orders – was not delivered to the Foreign Office.¹ On arrival there the messenger learned that Palmerston had just left. He therefore took the note to Palmerston’s home and handed it to the footman requesting him expressly to give it to the Foreign Minister at once. In Palmerston’s home, where it was usual, however, for letters and dispatches to be sent, the note then was “mislaid”, until Reventlow’s talk with Palmerston on the 29th brought it to light. Both the *Times* and the German press criticized Palmerston severely on account of “the mislaid Despatch”.

Bunsen did not receive the Danish note of the 26th from Palmerston until late on the evening of the 29th.² At the Queen’s reception on the 29th Reventlow had also, incidentally, asked Bunsen about the reply to the Danish ultimatum. Bunsen had truthfully replied that he knew nothing about an ultimatum. The time limit for the reply, then, had expired before Bunsen knew that such a limit had been set.

On the 30th Bunsen answered Palmerston by referring to his (Bunsen’s) earlier statements and criticizing the Danish counter-proposal.³ Palmerston replied on the 3rd of April by sending the above-mentioned (p. 74) note dealing with the significance of Frankfurt’s decision about Article Two of the Reich Constitution. The same day he sent the Danish negotiators Bunsen’s criticism of the Danish draft and a letter saying that it would greatly facilitate the peace negotiations if the Government published the

¹ Reventlow’s dispatch 18/4, No. XXX; cf. dispatches 21/4, No. 43, and 24/4, No. 45.

² Bunsen’s dispatch 30/3, No. 40.

³ F.O. 64/307: 30/3.

special Constitution intended for Slesvig.¹ Reventlow and Treschow then urged the Government to do so, but the difficulties involved were far too great for the Government.²

Although Moltke in the dispatch of the 21st of March had found Article One "acceptable", he criticized the expression "union politique" in a later letter of the 26th as being too vague and not sufficiently clearly maintaining Slesvig's inseparability from Denmark.³ The negotiators thought that it definitely did lay this down, but found that the question was unimportant at the moment as Bunsen would accept neither the one nor the other expression.⁴

As mentioned above, Brunnow received information about the Danish ultimatum on the 27th of March. The following day he sent Palmerston a confidential note accompanied by a memorandum.⁵

He had he wrote, expressed his deep regrets to Reventlow at the steps taken by the Danish Government, and he had done the same in a dispatch yesterday to the Russian Minister in Copenhagen. "Mais les regrets seuls ne suffisent pas pour empêcher le mal." It was a question of keeping the Slesvig affair "dans les limites étroites qui lui sont propres, sans qu'elle puisse acquérir la gravité d'une complication générale. Nous sommes tous intéressés à écarter cette chance." They would surely succeed when they united their endeavours. Brunnow stated that his memorandum expressed, it was true, only his personal views, but that he was familiar with the opinions of his Government. He therefore submitted it to Palmerston at this moment when everything depended on the way "que Vous sauriez imprimer à cette affaire, afin de la résoudre dans les voies de la conciliation et de la paix."

In the memorandum Brunnow first stated that even if hostilities recommenced, the British mediation did not end. For the Friendly Powers this mediation was "un gage de paix." The war will concern Slesvig and be fought in Slesvig without this local clash becoming a question of European interest, and it will soon

¹ F.O. 22/175: 3/4.

² Reventlow's and Treschow's dispatch 4/4, No. 36.

³ Orders 26/3, No. 34.

⁴ Reventlow's (and Treschow's) dispatches 31/3, No. 32, and 1/4, No. 33.

⁵ F.O. 65/374.

again be succeeded by peace negotiations. Britain's peace basis of the 13th of March was the one which was most suitable for an understanding. The Friendly Powers "qui ont un égal intérêt au maintien de l'équilibre dans le Nord" should steer towards this goal.

Palmerston could be satisfied with these statements of Brunnow's. "Nothing in my opinion," he replied, "can be more just than the reflections and suggestions which are contained in that paper."¹ In the following chapter we shall see the results of Palmerston's and Brunnow's united efforts to limit the conflict and to reopen the negotiations.

7. The Question of Slesvig's Constitution.

Brunnow's Initiative. Palmerston's Proposals of the 17th of April and the 9th of May for an Armistice.

Denmark's termination of the armistice and the new outbreak of hostilities evoked the disapproval not only of the mediating Power but of the Powers friendly towards Denmark, Russia, France and Sweden-Norway. In addition Denmark immediately suffered military defeats. During the encounter on the 5th of April at Egernförde between Danish naval forces and German land batteries the ship of the line "Christian VIII" blew up, and the frigate "Gefion" was captured. The rejoicing in Slesvig-Holstein and Frankfurt was indescribable. Prince Löwenstein wrote from Egernförde to Prince Albert: "es ist wohl in der Weltgeschichte niemals ein grösserer Sieg mit kleineren Mitteln erfochten worden."² And Prince Albert stated his opinion in a letter to his brother: "Es konnte nichts Glücklicheres vorkommen, und der Verlust der Schiffe mag Dänemark bereiter machen, Vernunft zu hören. . . ."³

The naval loss, however, made no difference to the Danish blockade of the German Baltic ports. But the Germans quickly gained possession of the whole of the mainland of Slesvig, and

¹ F.O. 65/374: 28/3.

² R.A.W. I 13/27: 9/4.

³ Kurt Jagow: Prinzgemahl Albert. Ein Leben am Throne (Berlin 1937), p. 195.

about the 20th of April first Slesvig-Holstein and then Federal troops crossed the frontier into Jutland.

At the same time as they terminated the armistice the Danish Government had stressed their peaceful intentions, and declared that they would keep to the defensive as far as possible – apart from the blockade, which was by way of retaliation for Germany's support of the rebels. Faced with Britain's and Russia's severe condemnation of the renewal of hostilities Moltke gave assurances in a verbal note of the 17th to the Ministers in question in Copenhagen, that the Danish offensive movements at the beginning were due to "a misunderstanding" and that the army had "again" been directed to adopt a defensive attitude.¹ However, Palmerston remarked realistically to this that Germany could not be expected to attach much importance to these reassurances as long as Danish ships continued the war against German ships and ports: "The only meaning of this order [about keeping to the defensive] is that the Danish Government hope by such a stratagem to obtain a practical Truce by Land, where they are weakest, while they continue hostilities by sea where they are strongest. It would be idle to suppose that the Germans would acquiesce in so one-sided an arrangement."²

During a talk at the beginning of May Reventlow complained to Palmerston about the "ton tranchant" which he had used in his latest dispatches.³ There are many examples of this tone in Palmerston's letters to Wynn.⁴ You must, so it is stated in a dispatch of the 1st of May, "represent to the Danish Government the losses and injuries which they are bringing upon the dominions of their Sovereign by the impolitic course which they are pursuing in regard to this war." The Danish Government had terminated the armistice at a time when the Central Power had accepted the peace basis proposed by Denmark herself. They began hostilities in spite of assurances that these would not be recommenced after the termination. Denmark seemingly believed that Germany was tired of the war, but if she thought so she had been disappointed. But if Denmark did not believe this her resumption of

¹ Ges. ark. London. Orders: 18/4, No. 45. – F.O. 22/172: 18/4, No. 77.

² F.O. 22/169: 24/4.

³ Reventlow's dispatch 7/5, No. 51.

⁴ F.O. 22/169: 24/4 and 1/5 (bis).

hostilities "against a superior Power . . ." is "an act of deliberate imprudence which it baffles all conjecture to explain."

The result will be, continued Palmerston, that the Danish troops will be driven out of Jutland; and far from the King's being able to protect the Danish population in North Slesvig from German oppression, "he has now exposed the whole Danish population of Slesvig to the calamity of the military occupation of their Country by a German Force, and upon the Jutlanders will be visited in retaliation all the severities which the Danes may inflict upon the maritime commerce of Germany." Britain "cannot too earnestly recommend to the Danish Government to lose no time in re-establishing an armistice upon any terms which the Central Power may be willing to grant as the only means of averting grievous ills from the loyal Subjects of the Danish Crown."

This was an appeal which the Danish Government far from felt called upon to comply with, probably it was not the intention either, that it should be taken literally ("upon any terms"), but only that it – together with the other reproaches with which Denmark was overwhelmed – should persuade her to adopt a more moderate attitude. The Danish negotiators in London were naturally also the object of Palmerston's anger at the new interruption of Britain's commerce. Reventlow mentioned in a later dispatch that Palmerston "half in jest, half in earnest," had threatened to send Admiral Napier to raise the blockade, and that he had said on another occasion that if they would not be guided by him the mediating Power might have to intervene – an action by no means unprecedented in history.¹ Reventlow thought, however, that such threats had not much significance.

As mentioned at the end of the last chapter, Palmerston agreed with Brunnow that, in spite of the termination of the armistice, Britain's mediation should continue, and on the basis of the protocol of the 13th of March. On the 3rd of April he wrote to Reventlow that it would greatly facilitate the peace negotiations if Denmark would publish immediately the promised, special Constitution for Slesvig.² At the same time he sent

¹ Reventlow's dispatch 10/7, No. 80.

² F.O. 22/175.

the Danish negotiators Bunsen's criticism of the Danish draft for a protocol of the 26th of March.

Although the Danish Government maintained on principle that Germany had no right to interfere in the question of Slesvig's Constitution, they showed that they were favourably disposed to Palmerston's wishes.¹ On the 23rd of April they sent Reventlow a draft for the determination of Slesvig's future constitutional position adopted by the Council of State. Moltke wrote that Brunnow's above-mentioned "aperçu" had been followed on the whole, and Reventlow was requested to inform Palmerston.

Moltke naturally realized that Bunsen would object to the draft, the first Article of which read: "The Duchy of Slesvig is inseparably united to the Kingdom of Denmark under a joint general Constitution; with a Constitution of its own for the special affairs of the Duchy. Citizenship will continue to be common [to the Duchy and the Kingdom]." But Bunsen did not see the draft. Palmerston said to Reventlow that it answered "ni à son intention ni à son attente,"² and he wrote to Wynn that he hoped that the Danish Government would not publish such a Constitution "which will only add to the existing difficulties in which Denmark is placed instead of diminishing them."³ The Constitution did not carry fairly into practice the principle which Denmark herself – in Palmerston's view – had proposed as a peace basis: Slesvig's separation from Denmark as well as from Holstein. It was, on the contrary, based on Slesvig's incorporation in Denmark, "a former attempt to effect which was the immediate cause of the war between Germany and Denmark." He had not told Bunsen of the draft.

Palmerston confirmed in a dispatch to Wynn that he had imagined that the relationship between Slesvig and Denmark would be the same as that between Norway and Sweden.⁴ However, he had, if anything, had this idea in order as far as possible to drive Denmark over towards the German view which was supported in Nesselrode's dispatch to Budberg (cf. p. 32). Wynn did not omit to "point out . . . [to Moltke] several parts which I am

¹ Ges. ark. London. Orders: 11/4, No. 42, and 23/4, No. 47. – Statsrådets Forhandl. II, p. 121 ff.

² Reventlow's dispatch 7/5, No. 51.

³ F.O. 22/169: 4/5.

⁴ Ibid.: 27/4.

convinced Your Lordship will not think likely to satisfy the expectations of the Slesvigers.”¹ When he received Palmerston’s warning not to publish the Constitution, he was able to reply that he had anticipated his wish.² Immediately after reading the draft he had asked Moltke not to go beyond communicating it to him and his colleagues “who were equally convinced of the evil consequence which would result from its being published in its present form.” In a private letter of the same date to Palmerston Wynn made a slight correction to this general statement: “Sternberg did not disapprove of it as much as my other Colleagues [Lagerheim?] and myself.”³

The day after he had pointed out to Reventlow that it was desirable to issue a separate Constitution for Slesvig at once, Palmerston informed Bunsen of the steps he had taken.⁴ Bunsen was of the opinion that negotiations had now entered upon a completely new phase – provided that Denmark had not reopened hostilities on the 3rd! – and that Palmerston by his proposal had declared himself “entschieden zu Gunsten Deutschlands.”⁵ He could not, however, believe, he wrote in his report to Berlin, that the present Danish Cabinet would agree to give Slesvig “eine wahrhaft selbständige Verfassung.”

If the above-mentioned proposal must be said to be in favour of Germany, the letter which Palmerston had sent on the 3rd to Bunsen was on the other hand, in Denmark’s favour.⁶ Referring to the Reich Constitution newly passed in Frankfurt, Article Two of which laid it down that the connection between a German country and a non-German country could only have the character of a personal union, Palmerston remarked that this seemed to him “to have settled at once and finally the real point at issue between Germany and Denmark, and to have left scarcely anything to be settled which could form a serious obstacle to the conclusion of Peace.” The Central Power could not hereafter claim any right to keep the King out of his own country or prescribe him his course of action concerning its Constitution.

¹ F.O. 22/172: 29/4, No. 87.

² Ibid.: 13/5, No. 95.

³ P.P. 13/5.

⁴ F.O. 64/307: 4/4.

⁵ Bunsen’s dispatches 5/4, No. 17 (confidential), and 5/4, No. 48.

⁶ F.O. 64/307: 3/4.

Palmerston's instructions to Cowley during the following weeks were in a similar tone. A dispatch of the 10th¹ which Cowley was instructed to read to Gagern stated: Germany went to war to uphold the connection between Slesvig and Holstein, but has made this impossible by her later decisions. The sooner Gagern and the National Assembly "can bring their minds to see and acknowledge this state of the Matter, and consequently to abstain from aggressive Measures against Denmark, with reference to the Duchy of Slesvig, the sooner will Germany be relieved from the expenses and embarrassment, resulting from her interference in the Affairs of a Country with regard to which she can no longer claim any right." The King of Denmark had promised to give Slesvig a Constitution "separate from that of Denmark," and would certainly do so. Then there was little else left "to be done as between Denmark and Germany except to conclude a Treaty reestablishing Peace between them."

On Cowley's reporting that Gagern would be satisfied if the relationship between Denmark and Slesvig were the same as that between Norway and Sweden, Palmerston remarked in a dispatch, also of the 10th: Germany has no right to prescribe to the King of Denmark "the particular kind of constitution which he is to give to Slesvig."² That "the two cases are different in many essential aspects" told against taking Norway-Sweden as a model, both Denmark and Slesvig being too small to be placed in such a relationship. The relationship, moreover, between Sweden and Norway was not of such a kind that it could serve as an example to others. — The difference between Palmerston's lecture here to Cowley and his declarations as seen above to Wynn can be put down, I believe, to his efforts as mediator to bring the parties together.

A week later Palmerston again emphasized in a communication to Cowley that by Article Two of the Reich Constitution any basis for Frankfurt's intervention in Slesvig's internal affairs had disappeared.³ He asked Cowley besides to suggest to the Central Government that they ought now to let the Slesvig deputies retire from the Assembly as Germany "no longer puts forward a pre-

¹ F.O. 30/120: 10/4, No. 115.

² *Ibid.*: 10/4, No. 116.

³ *Ibid.*: 17/4, No. 119 and No. 124.

tension that Slesvig forms or is to form a part of Germany." The presence of Slesvig deputies at Frankfurt was a symbol of aggression and gave rise to irritation in Denmark.

As mentioned in the last chapter, Bunsen had returned his credentials as Frankfurt's negotiator to Gagern on the 1st of April on account of the contrary instructions he received from Frankfurt and Berlin. He had, however, declared that he was willing to undertake the task until a successor was appointed. However, no successor was appointed, and for more than another six weeks Bunsen had to hold this strange double post. The renewal of hostilities also, for that matter, put an end to the conflict which had arisen between Frankfurt and Berlin. Berlin had not yet either made a final decision about the election of Friedrich Wilhelm IV as German Emperor by the National Assembly on the 28th of March, or about the Reich Constitution. Not until a month later did Berlin reject both. However, at the same time she continued her efforts to unite the German Governments under Prussian leadership. Under these conditions it was important not to forfeit the goodwill which her intervention on behalf of the popular Slesvig-Holstein cause had won for her. Bunsen then, was allowed to continue as the mouthpiece of the nationalistic circles in Frankfurt. On the 8th of April Meyendorff wrote to Nesselrode: "Bunsen a mieux aimé désobéir aux ordres de son Roi et bienfaiteur, que d'être accusé dans quelque journal d'avoir trahi la cause nationale. . ."¹

On the 4th Bunsen replied to Palmerston's above-mentioned short note of the 3rd by sending what he called "quelques observations,"² which, in his long-winded way, filled ten pages. I shall just mention that he emphasized that if Denmark had begun the war Germany would have been freed from all her obligations and could reserve for herself complete liberty of action. Several days later he wrote to Berlin that he assumed that the renewal of hostilities would put a temporary stop to the negotiations in London.³ He urged Germany to wage war energetically and was of the opinion: "Nie ist eine Sache reiner, edler

¹ Hoetzsch. II, p. 185.

² F.O. 64/307.

³ Bunsen's dispatch 9/4, No. 18 (confidential).

und klarer gewesen, als die der von Deutschland vertretenen Herzogthümer."

Bunsen's view that the renewal of hostilities placed Germany in a free position and temporarily interrupted further negotiations under Britain's mediation was shared neither by Palmerston nor by the Russian Minister, Brunnow. In a dispatch which the latter sent on the 5th of April to Nesselrode by "flying seal" via Meyendorff, he maintained that the negotiations in London continued "à marcher vers une solution pacifique."¹ Everything depended on the wisdom prevailing in Berlin. According to Reventlow's communications Denmark would only occupy North Slesvig as far as Flensburg-Husum, and if Prussia did not prevent her doing this, Denmark would refrain from blockading the German ports.

On the 13th Brunnow sent Palmerston a note in which he expressed a wish to speak to him "sur l'affaire Danoise, qu'il serait bon de remettre sur une meilleure voie, avant qu'elle ne se complique davantage."² The talk took place the next day and Brunnow was said to have pointed out that after the catastrophe at Egernförde it was not so easy for Denmark to take the initiative in reopening armistice negotiations.³ When Palmerston told Brunnow that Bunsen intended to resign the task of German negotiator Brunnow answered that as long as he had not done this officially and Frankfurt had not replaced him with another, there was nothing to prevent his being sent – as Reventlow was to be sent – "la communication, dont nous avons parlé, Samedi, entre nous."⁴ It would be a long step towards the reopening of peace negotiations. Even if Bunsen replied that he considered that his authority had expired, he would not be able to refuse to forward the communication to Frankfurt, and it could possibly be sent through Cowley.

The following day when Brunnow sent Palmerston a copy of a dispatch from Nesselrode on Walachia, he again asked him not to lose sight of the Danish affair.⁵ He would like to be able to tell

¹ Ges.ark. London. Orders: 18/4, No. 45; cf. 2/5, No. 51. – Ungern Sternberg's dispatch 18/4, No. 57, to Nesselrode.

² P.P.

³ Reventlow's dispatch 19/4, No. 42.

⁴ Brunnow's letter 16/4. P.P. – Copy in F.O. 65/374.

⁵ F.O. 65/374. – Copy of Brunnow's letter 17/4 in P.P.

the Tsar that Palmerston had done something "pour remettre la négociation en train, afin d'empêcher que la continuation des hostilités n'entraîne une complication plus grave dans le Nord." "Cette maudite affaire," as he called it.

Brunnow had his wish fulfilled immediately. On the 17th Palmerston sent a note both to Bunsen and Reventlow appealing to them to conclude an armistice so that they would be able to continue the peace negotiations under Britain's mediation.¹ The note expressed deep regret at the renewal of hostilities just at a time when the negotiations seemed to be leading to results. It was suggested that the Generals should conclude the armistice and that the line of demarcation should correspond to the respective positions of the forces at the conclusion of the armistice. The armistice should run from month to month with three weeks notice of termination. Palmerston stated in the note that the British Government were prepared to let a Briton be intermediary during the conclusion of the armistice.

On hearing of the note from Palmerston, Brunnow was loud in his praises of it.² If only a little goodwill could be found in Denmark and Prussia, Palmerston's plan for the re-opening of the negotiations must succeed, he believed.

In Frankfurt, at any rate, little goodwill existed. Palmerston had – also on the 17th – informed Bunsen of an extract of a dispatch from Reventlow expressing Denmark's love of peace and readiness to resume negotiations on the basis of the Danish counter-proposal of the 26th of March.³ Bunsen replied by saying that Frankfurt had rejected this plan, so that it could receive no consideration at the negotiations.⁴ He would not go into the question as to how far the peace basis had ceased to be valid at the resumption of hostilities. In another note, of the same date, to Palmerston Bunsen stated that the questions concerning the cessation of hostilities, the re-opening of the negotiations and the retention of the peace basis, were to be settled by the Central Power.⁵ He criticized, in addition, the proposal for an armistice: the armistice ought to last the whole year, status quo should

¹ F.O. 64/307. – F.O. 22/175.

² F.O. 65/374: Jeudi Soir [19/4].

³ F.O. 22/175: 16/4. – F.O. 64/307: 17/4.

⁴ F.O. 64/307: 18/4.

⁵ Ibid.: 18/4.

continue in the Duchies, and there must be a prospect of a sensible peace.

It can be seen that it was Bunsen's intention now to make the German demands more rigorous. Palmerston answered briefly that he realized, naturally, that Bunsen had to send his proposal to Frankfurt, and that Britain, for that matter, would only be pleased if the armistice lasted longer than had been suggested.¹

In connection with the doubt prevailing among the diplomats in London as to whether Bunsen was still Frankfurt's negotiator, I shall mention that in a dispatch of the 17th to Berlin he stated that the Reich Ministry had recently requested him to carry on the negotiations for the time being.² He believed that his so doing would be in conformity with the wishes of the Prussian Government ("im Sinne der Königlichen Regierung"). Three days later he wrote to Berlin that he had expressed himself very cautiously in his reply to Palmerston.³ The moment had come "sich über die ganze Tragweite der schleswigschen Frage ins Klare zu setzen." Whether he really succeeded in making the matter clear to the Berlin Cabinet by his detailed exposition pro et contra which filled forty pages in the draft, must remain undecided. But he stressed the importance of not discontinuing the British mediation as Britain hereby prevented Russia from interfering, "obwohl es vielleicht fortfahren wird, zu gelegener Zeit damit zu schrecken. Es will vor allem anderen den Frieden. . ." In general, he stated, Palmerston will treat Germany with respect and consideration.

In contrast to Frankfurt's attitude, a definite desire for an armistice and the re-opening of negotiations was expressed in Copenhagen even before Palmerston's proposal of the 17th of April became known there. The reason for this wish was partly the unfavourable military position, and partly the attitude of the "Friendly" Powers, who not only refrained from supporting Denmark during the renewed hostilities, but who, as mentioned before, severely reproached Denmark for terminating the armistice. The hopes entertained by the Danish Government of active Russian support were extinguished by the Tsar Nicholas's letter

¹ F.O. 64/307: 20/4.

² Bunsen's dispatch 17/4, No. 53.

³ 20/4, No. 19 (confidential).

of the 29th of March to Frederik VII in reply to the latter's request of the 20th.¹ The letter stressed that in the case of a new war Russia must remain neutral for the sake of her own interests and the welfare of Northern Europe.

The Tsar's letter which came via Berlin, did not reach Copenhagen until about the middle of April.² It was brought by the Secretary to the Russian Legation in Berlin, Glinka, who had also letters with him from Meyendorff to Ungern Sternberg and from Westmorland to Wynn. In the letter to Wynn (of the 11th),³ Westmorland wrote: "It is very despairing after a year's labour to have come round to nearly the same point as where we began." The same day as he had written the letter he had spoken to Brandenburg, who had given him assurances of Prussia's desire for peace, "and with this view they had represented against an order of the Central Government to push military measures with vigor and they had also represented against an attack upon Jutland." Prussia was willing to conclude an armistice, but in that case the blockade must be raised.

On receiving these letters both Wynn and Sternberg approached Moltke to persuade Denmark to take some favourable action. On the 14th Wynn wrote to Westmorland that the suspension of the blockade would be a bitter pill for the King and people to swallow especially at the moment, "when they are anxious to show that their late disaster has not crippled their means of carrying on the Naval war."⁴ Wynn's and Sternberg's representations to Moltke, however, brought about the result they wished: a promise of the suspension of the blockade in return for an armistice. They were informed of this in a note of the 17th which Wynn wrote that he received at 1 a.m. on the 18th.⁵ Glinka, then, was able to take a copy of this back with him to Berlin.

The note had been put before the Danish Council of State on the 16th, but the form adopted that day was not the final one.⁶ Wynn told Palmerston in his dispatch that Moltke showed him

¹ Löfgren, p. 190 f.

² Westmorland, III, p. 377 ff. and 413 ff. — Hoetzsch, II, p. 187: Meyendorff's dispatch 13/4. — Ungern Sternberg's dispatch 15/4, No. 56.

³ Cf. Westmorland's dispatch 12/4, No. 129. F.O. 64/298.

⁴ Westmorland, III, p. 413 ff.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 441 ff.

⁶ Statsrådets Forhandl. II, p. 115.

the draft and that he suggested "some alterations, which have been adopted, but not to the extent I should have wished."¹ He believed, however, that the main object had been achieved: "that of shewing that the desire for Peace expressed at Berlin will be responded to here." The Danish Government had wanted Germany to evacuate the whole of Slesvig, but Wynn had urged upon Moltke that the Central Government would probably not approve that; and as it was only a question of a suspension of hostilities, and the question of the civil administration had been left undecided, it could be left to the Commanders-in-Chief to define the line of demarcation.

Moltke's note of the 17th to Wynn and Sternberg stated first, as mentioned above (p. 81), that the Danish army had been given orders some days ago to keep to the defensive, and the orders would be repeated.² The draft for a Constitution for Slesvig would be sent to London as soon as possible. If the peace basis, Slesvig's independence of Germany, was maintained, and Denmark received assurances that Prussia was acting not only in her own name, but also in the name of the Central Government, the King would order the Navy to refrain from attack and would raise the blockade if the opponent's army retreated behind a line agreed upon by the Generals.

Wynn had first suggested for the peace basis the form "La Base de l'indépendance restant établie . . .," which the Danes had changed to the indefinite "Aussitôt que la Base de la Paix aura été établie. . ." However in a postscript to the dispatch to Palmerston Wynn stated that Ungern Sternberg regarded Wynn's suggestion as the preferable one by far, for which reason he had got Moltke to accept it with the addition of "de l'Allemagne". That cannot have been difficult for Sternberg.

Wynn commented on the note: "the whole paper is ill drawn up," but he believed, as mentioned above, that the main object: to show Denmark's desire for peace had been achieved. When Moltke informed the Danish negotiators in London of the note he remarked that it was the intention of the Government to put an end to the various contradictory interpretations of the words

¹ F.O. 22/172: 18/4, No. 77.

² Ges.ark. London. Orders: 18/4, No. 45 with enclosure. — U. Min. Gehejmeregistratur 1849 17/4. — Ungern Sternberg's dispatches 15/4, No. 56; 18/4, No. 57.

with which Palmerston had defined the peace basis, and that the Government would not commit themselves regarding a line of demarcation. But above all, he added, the Government would gain time for the negotiations in London and they have wanted "prouver son esprit de modération et regagner le terrain qui pourrait être perdu à cet égard."

According to Westmorland's assurances Berlin received Moltke's note favourably and sent it to Frankfurt recommending it and suggesting that the negotiations should be entrusted to Prussia.¹ Cowley refrained from showing Moltke's note to Gagern as he thought it was impossible for the Central Government to accept its proposal.² But Frankfurt received the note direct from Berlin together with a note which Cowley informed Palmerston was "one of those incomprehensible notes, which . . . characterize all the communications of the Prussian Cabinet on this question. It recommends that the Danish propositions should be taken into consideration. It advises in one passage that the frontiers of Jutland should not be crossed by German troops and in another that the war should be pushed with vigor, the only place where it can be pushed with vigor being Jutland."

Cowley characterized the duplicity of Prussia's politics in a private letter to Westmorland: "one language has been held by the Prussian Cabinet to foreign Powers, and another to the Central Power."³ I shall not go into further details about the correspondence between the two British diplomats on the subject, or about Arnim's attempt to justify his actions to Westmorland.⁴ Prussia's attitude was dictated, as mentioned before, by her unwillingness to break with Frankfurt over such a popular question as the Slesvig-Holstein one. Cowley was right, Westmorland wrote to him, that Prussia ought to have taken "a line of its own but there has been such a division of opinion as to the Central Power, the Unity of Germany, the hope of getting to the Head of it, the ambition of being Imp¹, that so straight forward a decision was not ventured upon and is not now. . . ."⁵

¹ Westmorland. III, p. 463 ff. — Westmorland's dispatch 25/4, No. 145. F.O. 64/298.

² F.O. 30/125: 25/4, No. 207.

³ Westmorland. III, p. 485 ff.: 27/4.

⁴ Ibid. p. 493 ff. — Westmorland. IV, p. 5 ff.; 21 ff.; 29 ff. and 41 ff.

⁵ Westmorland. IV, p. 21 ff.

The German troops, then, were allowed to invade Jutland, and Frankfurt, unhindered by Prussia, was allowed to stick to her rejection of both Palmerston's and Moltke's proposals of the 17th of April.

On the 18th when Ungern Sternberg sent Brunnow a copy of Moltke's note he remarked that it must be able to satisfy the exigencies of the moment: "en offrant pour la reprise des négociations des facilités plus grandes même que V.E. m'avait demandées."¹ On the 23rd Brunnow sent Palmerston copies of the notes, stating that it was thereby evident that Britain's efforts for a peaceful solution had received the genuine support of Russia. He made many flattering statements about Palmerston's tireless work for peace. Palmerston thanked him in the same tone for his information which seemed "to hold out a fair prospect that the proposal which, at your friendly suggestion, I recently made to the contending parties for a renewed suspension of hostilities, may produce a successful result."²

Bunsen was informed of Denmark's favourable action of the 17th both by Brunnow and Berlin.³ Arnim's communication on the subject was favourably disposed towards the Danish proposal and towards a re-opening of the negotiations on the basis of the 3rd of February. He believed that Frankfurt was also prepared to agree to this.

It appeared that Frankfurt was not willing. On the 2nd of May Bunsen received the Central Government's instructions of the 27th and the next day he sent a copy of them to Palmerston.⁴ The instructions rejected the proposal for an armistice and stated that Frankfurt was not willing to resume the peace negotiations on the basis of Slesvig's independence. On the other hand, she could agree to one of Palmerston's proposals made last summer: either separation or a Slesvig-Holstein, without, however, the incorporation of Slesvig in Germany. Palmerston replied that Britain could not "support or countenance any attempt on either side to withdraw from the Basis of arrangement already agreed

¹ F.O. 65/374: Brunnow's note 23/4 with enclosure.

² *Ibid.*: 28/4.

³ Bunsen's dispatch 24/4, No. 60. — Arnim's dispatch 22/4.

⁴ F.O. 64/307: 3/5.

upon in Principle between the two Parties.”¹ He regretted that the communication was unsuitable to bring about an understanding.

In Frankfurt, as planned, Cowley had also “discouraged the slightest hope” of the possibility of withdrawing from the basis of the 3/2.² During a talk which he had with Gagern, probably on the 6th of May, Gagern was said to have stated that if Denmark would agree to an armistice of a suitable duration, and “formally” recognize the Third Plan as expressed by Britain, the Central Power would negotiate “upon that basis”, but retain its right during the negotiations to try to carry through one of the other two proposals.³ How far it could then be called a negotiation “upon that basis”, I cannot say. Cowley remarked in addition: “If the Central Power should conceive the National Cause likely to be benefited by a continuation of the rupture with Denmark, so great is its present infatuation, it will continue the war at all regards, as long as it can find troops to fight.”

As was the case in Frankfurt, it took some time for the Danish Government to give a final answer to Palmerston’s proposal of the 17th. The purpose of Moltke’s note of the same day has been explained above. On receiving Palmerston’s proposal the Danish Government were at first willing to let the Danish negotiators accept it, but on second thoughts they asked for time to consider it.⁴ It was the 2nd of May before Moltke gave Reventlow and Treschow definite instructions about the Government’s decision.⁵

In order to support Palmerston’s proposal Brunnow had sent couriers with letters on the 19th to Ungern Sternberg and Meyendorff.⁶ The same day Brunnow said to Treschow that during the armistice North Slesvig with Flensburg ought to be placed again under the King’s authority. Reventlow did not take part in the talk as his children had measles, and the Russian diplomat was terrified of catching them.

Sternberg’s representations to Moltke resulted in his note to him of the 30th of April, approved by the Council of State.⁷ It

¹ F.O. 64/307: 5/5.

² F.O. 30/125: 29/4, No. 218; cf. 6/5, No. 236.

³ F.O. 30/126: 7/5, No. 237 (confidential).

⁴ Ges.ark. London. Orders: 25/4, No. 48; 26/4, No. 49; 29/4, No. 50. – Statsrådet’s Forhandl. II, p. 129 ff.

⁵ 2/5, No. 51.

⁶ Ibid. and Reventlow’s dispatches 19/4, No. 42, and 21/4, No. 43.

⁷ Wynn sent 3/5, No. 89, Palmerston a copy of this. F.O. 22/172.

might serve as a guide for them, Moltke wrote in his dispatch of the 2nd of May to the negotiators. The note first mentioned Denmark's desire for peace and her verbal note of the 17th by which there had already been established "une concordance entre les dispositions respectives. . ." The German troops ought to withdraw at any rate behind the line Flensburg-Husum, so that North Slesvig again came under the King's authority. The Constitution which would be given for Slesvig would make it evident that Denmark did not intend to incorporate Slesvig.

In the dispatch Moltke directed the negotiators to insist on Germany's continuing to recognize Slesvig's separation from Holstein as the peace basis. In addition he remarked that if the line of demarcation cannot be obtained between Flensburg and Husum then Husum must remain south of the line. A report must be sent to Copenhagen if a demand were made for Flensburg also to remain south of the line. Such a provisional arrangement can in no way prejudice the legitimate rights of the Danish Crown. The opponent's wish for an armistice of eight months could be met.

Before Moltke's instructions reached London, Reventlow had on the 6th had a talk with Palmerston to explain to him why the Danish negotiators had not so far been able to discuss the proposal of the 17th in more detail.¹ He found Palmerston much more friendly than he had expected from the note which Palmerston had sent the Danish negotiators on the 4th.² This note again reproached Denmark severely for terminating the armistice and for "this needless and uncalled for resumption of hostilities."

How far Palmerston's friendly tone had been caused by the French dispatch of the 30th of April in Denmark's favour, which Admiral Cécille, the French Minister, communicated to Palmerston is undecided.³ At any rate, the dispatch did not influence the note of the 4th. Palmerston told Cécille during their talk that he still urged the two parties to conclude an armistice, but that the German military victories had resulted in the idea of aban-

¹ Reventlow's dispatch 7/5, No. 51.

² F.O. 22/175.

³ Cécille's dispatch 3/5, No. 32. — Reventlow's dispatch 5/5, No. 50. — Löfgren's statement, p. 188, that it was virtually France's action that prevented the negotiations in London from "coming to nothing" is incorrect, as will be seen from my account.

doing the peace basis of the 3rd of February. Palmerston, whom Cécille incidentally found somewhat passive as regards concluding the affair, believed that France as a non-mediator could contribute greatly to securing an armistice by taking a firmer line in Copenhagen and Frankfurt.

If Palmerston was perhaps somewhat passive, then Brunnow, as we have seen, was all the more active. He had a lengthy discussion on the 3rd with Cécille, to whom he explained that as France and Russia had common interests in the Danish question: the integrity of the Danish monarchy and the maintenance of peace, they ought – in spite of the difference of their forms of government – act jointly in this case. Brunnow's secretary, Koudriaffsky, whom he had sent to Berlin, had returned with the assurance that Berlin was prepared for peace, but that the Cabinet "tirailé entre ses embarras intérieurs et ses relations avec Francfort n'avait pas assez de force propre pour réaliser ces bonnes dispositions et qu'une pression exercée sur lui et surtout à Francfort par la France, la Russie et la Suède, était nécessaire pour les convertir en fait." France and Russia ought to agree to re-establish peace in the North and they would not part company, in this way, with Britain, but on the contrary accelerate Britain's mediation.

On the 8th Reventlow was able to inform Palmerston that he had received the necessary instructions for the conclusions of the armistice.¹ The next day at 12 o'clock the Danish Commissioners negotiated with Palmerston, who now, according to Reventlow, considered the state of the Danish cause "avec une impartialité louable." Later the same day Palmerston had a talk with Bunsen and told him of the Danish proposals, which he recommended for the following reasons: (1) the end of bloodshed; (2) the raising of the blockade, and (3) the present hopeless state of affairs in Germany which must make her interested in peace, and during which she needed troops at home.² In connection with the suggested line of demarcation Bunsen asked if it were an attempt to revive the former proposal for separation. Palmerston said that he had asked the Danish negotiators about that himself, but they had definitely denied it. Bunsen had, of course,

¹ Reventlow's dispatch 9/5, No. 52. – F.O. 22/175: 8/5.

² Bunsen's dispatch 10/5, No. 69.

many objections to make to the Danish proposals, and an hour after the talk he noted down his "observations" in a communication to Palmerston.¹ The proposals could not be approved either on military or other grounds, and they had scarcely "a chance of success in Germany and in Slesvig."

After his verbal negotiations with the parties Palmerston the same day drew up a draft for a protocol concerning an armistice which he sent to the parties in question requesting them urgently to accept it.² Although the draft did not quite correspond to the wishes of the Danish Government, it was very favourably disposed towards these wishes. The next day, in a letter to Russell, Palmerston said that it really was Reventlow's proposal "and I have adopted it as my own, only because such a Form gives a better Chance of its being agreed to by the People at Frankfort."³ To "arrest the further effusion of Blood and to pave the way for the conclusion of a definitive Treaty of Peace" a proposal was made for an armistice on land and at sea until the end of the year and then continuing with a month's notice of termination. The line of demarcation between the troops should be a line from Flensburg to Husum, both towns to be north of this line. The parties were to "resume without delay the negotiation for a definitive Treaty of Peace."

The draft for the protocol was sent the next day to Cowley and Westmorland, who were directed to try to persuade Frankfurt and Berlin, respectively, to instruct Bunsen immediately to sign the protocol "to put an end to these disastrous hostilities."⁴ The terms of the protocol were the only terms on which Denmark could be persuaded to conclude an armistice, and she was supported by France, Russia and Sweden. Germany ought to consider the great amount of damage which the blockade caused to trade and Germany's only means of retaliation was the occupation of Jutland. But such an action would probably "bring other Powers into the Field," and if Germany levied heavy contributions in Jutland Denmark was strong enough to attack German coastal ports.

¹ F.O. 64/307: 9/5.

² F.O. 64/307: 9/5. – F.O. 22/175: 9/5. – Reventlow's dispatch 11/5, No. 53 with enclosure.

³ P.R. O. 30/22. 7 F.

⁴ F.O. 30/121: 10/5, Nos. 141 and 142. – F.O. 64/295: 10/5, Nos. 121 and 122.

Palmerston naturally informed Brunnow of the protocol.¹ In his reply of the 11th Brunnow praised "Your excellent protocol" and stated that he was going to send a secretary to Berlin to ask Meyendorff to double his efforts to get Prussia to instruct Bunsen to sign.² He had spoken yesterday to the Danish negotiators and advised them to sign without raising formal difficulties and said that he would be responsible, if necessary, to the Danish Government. If Bunsen refused, the King of Prussia ought to force him to sign; he was, first and foremost, the Prussian Minister, then the German Ambassador.

Bunsen did not feel like this, though, and Palmerston told Brunnow in his reply of the same day that Bunsen asserted that he could not sign the protocol without special authority from Frankfurt.³ Palmerston mentioned that he had appealed to Cowley and Westmorland to get Frankfurt and Berlin to send Bunsen positive instructions: "On le fera peut-être à Berlin, mais je doute un peu quant à Frankfort." He had spoken to Bunsen along the same lines as his appeals to the British Ministers.

As Brunnow mentioned, Reventlow and Treschow had negotiated with him on the 10th.⁴ Brunnow had now got the better of his fear of the Reventlow children's measles. The Danish Commissioners pointed out the changes necessary in the draft for the protocol to make it agree entirely with their instructions. As stated, Brunnow advised them to accept the draft if necessary in its entirety; he would be glad to accept 3/4 of the responsibility for this.

After his talk with Brunnow Reventlow went to see Palmerston. He found Bunsen waiting to see Palmerston but he (Bunsen) assured him, however, that he would not take more than ten minutes and, Reventlow wrote: "cette fois-ci le Ministre de Prusse a dit la vérité." Reventlow mentioned to Palmerston the points which he would like changed – the next day he sent a letter on the subject⁵ – but ended by saying that he and Treschow were willing to sign the protocol as it stood, if Bunsen were.

In Copenhagen Moltke would have preferred the Danish

¹ F.O. 65/374: 10/5.

² Ibid.: Vendredi matin [11/5].

³ Ibid.: 11/5.

⁴ Reventlow's dispatch 11/5, No. 53.

⁵ F.O. 22/175: 11/5.

negotiators to sign the protocol on their own responsibility.¹ The matter had now to go before the Council of State, but on the 19th he was able to authorize them to sign. On the 24th Reventlow and Treschow told Palmerston this and declared that they were even willing to consider some modifications of the line of demarcation.²

The note in question said that they were awaiting instructions from their Government regarding the question of the amnesty for the rebels in that part of Slesvig north of the line of demarcation. Palmerston touched on this question on Saturday the 12th when he and Reventlow were conversing in Palmerston's drawing room. Reventlow thought it was Baron Heintze, a former member of the Joint Government, who, during his present stay in London, had got Bunsen to speak about the matter to Palmerston.³ The question was raised formally in Palmerston's note of the 15th to Reventlow, a note which showed Palmerston to be strongly influenced by German views.⁴ The note stated that the King of Denmark should immediately give full amnesty to all residents in that part of Slesvig which, by the terms of the armistice, would be occupied by Danish troops. Britain would not hand over any part of Slesvig to these troops "without the most formal security that the persons and property belonging to such territory shall be protected against any acts of resentment which the violent Danish Party at Copenhagen might wish to exercise towards the Schleswickers."

The statement made by the Danish negotiators of a possibility of certain modifications in the draft for a protocol was caused by the fact that neither Frankfurt nor Berlin appeared willing to agree to the protocol. On the 13th Cowley wrote from Frankfurt that he would defer sending a report as the Reich Government was being reorganized.⁵ He believed that Prussia would approve the proposal and "in the present weak state of the Central Power, very little attention will be paid to objections coming from hence, should the new Ministry be inclined to raise any."

The new Reich Cabinet, in which General Jochmus was

¹ Ges.ark. London. Orders: 17/5, Nos. 57 and 58, and 19/5, No. 59.

² F.O. 22/175: 24/5.

³ Reventlow's dispatch 14/5, No. 54.

⁴ F.O. 22/175: 15/5.

⁵ F.O. 30/126: 13/5, No. 249.

Foreign Minister, did raise objections.¹ But after a protest on the 10th of May from the National Assembly about the entry of Prussian troops into revolutionary Saxony, Friedrich Wilhelm recalled the Prussian deputies from the Assembly, and on the 18th Prussia informed the Regent that she had decided to take over the leadership of both the military and the civil sides of the Danish affair. The same day Brandenburg sent Bunsen orders directing him in future to accept instructions only from Berlin.² Brandenburg had taken over the Foreign Ministry himself when Arnim had retired on the 1st of May. It was not until the 26th that Bunsen informed Frankfurt that, according to Berlin's decision, he would have to break off relations with them, and he pointed out that he had sent in his resignation on the 1st of April.³

Palmerston's hopes that Berlin would perhaps approve of his protocol were dashed. On the 14th Westmorland had communicated the matter to Brandenburg, but did not receive a reply until the 18th, that is to say, the day before Prussia took the Slesvig-Holstein affair into her own hands.⁴ Denmark would have to make acceptable proposals to Germany, Brandenburg wrote, but Palmerston's protocol did not contain such proposals, and did not take the military position into consideration. Prussia wanted a final peace, but would agree to an armistice and evacuate Jutland if Denmark raised the blockade and returned the captured ships. Westmorland promised, of course, to send Palmerston the note, but told Brandenburg that he viewed the matter "with extreme regret." He considered its terms as unacceptable to Denmark, and they were very different from Palmerston's "whose impartial conduct in this negotiation has on all sides been recognized." However, after Westmorland had informed Brandenburg of Palmerston's note of the 15th about the amnesty, he thought that Brandenburg's attitude might be regarded as a little more friendly, provided that Denmark granted an amnesty.

Brandenburg repeated the above-mentioned terms for the armistice in his dispatch of the 19th to Bunsen. If these terms could not be met, Prussia was willing to withdraw the German

¹ F.O. 30/126: 19/5, No. 270, and 26/5, No. 287.

² Brandenburg's dispatches 18/5 and 19/5.

³ Copy of Bunsen's dispatch 26/5 to Jochmus.

⁴ F.O. 64/299: 16/5, No. 187, and 19/5, No. 194.

troops behind a line between Flensburg and Tønder, provided that North Slesvig be occupied by 3–4000 Slesvig-Holstein troops[!]. If, however, the Danish Government were inclined to agree to the former proposal for separation, Prussia would recognize the line between Flensburg and Tønder as the final frontier, and would conclude peace preliminaries on this basis. In that case Prussia would withdraw her troops right out of Slesvig, and would not prevent the occupation of North Slesvig by Danish troops. Brandenburg realized that the Slesvig-Holsteiners were opposed to such an arrangement, “glauben aber, dass in dem nördlichen Theile von Schleswig kein ernstliches Widerstreben dagegen zu befürchten sei,” and mentioned that the advantages of a definitive arrangement made up for the difficulties.

Bunsen informed Palmerston of what he called the most important parts of Brandenburg's instructions.¹ On the 25th Baron Ernst Stockmar, who was Bunsen's secretary, informed his father – and through him Prince Albert and the Queen – of Brandenburg's dispatches of the 18th and 19th.² “Du siehst, lieber Vater,” he wrote, “die Instruktionen sind doch etwas besser als zu Arnims Zeit. Palmerston ist vorerst nur der erste Theil vertraulich mitgetheilt worden. Er hat sich darüber sehr ungnädig geäußert. Die Dänen sind auch sehr ärgerlich. . .”

Palmerston's “ungracious remarks” – they soon became much more severe – were made during a talk on the 24th with Bunsen. Later Bunsen sent Palmerston new proposals the correct interpretation of which developed into a lengthy polemic with the Danish negotiators.³ There is hardly any need to dwell on the matter here.

The day after the fruitless talk Palmerston sent Bunsen one of his fulminating letters.⁴ Before referring to this letter mention must be made of the fact that Brunnow had informed Palmerston on the 18th of two dispatches just received from St. Petersburg.⁵ One of them was the circular dispatch in which Russia gave the reasons for her help to Austria in crushing the Hungarian revolt.

¹ F.O. 64/307: 22(23)/5. – Cf. Samwer's letter 22/5. EE. 46. b 1.

² R.A.W. I 14/46.

³ F.O. 64/307: 25/5; 31/5 and 2/6. – F.O. 22/175: 28/5, 9/6 and 13/6. – Reventlow's dispatches 29/5, No. 65, and 13/6, No. 71. – Bunsen's dispatches.

⁴ Copy of this (25/5) with Palmerston's letter 29/5 to Westmorland, P.P. – Likewise a copy with Bunsen's dispatch 26/5, No. 26, and in R.A.W. I 14/66.

⁵ F.O. 65/374: 18/5.

The other of the 9th of May dealt with the Danish affair, and stated that German troops were already in Jutland and were threatening to take Als. Ought not the Friendly Powers to prevent "la triomphe d'une des plus intolérables prétentions que l'Allemagne ait mis en avant celle d'étendre sa domination partout où sa nationalité a pu s'introduire ou laissé quelques traces?" And could the mediating Power be indifferent to the fact that her efforts remained fruitless? Nesselrode therefore proposed that Russia, Sweden and France together with Britain appealed to Berlin and Frankfort to stop the war at once and evacuate Jutland (and Als, too, if this had been taken).¹

On the 22nd Palmerston refused to take part in the joint appeal – and he was not then either aware of Prussia's attitude.² The British Government, he wrote, were still not in doubt that the negotiations would succeed. "The recent course of events at Frankfort and at Berlin seems rather favourable than otherwise to the prospect of an adjustment." Britain did not find it right "to depart from her present position of Mediator." – On the 14th Disraeli had put a question in Parliament to Palmerston about the British mediation, but Palmerston had extremely cautiously refrained from making any predictions on its success.³ He declared merely that "negotiations are going on for an armistice and the conclusion of a peace."

On learning on the 24th and 25th of Prussia's rejection of the protocol of the 9th, Palmerston sent Bunsen the above-mentioned threatening letter on the 25th.⁴ He was to inform his Government confidentially that Britain "is becoming wearied of its unavailing Mediation . . . and that its Patience is nearly exhausted." The hope of a result had for a long time rested on the belief that "the violence and Injustice of Frankfort would be counteracted by the moderation and Equity of Berlin," but the latest communications from Berlin and from Bunsen himself "have gone far to dissipate that belief, and we are beginning to foresee the approach of the moment where we *must* give up in despair the task of mediation

¹ Cf. Buchanan's dispatches from St. Petersburg 5/5, No. 163, and 10/5, No. 177. F.O. 65/364.

² F.O. 65/374: 22/5.

³ Hansard's Parliamentary Debates. Vol. CV. 3d Series (8/5–11/6 49), p. 388. – Reventlow's dispatch 15/5, No. 55.

⁴ Cf. Hoetzsch. II, p. 208: Meyendorff's dispatch 2/6.

and range ourselves in accordance with our Treaty Engagements, as Parties in conjunction with France and Russia." The British Government would be very sorry if this became necessary, "but we feel that we should not be dealing fairly and cordially by your Government," if we did not tell them this. Palmerston ended by saying that he had written in the same strain to Westmorland.

Bunsen reacted strongly to Palmerston's threats.¹ If the British Government were "nearly exhausted" he did not understand why they did not direct their dissatisfaction towards Denmark. Britain's views were "as injurious to the honour of England as to that of Germany, namely that a government like that of Great Britain should think, Germany ought now to accept any terms dictated by Denmark, because she is, at this moment, in a state of internal dissension and fermentation." He wanted a plain answer stating Palmerston's intentions "on the present important occasion, where *an eventual declaration of war against Germany by England* may seem to be implied," although Germany has given solemn and satisfactory explanations to the whole of Europe that the occupation of Jutland was "merely defensive and temporary," and had given Britain evidence of her desire for peace and her unselfishness.

In his letter to Westmorland Palmerston expressed a wish that Westmorland should point out to Friedrich Wilhelm that it was inconsistent of Prussia to crush revolutions in Saxony and Hungary (here it was, however, Russia), but to support one in Slesvig.² Westmorland was, in addition, to explain confidentially to the Prussian Government that Britain's patience as mediator was nearly exhausted, and that she, if she gave up the mediation, would take active measures together with France and Russia to stop "this utterly unjustifiable interference of the Germans in the affairs of Slesvig." The Germans could then be forced "to retreat in a manner which would not be equally satisfactory to their national Pride."

Palmerston said in his letter that Prussia's inconsistent behaviour mentioned above, was gone into in more detail in his official dispatch. Such a dispatch, dated the 28th, was laid before

¹ Bunsen's letter 26/5. P.P. (the correspondence with Westmorland). – Copy with Bunsen's dispatch 26/5, No. 26.

² 25/5. P.P.

the Queen for approval, but she (Albert) found that it would not "produce a good effect."¹ Palmerston, she wrote – quite in the spirit of Bunsen – "must himself be too well aware of the material difference between the cases of Slesvig and Saxony to use the comparison as an argument to Prussia. The Queen never thought it was possible for Prussia to accept the last proposal of Lord Palmerston which would have given her a worse Armistice than that of Malmoe, which the Danes have broken, and this now after a long and bloody campaign."

As far as can be seen Palmerston refrained from sending the dispatch after the Queen had criticized it. On the other hand on the 29th he sent a private letter to Westmorland enclosing a copy of the letter to Bunsen, and requesting him to use the same terms to the Prussian Government: "the point clearly to explain is that we cannot be answerable for maintaining much longer our mediating and neutral position."²

In a private letter of the 29th Westmorland informed Palmerston that he had read the latter's letter of the 25th to Brandenburg.³ At a review on the morning of the 29th he had spoken for a long time to Friedrich Wilhelm who had said to him, "... give me the means and there is nothing I desire so much [as to end the war], but you know I have Ministers and they will have their own way. I never would have sent a man to begin this second war in Slesvig. I sent to tell Gagern I would not, but I believe my message was never delivered, and my troops were ordered to march without my being told of it." But as they were now in possession of a large part of Jutland he could not withdraw them for nothing.

On the 5th of June Westmorland sent a private reply to Palmerston's letter of the 29th.⁴ Brandenburg had already seen the letter of the 25th to Bunsen, he wrote, as Bunsen had sent it with the assurance that the Prussian Government "need not be alarmed at its contents as you had no intention of acting up to them." He was sorry to have to mention this as Bunsen was "a very old friend of mine but I would not know the fact I have mentioned, without putting you confidentially in possession of

¹ R.A.W. L 14/78 and 79.

² P.P.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

it." Bunsen's words were "be not alarmed at L^d P.'s letter, it is only a gun fired off to frighten."

Bunsen's mention of the warning shot is to be found in his dispatch of the 26th.¹ He knew, he wrote, that Palmerston had no authority to express such a threat without a decision made by the Cabinet and approved by the Queen.

On the 30th Palmerston informed Westmorland that he was convinced that Prussia's proposal for a line of demarcation from Flensburg to Tønder with troops in North Slesvig "belonging under the orders of the insurrectionary Government of the Duchies" would not be accepted by Denmark,² who would probably rather have submitted to German troops in North Slesvig.

I shall mention two pieces of evidence from April and May which showed that Prince Albert's sympathy was on the side of the Slesvig-Holsteiners and Frankfurt. In April the Prince sent a pamphlet defending the Slesvig-Holsteiners to Lord Aberdeen, the Conservative politician. Aberdeen's letter of thanks was not as the Prince had wished, but it is hardly likely that it has changed his views.³ Aberdeen wrote that the pamphlet "contains a very clear statement of the case; although I fear it cannot be said that it is written by a very impartial, or disinterested author." He said that British public opinion, which was favourable towards Denmark, hardly "arises so much from any conviction of its right and justice, as from that natural inclination which every man must feel to support the weak against the strong. . ." He would not claim to have studied the matter thoroughly himself, and found that Britain "has no great interest at stake," apart from the likelihood that Denmark's system of trade would be more liberal than the German one "and her ports more accessible to us." It would, though, be a different matter if "we could ever justly be called upon to give effect to our guarantee [1720], which would undoubtedly be a very serious affair."

At the beginning of May when it became fairly evident that the work of the Frankfurt National Assembly was in danger of failing, Prince Albert informed John Russell of his criticism of the views which the British Ministers in Germany expressed in

¹ 26/5, No. 26 (Geheimer Bericht).

² F.O. 64/295: 30/5, No. 139.

³ R.A.W. I 13/69: 20/4.

their dispatches "upon the subject of the contemplated changes in the political organization of Germany."¹ When Palmerston learnt of the Royal criticism from Russell he wrote to the Prince in defence of the Ministers. In his opinion they did not influence the German Governments, who, presumably, would not let themselves be influenced. He was, moreover, in doubt himself about Frankfurt's work, and he would like to hear the views of the Prince, who was so much better acquainted with the conditions than he was. This statement was probably to be taken with a grain of salt.

Prince Albert's criticism corresponded to the opinions expressed by Stockmar to Russell and Palmerston during a visit to England.² In a letter of the 7th of August to Cowley he wrote that he was "sorry to see . . . that all our English Agents in Germany, you excepted, were determined, partly from prejudice, partly from self-interest, to do to the German cause all the mischief in their power."³ On several occasions he had discussed the matter with Russell and Palmerston. Russell "fully agreed with me that it was unenglish, dangerous and mischievous. Palmerston hummed and hawed without saying or doing anything to remedy it."

Shortly after the middle of May Prussia, as has been mentioned, broke with Frankfurt and decided to take over the negotiations with Denmark herself. On the 23rd Brandenburg informed Bunsen that a Danish negotiator had arrived in Berlin, and that an attempt would be made to secure an armistice and a basis for a final peace. The actual peace negotiations, however, were to be carried on under Britain's mediation, which Prussia continued to accept with full confidence. Brandenburg wrote that Palmerston had declared in a dispatch to Westmorland that he was completely satisfied with the above-mentioned negotiations.⁴ Bunsen was to postpone further negotiations with the British Cabinet until Brandenburg could inform him of the result of the negotiations in Berlin.

¹ R.A.W. I 14/25: Palmerston's letter 8/5. — Cf. Samwer's statement in his letter 26/6 (EE. 46. bl): "Es ist der Einfluss Stockmars, der den hiesigen Hof deutschergesinnt macht, als ohne Zweifel die meisten Regierungen Deutschlands es sind."

² According to Stockmar, p. 586, Stockmar left England at the beginning of July.

³ F.O. 519/161.

⁴ See dispatch 15/5, No. 125.F.O. 64/295.

On the 26th Bunsen sent Palmerston a copy of Brandenburg's dispatch.¹ Palmerston replied on the 28th that it would give the British Government much pleasure to hear the news when the negotiations in Berlin gave satisfactory results.²

8. Direct Negotiations Between Denmark and Germany in Berlin.

The Convention of the 10th of July.

Palmerston was not surprised to learn of the opening of direct Danish-German negotiations in Berlin. As mentioned by Brandenburg, Palmerston had expressed his approval in the event of such a procedure in a dispatch of the 15th to Westmorland.

As early as the 22nd of April Westmorland had told Palmerston in a private letter that Arnim had requested him to ask what Palmerston's attitude would be to a proposal for transferring the negotiations, under Britain's mediation, from London to e.g. Wismar or Lübeck.³ Arnim counted on Frankfurt's giving Prussia full powers to negotiate, and he undoubtedly wanted the negotiations to be taken out of Bunsen's hands. There is no evidence of Palmerston's reply, and the negotiations were left in the hands of Frankfurt and Bunsen.⁴ As mentioned above, Arnim retired on the 1st of May, and Brandenburg took over the Foreign Ministry himself with Bülow as Under-Secretary of State.

At the beginning of May the idea emerged of sending a Danish negotiator to Berlin. Prussia stated officially that it was a wish expressed by Denmark, while Denmark stated that it was a Prussian suggestion. The latter is the more correct.⁵ The question must have been discussed by Meyendorff, Westmorland, and Brandenburg-Bülow and in order that neither of the two opposing parties should be considered as the originator, the initiative was taken by Meyendorff and left in his hands. He took the first step by writing a note on the 8th of May to Brandenburg. As West-

¹ F.O. 64/307.

² *Ibid.*

³ P.P.

⁴ Cf. Westmorland's dispatch 3/5, No. 166. F.O. 64/299.

⁵ For further details see Krigen 1848-50, II, p. 994 ff. and Lundqvist, p. 16 ff. — See also Ungern Sternberg's dispatch 6/5, No. 65, and private letter of the same date.

morland wrote to London, Meyendorff had received information from Copenhagen through Ungern Sternberg that the Danish Government would be prepared "to treat with Prussia for the reestablishment of Peace with Germany."¹ This information he passed on, as mentioned above, to Brandenburg. After the matter had been discussed at a Cabinet meeting, Brandenburg sent Meyendorff a note on the 9th, telling him that Prussia was willing to negotiate on the basis of the proposal of the 3rd of February. A few days later, when Westmorland informed Brandenburg that Palmerston had rejected the attempt of the Central Power to give up the above-mentioned basis, Brandenburg was very satisfied "as he felt that if the proposal he had made to Denmark to treat with Prussia was accepted, it would be satisfactory to feel that the basis upon which that negotiation was to be undertaken" would be in agreement with that to which Gagern had consented.² As appears from the statement, Westmorland also took it for granted that the proposal for the negotiations came from Prussia.

On the 7th of May Westmorland answered Wynn's letter of the 3rd, which must have concerned the opening of the negotiations between Prussia and Denmark.³ Westmorland wrote: "I think it would be a good measure to send back Bⁿ Plessen, but if a negotiation takes place *fewer stipulations* should be put forward by your side than stated by Count Moltke" in the letter of the 30th to Sternberg. — Baron Carl Plessen (Scheel-Plessen) had been in Berlin for the settlement of Denmark's claim in connection with the German requisitions in Jutland. He left Berlin when hostilities recommenced.

Westmorland's letter was brought to Copenhagen by the British Minister to Sweden, Cartwright, who was on his way back to his post in Stockholm. He handed over other communications from Berlin, possibly also correspondence between Meyendorff and Brandenburg. In Copenhagen Wynn and Sternberg then pressed Moltke to accept the proposal at once and send Plessen to Berlin.⁴ Wynn said in his dispatch of the 13th to Palmerston that it was

¹ F.O. 64/299: 8/5, No. 174, and 10/5, No. 177. — Hoetzsch. II, p. 195 f.

² F.O. 64/299: 12/5, No. 180.

³ Westmorland. IV, p. 37 ff.

⁴ Westmorland. IV, p. 81 ff. and 85 ff.: Wynn's letters to Westmorland 12/5 and 13/5. — Sternberg's dispatch 13/5, No. 76.

decided that Plessen should leave the same evening.¹ If necessary, and if there were a possibility of a congress a man of higher rank could replace him later. If the Danish Government had too many misgivings in sending Reedtz, Wynn would suggest Pechlin or Reventlow-Criminil, "both men of far superior talents to any of those who now form His Danish Majesty's Council."

Plessen's "immediate departure" came to nothing. In spite of pressure from the Russian and British Ministers Moltke postponed the decision, and brought the matter up for discussion at a meeting of the Council of State on the 14th.² In Berlin Brandenburg and Meyendorff expressed a strong desire to have Reedtz, whom they knew from the previous autumn as a negotiator who was ready to hear the views of the opposing party. However, in the Danish Cabinet, Wynn wrote, there was "a very strong Party" against him, and it was also doubtful whether he would accept the task of negotiator even if it were offered to him "after the manner his zealous, if not successful services had last year been appreciated." At the moment Reedtz was at his estate in Jutland, far away from the diplomatic scene, "unfortunately surrounded by requiring Troops."

At the meeting of the Council of State, Moltke's suggestion to send for Reedtz obtained support. Before Wynn knew of this decision he wrote to Reedtz, as he told Westmorland, "to tell him the real State of the question for fear they should not state in as strong terms as they ought to do the decided wish existing at Berlin that he should be charged with the negotiations."³

On the 15th Cartwright wrote from Copenhagen to Westmorland telling him that the Danish Government were beginning to understand that "a more pliant course is requisite, and that the overtures which have been made to it from Berlin during the last few days ought to be met in a conciliatory spirit."⁴ He had been present at a discussion between Wynn, Sternberg and Plessen, but found Plessen's statements on "The Prussian proposition

¹ F.O. 22/172: 13/5, No. 97.

² Statsrådets Forhandl. II, p. 143 f.

³ Westmorland. IV, p. 93 ff. — Wynn wrote in his letter of the 14th to Reedtz: "You will have been informed that Count Brandenburg, Lord Westmorland and Baron Meyendorff have all most strenuously advised and even requested that you should be the person selected as most likely to bring matters to a successful termination." H. C. Reedtz's private papers. G II.

⁴ Westmorland. IV, p. 97 ff.

made through Baron Meyendorff . . . so stiff and rigid and pedantic," that he agreed with Wynn and Sternberg that Plessen was not a very suitable negotiator. Cartwright had also seen Pechlin whom he called an old friend, and mentioned that he (Pechlin), who was "extremely intimate" with Reedtz, was convinced that "whatever grievance the latter may have against the Government he will not allow it to have weight when called upon – to undertake this Mission – by the urgent wishes of so many parties." Cartwright asked Westmorland to tell Meyendorff that he had acted according to his wishes, i. e. represented "the necessity of not throwing away the present opportunity of endeavouring to come to an understanding with Prussia."

There has probably been reasonable doubt as to whether such an opportunity existed. God knows, Wynn wrote on the 13th to Palmerston,¹ whether "the present propositions from Berlin will lead to anything," and whether the Danish negotiator when he arrives "will find the same disposition which is now expressed." But he promised Palmerston to do all that he could to see that the negotiator received favourable instructions "and above all as to the Constitution [for Slesvig] tho' this must of course be definitively settled by you in London."

On the 16th Westmorland wrote from Berlin to Palmerston informing him that the Tsar had written to Friedrich Wilhelm advising him not to invade Jutland and announcing a demonstration by the Russian Fleet in support of Denmark.² Meyendorff had said to Brandenburg that he would not advise Denmark to send a negotiator to Berlin "unless he received an assurance that the Prussian troops should be directed not to continue their hostile invasion of Jutland." Brandenburg replied "that no one more than himself desired a peace or an armistice, and the retreat of the troops engaged in this unfortunate conflict; that as soon as the Central Power had either ceased to exist or had passed into the hands of Prussia, he had the moral conviction that the movement of the Prussian troops in Jutland would be stopped." Just at the moment, however, he could not incur such an obligation.

¹ P.P.

² F.O. 64/299: 16/5, No. 187. – Cf. Löfgren, p. 282 f. – In the Tsar's letter of 10/5, see Hoetzsch, II, p. 196 ff., no mention was made of the Naval demonstration, but a demand was made for peace with Denmark and the withdrawal of the Prussian troops from Slesvig and Jutland.

He thought that the Danish negotiator "might arrive here" and begin negotiations with Prussia. Westmorland wrote in his dispatch that Meyendorff considered Brandenburg's "moral conviction" sufficient grounds to persist in the wish for the arrival of a Danish negotiator.¹

During a talk on the 16th with Westmorland Brandenburg also stressed his strong desire to end the war with Denmark. He was also said to have stated that he would take Palmerston's above-mentioned proposal of the 9th as a basis for the discussions with the Danish negotiator. This he denied, as mentioned above (p. 100), a few days later.

Pechlin's statement that Reedtz was willing to ignore personal grudges if called upon, proved true. Wynn wrote that Reedtz "set off an hour after he had received the letters."² He arrived in Copenhagen on the evening of the 17th, acquainted himself with events since his retirement, and left on the 20th for Berlin which he reached two days later.³

The very day after his arrival Reedtz got into touch with Westmorland, Meyendorff and d'Ohsson. Some time, however, elapsed before negotiations could begin with the Prussian Government. A few days later Meyendorff told Reedtz that it was mainly due to his efforts that Schleinitz, the Prussian Minister in Hanover and former Secretary of Legation in Copenhagen, would be appointed Prussian negotiator. He was of the opinion that Schleinitz would be easier to treat with than Bülow, who could not forget that the negotiations he had carried on in Copenhagen regarding the Sound Dues had broken down.

Reedtz told Westmorland that he was pleased that he was going to negotiate with Schleinitz.⁴ However, when Westmorland informed him of Brandenburg's note of the 18th (cf. p. 100), he assured him "that upon the terms therein related he would not negotiate." In the dispatch in which Westmorland mentioned this he emphasized the unwillingness of the Prussian Govern-

¹ Cf. Hoetzsch. II, p. 201 f: Meyendorff's dispatch 15/5.

² F.O. 22/172: 19/5, No. 101.

³ Reedtz' reports from Berlin are to be found in File U. Min. Alm. Korr sager. Krigen 1848-50. Våbenstilstand og Fredsunderhandling 1848-50. See also H. C. Reedtz's private papers. G. II.

⁴ F.O. 64/299: 24/5, No. 204.

ment and especially of the Army to evacuate more than North Jutland. This opinion was shared by the King, with whom he had spoken, although the King was otherwise very desirous of peace.

On the 28th Reedtz and Schleinitz had their first informal talk. Westmorland reported Reedtz's account of this talk.¹ The two negotiators had agreed "that the stipulations upon which a peace might be established should form the basis of any armistice they would agree to, because in this way the question of military honour when giving up a line of country for the eventual disposal of which both parties were agreed would no longer be called in question." In addition both negotiators wished Westmorland to undertake the task of umpire. Westmorland mentioned this to Brandenburg, who warmly supported the wishes of the two negotiators.

On the 4th of June the more formal talks between Reedtz and Schleinitz began at Westmorland's home.² Besides these talks the two negotiators also had a number of more informal discussions. I shall not go into detail here concerning the plans and counter-plans which were put forward during the negotiations, or as to how Reedtz got further and further away from the instructions he had received or which were sent to him from Copenhagen.³ In the statement made by Hansen, the Danish Minister for War, on the 1st of June, it said characteristically: Reedtz already seemed "defeated, or intimidated by the state of affairs."⁴

In a letter to Cowley written after the first two talks (the 4th and the 6th) Westmorland remarked on his part: "I am a sort of umpire here between Reedtz and Schleinitz . . . both negotiators have the most pacific intentions and something I believe will come of it."⁵ And in a letter of the 14th to Wynn he wrote: "I confine myself to listening to the discussions and using my endeavours to remove difficulties when they arise."⁶ However,

¹ F.O. 64/299: 28/5. No. 210.

² F.O. 64/300: 4/6, No. 222. — Cf. Westmorland. IV, p. 169 ff.

³ See *Krigen 1848–50*. II, p. 1026 ff.; Thorsøe, p. 674 ff.; Lundqvist, p. 22 f. and A. Linvald: *Novemberministeriet og dets Stilling til det slesvigske Spørgsmål* (*Danske Magazin* 6. r. IV (1928), p. 216 ff.).

⁴ Enclosed with Reedtz's report to Moltke 29/5.

⁵ Westmorland. IV, p. 197 ff.: 8/6.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 233 ff.

Reedtz mentioned in his report of the conference which had taken place the previous day: Westmorland, unfortunately, took it into his head to protest against my rejection of Schleinitz's proposal.¹

At the first conference on the 4th, Schleinitz put forward the German view of the questions at issue, together with a plan for a Constitution for Slesvig, i.e. almost complete independence of Denmark.² Westmorland found that the plan was "entirely founded upon the proposition and instructions which at different times have emanated from Your Lordship."³ And Reedtz, he said, "hopes to give his adhesion to most of the principles laid down in this document." It appeared immediately that this optimistic statement was not very sound. The negotiations for a definitive peace had to be postponed until a later date, and plenty of difficulties were met before an agreement was reached on rather vague peace preliminaries and on terms for an armistice.

At the meeting on the 13th a plan for peace preliminaries and for an armistice was put forward and discussed.⁴ As Westmorland reported, negotiations on this matter did not lead to any result. Prussia's difficulty, he wrote, consisted in getting the Slesvig-Holstein troops to evacuate any part of Slesvig without using force "which the Prussian Government at present feels itself unable to sanction, on account of the unpopularity throughout Germany which would fall upon them if they now turned their arms against their confederates." Schleinitz mentioned, however, that if the Slesvig-Holsteiners refused to obey, Prussia could recall Bonin and the other Prussian officers who were serving in the Rebel Army, whereby their present formation would be disorganized. At the meeting both Schleinitz and Reedtz requested the British Minister to approach the Prussian Government on the question of the suspension of hostilities, as neither of the parties wished to take the initiative. Westmorland complied with the request and wrote the same day to Brandenburg. He did not, however, achieve his aim.

¹ Reedtz's report 13/6, No. 10.

² Krigen 1848-50. II, p. 1026 ff. - Thorsøe, p. 674 ff.

³ F.O. 64/300: 4/6, No. 222. - Cf. Hoetzsch. II, p. 213 ff.: Meyendorff to Brunnow 11/6.

⁴ F.O. 64/300: 14/6, No. 235. - Westmorland. IV, p. 233 ff. - Krigen 1848-50. II, p. 1035 f.

We shall return to London for a moment. On the 30th of May Brunnow had sent Palmerston Nesselrode's dispatch of the 16th, which had informed Brunnow of the demonstration by the Russian Fleet in support of the Danish Monarchy, "dont la conservation est d'une si haute importance pour le Nord de l'Europe."¹ In addition Brunnow on the 3rd of June informed Palmerston confidentially of a dispatch of the 31st of May from Meyendorff stating that the negotiations in Berlin were going ahead well (they had not yet begun officially!). But both Berlin and Copenhagen admitted that a certain guarantee was necessary if an armistice were to be effected in Slesvig. If Britain would undertake to be guarantor, both parties would agree to this, Meyendorff believed; however, if she would not, Meyendorff suggested a joint guarantee from Britain, France, Austria, Sweden and Russia.² And what was Britain's attitude towards the stationing of Swedish troops in Slesvig during the armistice?

In his reply to Brunnow of the 5th Palmerston declined the invitation to be a guarantor.³ He certainly did not believe that the population north of a line from Flensburg to Husum would oppose the re-establishment of the authority of the King-Duke, "but if such resistance were to be offered, the British Government would not choose to take any part in forcible measures for overpowering it, and consequently we shall not like to join in the proposed guarantee." But why did the conflicting parties not agree on the definitive peace? Palmerston did not think that more was wanting than that "the King Duke should grant to the Duchy of Slesvig a Constitution which should be bona fide in accordance with this mutually agreed upon basis [of the 3rd of February], and if that was once done there would appear to be no longer any point in dispute that need prevent the signature of a definitive Treaty of Peace."

It was certainly true that many ties of common interest had been formed between South Slesvig and Holstein, Palmerston continued in his reply, but with a little goodwill problems concerning these ties could be solved in a satisfactory way. It must

¹ F.O. 65/374: Brunnow's letter of 30/5 and Palmerston's reply 31/5.

² Cf. Hoetzsch. II, p. 209 f.

³ F.O. 65/374. — Printed in Hoetzsch. II, p. 211 f. — In a letter of the 26th of June to Russell Palmerston also wrote: "I am strongly against our being Parties to any such guarantee as is suggested about Slesvig. . ." Gooch. II, p. 25.

not be forgotten that Slesvig's constitutional and administrative separation from Holstein "is a necessary consequence of the provisions of the new Constitution which the Germans have adopted for themselves."

If Palmerston thus refused to let Britain commit herself to more than her task of mediator he had no objection, while the negotiations were going on in Berlin, to firing a couple of warning shots at the Prussian Government. On hearing that Sweden would follow Russia's example by giving a Naval demonstration, Palmerston sent Westmorland a dispatch on the 12th: "The Prussian Government ought to feel that the appearance of the Russian and Swedish Fleets off the coasts of Jutland and Slesvig is the first scene of a new act, and it depends upon the course pursued by the Prussian Government what the character of the scenes of that further act shall be."¹

Westmorland did not omit to quote Palmerston's rather oracular statements to Brandenburg,² who, however, found that Prussia's present course would prevent the rise of complications. The British Minister also believed this on account of the results of the negotiators' conference at his home on the 15th.³ He ended his account by stating that Reedtz had sent to Copenhagen "to obtain the sanction of his Government to these different arrangements."

One of the arrangements was that Slesvig should be administered by a Commission of Three during the armistice. Both negotiators were very anxious that Britain should appoint one of the members, an umpire; otherwise it would be impossible to solve the problem. In an earlier dispatch Westmorland had mentioned that negotiations had been carried on concerning this very arrangement.⁴ South Slesvig – south of the line Flensburg-Tønder – was to be occupied by German troops, while in North Slesvig there was to be a police force appointed by the Danish

¹ F.O. 64/295: 12/6, No. 152.

² F.O. 64/300: 18/6, No. 239.

³ In the above-mentioned dispatch the Conference was stated to have taken place last Saturday [i.e. the 16th], but the real Conference was on the 15th. Reedtz's report 16/6, No. 11. Cf. the French Minister's dispatch from Berlin 16/6, No. 23, which stated that Prussia's and Denmark's negotiators "sont tombés d'accord sur les bases principales de l'armistice et des préliminaires de paix. . ." The very inaccurate remarks in Bunsen. III, p. 10 presumably refer to these proposals. "Reeve" here must be Reedtz.

⁴ F.O. 64/300: 7/6, No. 227.

King from among the inhabitants. If such a force was not sufficient "it has been proposed that Prussian or Hanoverian troops should be called in to assist in occupying the Country."

According to Schleinitz's proposal Prussia should conclude the Convention alone, but a clause should be included to the effect that other German Governments could join and thereby share the advantages of the Convention: the raising of the blockade, etc. As a means of making the rebels comply with the Convention, Schleinitz stated, as mentioned above, the possibility of recalling the Prussian officers.

Reedtz did not from Copenhagen receive the sanction he wanted for "the different arrangements."¹ According to his dispatch of the 18th, Wynn had, it was true, urged Moltke to accept Schleinitz's proposals.² However, during the talk which Moltke had on the 20th with Wynn and Sternberg to discuss Reedtz's communications, both Ministers seem to have agreed with the criticism of the Prussian proposals. Wynn's standpoint appeared more clearly in his private letter to Westmorland than in his dispatch to Palmerston.³ As Wynn wrote in his private letter, both Ministers agreed with Moltke that it was not enough that Prussia – and not Germany – concluded the armistice. He even stated, "The Malmoe Convention was not sufficiently explicit and liable to wilful misinterpretations but God knows such an armistice as is now proposed is 20 times worse." The only security during an armistice, Wynn continued, will be the Swedish occupation, but I am tired of the word Armistice, and peace preliminaries should be concluded at once. As he was not sure whether Palmerston would approve of the idea of a British umpire he had suggested a Swedish one, "an office naturally belonging to the Commander of Troops," whom he hoped would be Swedish.

The Danish Council of State were unanimous in rejecting Schleinitz's proposals at their meeting on the 20th.⁴ They wanted Slesvig to be occupied by Swedish troops and Prussia to conclude the Convention on behalf of Germany. Instructions referring to

¹ *Krigen 1848–50*, II, p. 1039 ff.

² F.O. 22/172: 18/6, No. 128.

³ Westmorland, IV, p. 289 ff.: 21/6. – F.O. 22/172: 21/6, No. 129. – Sternberg's views are not quite clear in his dispatch 24/6, No. 95.

⁴ *Statsrådets Forhandl.* II, p. 168 ff.

this and to several other points which I shall not go into here, were sent to Reedtz, who received them on the 23rd.¹

The next morning he went first to see Meyendorff, then to Westmorland, to inform them of the instructions. On reading them they both said, Reedtz wrote to Moltke, that the result of presenting such a note as that, of which the draft had been sent him, would be the breakdown of the negotiations. They requested him the same evening to postpone the presentation of the note until he had obtained further orders from Moltke, and until Moltke through Ungern Sternberg and Wynn had learnt the Ministers' reasons for their request.

While Reedtz named Meyendorff and Westmorland as those who had taken the initiative for the non-presentation of the note, it appeared from Westmorland's dispatch to Palmerston and letter to Wynn² that Reedtz himself (urged by Meyendorff?) was the originator of the idea.

In the dispatch Westmorland stated that Reedtz visited him "in very great distress", showed him the note he was to hand to Schleinitz, and "stated his fears lest the doing so would greatly retard, if it did not put an end to the negociation." He asked Westmorland and Meyendorff to advise him. After careful consideration the two Ministers agreed to write identical letters to their colleagues in Copenhagen, as Reedtz had not received definite orders to present the note, and it did not appear to be an urgent matter. They advised Reedtz to request fresh instructions.

I hope, Westmorland continued, that You, Palmerston, will not disapprove of the advice I have given Reedtz: "it was entirely in conformity with his own opinion." It appeared both to him and to Meyendorff that the Danish Government by reproducing and defining the words 'indissoluble Union' in the note wanted beforehand to decide the question of the succession which hitherto had been considered as the subject of negotiations. Westmorland referred to Palmerston's dispatch of the 13th of March to Cowley (see p. 60f.). He had, he went on to say, written privately to Wynn and explained his participation in the letter, and hoped that the

¹ Krigen 1848-50. II, p. 1043 ff. - Reedtz's report 24/6, No. 12.

² F.O. 64/300: 25/6, No. 249. - Westmorland. IV, p. 317 ff.

Danish Government did not find "I have improperly interfered in doing so, I have most certainly acted entirely in accordance with the sentiments of their own negotiator." I consider Reedt "as most zealous in the service of his Country and perfectly aware of the difficulties as well of the responsibilities of the negotiation he is charged with." If the Government did not give him wide powers, "I very much fear the negotiation will be a long while before it can be concluded." Finally Westmorland stated that Meyendorff had left that morning for Warsaw to give an account of the whole matter, and advise his Government to urge Denmark in the strongest manner to show as much goodwill as possible.

Before referring to the result of the support given by the two Ministers to Reedt, mention must be made of a new fulminatory dispatch from Palmerston to Berlin – a cold streak of lightning it could be called if its effect were taken into consideration.

Neither in Frankfurt nor as regards the Slesvig-Holstein question were developments taking place in a way that suited Bunsen or Prince Albert. In May Prince Albert had, as mentioned, criticized the attitude adopted by the British Ministers in Germany regarding the movement towards German Unity; in June he reproached Palmerston with the fact that the Ministers in Saxony and Hanover had made statements which were unsympathetic to the Prussian project for German unity.¹ Palmerston defended his Ministers, but declared that he agreed in theory with the wish to unify Germany. Queen Victoria, too, showed a keen interest in Prussia's politics. She let Bunsen know that she had told Lady Westmorland that Germany's only hope of salvation was for all the German Governments to join Prussia openly.² In the letter in which Bunsen mentioned this he remarked, "The Queen hopes, and I hope, too, that Lord W[estmorland] in this way [through Lady W.] will receive certain knowledge of his Royal Mistress' politics regarding this matter."

About the middle of June Palmerston heard through Wynn of Schleinitz's proposal at the first conference on the 4th of June,³

¹ R.A.W. I 15/50: Palmerston to Albert 19/6. – Cf. Bunsen. III, p. 13 ff., which shows how closely Bunsen was informed of British politics through Prince Albert.

² Bunsen. III, p. 16.

³ F.O. 22/172: 11/6, No. 121.

a proposal which, as Moltke said, was quite incompatible with the King's rights.¹ Palmerston considered it advantageous to fire a loud warning shot at Berlin and a dispatch to Westmorland was drawn up and sent to the Queen marked "immediate".² She and Albert did not consider this necessary. They added to the dispatch a number of critical remarks in the spirit of Slesvig-Holstein, and sent it to the Prime Minister, John Russell.

Russell had once more to play the part of mediator. On the 19th he informed the Queen that he had "approved of the draft now under consideration," but softened the blow by adding that he had told Palmerston that, at the same time, a dispatch ought to be sent to Copenhagen, stating that Slesvig "must have a real and not a nominal constitution." But it seemed to him, Russell wrote, that "Prussia has never had a right of war against Denmark on account of the separation of Slesvig from Holstein . . . the only right that Germany could claim was that of friendly remonstrance." Both parties he found, in Solomonic fashion, deserved "a rebuke for their extreme pretensions." That Denmark "should admit the real and total independence of Slesvig" was impossible.

Russell wrote to Palmerston that he found the dispatch "quite right – But it would be well to repeat to the Danes the caution you have already given them that their separate constitution for Slesvig should be a reality and not a show. – We have a right to say this, as they have repeatedly called on us for assistance in putting an end to the War and they ought to be *recti in curia*."³

The Queen sent Palmerston the dispatch the same day "leaving the remarks upon it," together with Russell's letter, and requested the dispatches to Wynn and Westmorland "for approval." The next day Palmerston sent her the dispatch to Wynn – it was sent to him on the 22nd – with its urgent request to the Danish Government that the Constitution for Slesvig "should be in good faith conformable with the Principle mutually agreed upon as a Basis of Negotiation, and that it should not be a practical incorporation of Slesvig with Denmark under the Guise of a separate political organization."⁴ In his letter to the Queen Palmerston remarked that in an earlier dispatch [of 4/5, No. 89] the

¹ Moltke's dispatch to Reventlow 11/6, No. 64.

² The sources for the following are R.A.W. I 15/51, 52, 53, 58, 59, 62 and 63. – Cf. Lundqvist, p. 28.

³ Russell to Palmerston 19/6. P.P.

⁴ F.O. 22/170: 22/6, No. 129.

Danish Government "had . . . been strongly urged to fulfill her Engagements."

In the dispatch to Westmorland which Palmerston returned to the Queen he had made "some verbal alterations." He had done this to comply with the Queen's "remarks", and to moderate the expressions he had used to give vent to his temperament. But they cannot be said to have changed the character of the dispatch. I shall mention some of the alterations below. In his letter to the Queen, Palmerston gave a further statement of reasons or repeated his arguments for the points of view stated in the dispatch.

The dispatch, which like Wynn's was sent off on the 22nd, informed Westmorland first of the protest made by the Danish Government against Schleinitz's proposal of the 4th.¹ "There is great force and justice in the representations made by the Danish Government," it stated, and it was to be hoped that Prussia would not persist in the above-mentioned claims. It was difficult to see what right Prussia thought she had to dictate to the King-Duke the minutest details in the Constitution he had promised to give Slesvig, or on what grounds Prussia or any German state could continue hostilities against Denmark.

The dispatch went on to state that Slesvig's incorporation in Denmark was stated as the reason for Germany's taking the side of the rebels last year. But whether Slesvig had right to a constitutional connection with Holstein or not, the King of Prussia ought not to have intervened any more than he had intervened on behalf of the rebels in Saxony and Hungary. The dispatch then referred to the articles in the Reich Constitution which have often been mentioned above, and remarked that if Holstein were not excluded from Germany, as was unlikely, "the asserted right of Holstein to be united administratively and constitutionally with Slesvig, which was originally alleged as the excuse for the war, has been put an end to, by the very parties who last year made use of it to justify their hostilities, and consequently it would now become difficult to draw any distinction in principle between continued assistance given by Prussia to the revolted Party in Slesvig, and assistance if it had been given to the revolted

¹ F.O. 64/295: 22/6, No. 160.

Party in Saxony and to the Hungarians who are in arms against the Austrians.”

As far as Article One of the Reich Constitution (the proviso concerning the future relation of Slesvig to Germany) was concerned, the dispatch stated, as earlier dispatches had also done, that all that Germany can decide about the relations of foreign countries to herself was only “that no such relations should exist at all.” It was probably a realization of this that “induced the Prussian Government to exclude it from their subsequent project of a Constitution for Germany.”

Westmorland was to use his own discretion in putting these views before the Prussian Government. He was also to express the definite expectation of the British Government that Prussia would “put an end without further delay by an equitable arrangement to a state of things” which had become “intolerable to all the nations whose material interests are so injuriously affected by the continuance of these aggressive hostilities carried on by Germany against Denmark.”

By “some [of Palmerston’s] verbal alterations” ‘unintelligible’ became ‘unmaintainable’, ‘aggression’ became ‘hostilities’, ‘not a shadow of right’ was changed to ‘no right’. An actual alteration was, however, made in the draft. Holstein’s pretension to a connection with Slesvig was described here as “the vague and as appeared to Her Majesty’s Government always unintelligible. . .” The Queen’s remark to this was: “Her Majesty’s Government are in possession of all the facts relative to the *real* existence of this administrative and constitutional Union.” Bunsen had provided Prince Albert with them – facts or not as they were! Palmerston here changed Holstein to the Frankfort Government, which was certainly something quite different.

Two of the Queen’s remarks defended Prussia’s right to interfere in the question of “the new Constitution” for Slesvig, as Prussia had helped Slesvig resist “an attack made by Denmark on her independence.” The analogy drawn in the dispatch between the rebels in Saxony and Slesvig was challenged by the Queen: “To give the King of Saxony assistance against the Republican Constitution was the Duty of Prussia under the act of the German Confederation; that same duty obliged her to assist Holstein against Denmark.”

In his letter to the Queen, Palmerston maintained that he could not understand how the union between the Duchies – be it “more or less intimate, and more or less long or short in its Duration” – could give Germany “a Right to interfere with a Territory not belonging to the Confederation.” And as Frankfurt had passed a Constitution “which necessarily puts an End to that Union neither Germany nor Prussia can be justified in continuing a war; the avowed and professed object of which was to compel the maintenance of an arrangement which they themselves have publicly declared must henceforward cease.”

Palmerston also maintained that the analogy between Saxony and Slesvig was justified. If the King of Prussia felt it was his duty to help Saxony as a Confederate, against a Revolt, he should, if anything, have assisted “the Duke of Holstein, one of his Confederates instead of assisting the revolted Holsteiners not only in resisting the authority of the Duke within the Duchy, but in aiding the Insurrection in Slesvig a Country not belonging to Germany.” He also upheld his opinion on the comparison with Hungary.

At the end of the letter Palmerston stated that even if it appeared to the Queen that he pressed Prussia “somewhat too strongly on this matter” he could assure her that “an early termination of this disastrous conflict is of great importance not only to the Parties engaged in it but to Your Majesty’s Dominions.” He hardly ever entered the House of Commons without being “assailed by some Member or other with Representations of the great injury which this war is inflicting upon some Part or other of this Country.” The Chancellor of the Exchequer could likewise inform the Queen that he considered “this unfortunate war as one of the Main Causes of the falling off of the Public Revenue.”

On the 21st the Queen sent Palmerston the dispatches “which she will not further object to.”¹ But she would, however, say “a few words” in reply to Palmerston’s letter. The “few words” filled nearly four pages. First the Queen stressed the union between the Duchies, and then she asserted – quite illogically it seems – that it was Germany’s duty “to see that the independence of Shleswig [this was the spelling] is secured before she abandons that country. The comparison with Saxony does not hold good for

¹ The letter is printed in *The Letters of Queen Victoria*, II, p. 264 f.

a moment: for the Shleswig revolution was not directed against the Duke[!], but against the King of Denmark, who invaded the rights of the Duke of Shleswig Holstein." Prussia's help, therefore, should not be given to Denmark but to Slesvig Holstein[!]. Prince Albert, for it was he who held the Queen's pen, should logically have written that assistance should not be given to the King of Denmark but to the Duke of Slesvig Holstein, or rather to the Duke of Slesvig and the Duke of Holstein. The three were one and the same person and should then, according to the Slesvig-Holstein and German theory, wage war on one another! "The Case of Hungary has neither any similitude."

Finally the Queen stated that she, too, wished the war to end quickly, but the mediation would not bear fruit "as long as the mediating power merely watches, which of the two parties is in the greatest difficulties for the moment and urge it to give way." The mediating power should examine carefully what was right and advise "that what is right and fair ought to be done." The reproaches are, almost word for word, Bunsen's.

Palmerston refrained from further controversy. He contented himself with assuring the Queen that he fully shared her views on the principles which ought to guide the mediating power "and it has throughout this Slesvig Holstein Negotiation been his Intention and Desire to hold the Balance as fairly between the contending Parties, as the Force of Circumstances, and the Course of Events could enable a Mediator, acting only by Persuasion and without any compelling authority, to do." As the news from Berlin sounded more encouraging regarding the success of the negotiations he had changed the end of the dispatch. Instead of directing Westmorland to read it and hand over a copy of it, he had only requested him to make its views known to the Prussian Government "according to his Judgment and as he may think useful."

As mentioned above, the dispatch to Westmorland was sent off on the 22nd. In a dispatch of the same date he was informed that the British Government "will not object to name an umpire if requested by both Parties concerned to do so."¹

Schleinitz and Reedtze were very pleased to hear this last piece of news.² When Westmorland informed Schleinitz and

¹ F.O. 64/295: 22/6, No. 161.

² F.O. 64/300: 28/6, No. 252.

Brandenburg of Palmerston's second dispatch, they remarked that they were waiting for Reedtz's reply to their proposal (cf. above). In his dispatch to Palmerston Westmorland mentioned their remarks on Palmerston's reference to Article Two of the Reich Constitution. Schleinitz, for instance, did not find it necessary to link Holstein to the German Customs Union. Reedtz, incidentally, wanted the discussion of the more special points deferred until the definitive peace. He had agreed to Prussia's acting only in her own name. But Westmorland remarked that support could be expected from several other German states; he regarded "this mode of proceeding as the one most likely, if not the only one of arriving at an early and satisfactory arrangement." Brandenburg would disapprove of the occupation of North Slesvig by Swedish troops as Denmark wished [the Danish Government wanted the whole of Slesvig to be occupied by Swedish troops!], as Germany could hardly consider Swedish troops as neutral.

Westmorland showed Palmerston's dispatches in confidence to Reedtz.¹ He stated, however, that he believed that it would be the East that would decide the dispute, not the West, and that all Palmerston's sharp remarks made no impression on the Prussian Cabinet, which had a skin like a rhinoceros. Westmorland wrote a private letter on the 28th to Wynn, stating that it was his opinion "that if the negotiation is not finished here as far as the signature of the Preliminaries of Peace and the Armistice it will be a long while before it will be terminated."² He did not believe that Russia would give "the Danes the support beyond what can be obtained here." He was anxiously awaiting a reply to his last communication [the notes from the Ministers to their colleagues in Copenhagen]: "everything will depend upon it."

On the 28th Wynn and Sternberg had a discussion with Moltke about Meyendorff's and Westmorland's identical notes of the 25th. On the 30th Wynn wrote to Westmorland that the talk "has been productive of some good, tho' not perhaps as much as we wished. . . ."³ Wynn asked Westmorland to tell Reedtz that "tho'

¹ Reedtz's report 30/6 (confidential).

² Westmorland. IV, p. 329 ff.

³ Ibid., p. 341 ff. – F.O. 22/172: 30/6, No. 140 – Sternberg's dispatch 1/7, No. 97.

there is certainly a party against him, he has some very firm friends and among these Sternberg and I are not the least active in his support" . . . "let him act to the best of his judgment, under your and Meyendorff's advice, and I *will answer* for his meeting with the general approbation of the Country."

The most important result of the talk with Moltke was that the passage concerning Slesvig's inseparability from Denmark was deleted from the note which Reedtze was instructed to hand to Schleinitz, and from which Westmorland and Meyendorff "anticipated so bad an effect in the Negotiation." Wynn had stressed that by this statement the Danish Government had returned to the principle of "Indissolubility", which had been changed some time previously to "Political Union" with the approval of the Danish negotiators.

Westmorland was very satisfied with the result obtained in Copenhagen.¹ He asked Wynn to thank Count Moltke and say that he was convinced "he had acted in a spirit of well understood conciliation in making the alterations in his original Note which have now been adopted."

From Wynn's dispatches and letters it can be seen that he continued his negotiations with Moltke and his discussions with Westmorland about the separate sections in the proposals for the forthcoming convention."² It does not seem that these discussions had any influence on the convention, some of them were prevented from doing so as seen purely from the point of view of time.

The news from Wynn and Westmorland stating the unwillingness of the Danish Government to give up their point of view made Palmerston draw up a note to Wynn which must have threatened Denmark with Britain's refusal, in any case, to put up with the continued blockade (cf. p 82).³ He sent Russell the note, but on the 5th of July Russell answered: "I have strong misgiving about this dispatch to Denmark. — Germany makes war in Jutland — we do not stop the German troops — neither do we enforce an Armistice — how can we then to prevent Denmark from using belligerent rights?" Palmerston thought that Britain was quite able to do so on account of the damage caused to her

¹ F.O. 64/300: 5/7, No. 263. — Westmorland. IV, p. 353 ff.

² F.O. 22/173: 5/7, No. 144; 8/7, No. 146; and 11/7, No. 149. — Westmorland. IV, p. 349 ff.; 369 ff. and 431 ff.

³ P.R.O. 30/22. 8 A.

trade. But as he wrote the same day to Russell: "My Despatch is not worth the Paper that has been used in writing about it and I have torn it up." He had intended "to press Denmark, as we have already pressed Prussia by intimating that our Patience might be exhausted" by the "unreasonableness" of the parties.

As Westmorland had suggested to Reedtz, it was Russia's attitude that determined the agreement that was reached between Reedtz and Schleinitz about peace preliminaries and an armistice at the beginning of July. At the end of June Meyendorff had gone to Warsaw, where the Tsar and the Chancellor were then in residence, and had given an account of his views on the negotiations. During Meyendorff's absence, the Russian chargé d'affaires, Budberg, acted in his stead. On the 1st of July Nesselrode sent Budberg a dispatch in support of the wish of the Danish Government that the whole of Slesvig should be occupied by Swedish troops during the armistice.¹ At the same time, however, the Russian Government sent a note to Ungern Sternberg with Meyendorff's "observations on the actual state of the negotiations at Berlin," urging Denmark to conciliation.²

Reedtz mentioned that the Tsar's courier arrived at Berlin on the 3rd of July with the above-mentioned documents, and that the Prussian Minister, General Rochow, had managed to get hold of copies of the Russian communications to Denmark.³ He considered that it was necessary to reach a result quickly, even if, in this way, he went further than his instructions allowed him to. He recast Articles Three and Four, so that Prussia could accept them, and arranged a conference held on the 5th at Westmorland's home.⁴ He went no further than to suggest that North Slesvig should be occupied by 2000 Swedish troops during the armistice. On the 7th Westmorland wrote to Cartwright, telling him that this suggestion would probably be accepted by Prussia: "I need not tell you what difficulties we have had from the misunderstandings between Reedtz and his Government, in which I must say the latter seems to me to have been quite in fault."⁵

¹ Löfgren, p. 239 f. — In Westmorland's dispatch 5/7, No. 263 (F.O. 64/300), it is stated incorrectly that the note concerns the occupation of North Slesvig.

² Sternberg's dispatch 8/7, No. 100.

³ Reedtz' report 3/7, No. 14, and 8/7, No. 15. — Lundqvist, p. 29, says that it was through General Rauch that Berlin learnt of the letter to Copenhagen.

⁴ F.O. 64/300: 5/7, No. 266.

⁵ Westmorland. IV, p. 365 ff.

On the 8th Westmorland was able to inform Palmerston that, at a meeting the same morning at his home, all the articles in the peace preliminaries, the armistice, and the secret articles were approved by Schleinitz and Reedtz and signed with their initials.¹ The documents were now to be translated into German and Danish, and the formal signatures would be affixed on Tuesday the 10th. This took place on that date, and, in a letter to Wynn, Westmorland congratulated both Wynn and himself on the result: "Nothing but the confidence with which I was treated by Schleinitz and Reedtz and their conciliatory conduct joined to their anxious desire with honor to both their countries to terminate the differences which had arisen between them could have led so speedily to the termination of the negotiation."²

The peace preliminaries consisted of five Articles, but contained no solution of the dispute about the status of Slesvig.³ Article One was essentially the same as Palmerston's proposal for a protocol of the 13th of March: Slesvig was to have a separate constitution as regards its legislation and internal administration, "without being connected with the Duchy of Holstein and leaving untouched the political union which unites the Duchy of Slesvig with the Danish Crown." The attempt on the part of the Danish Government to have "political union" changed to "Indissolubility" had failed (cf. above). In Article Two the question of "the final organization" of Slesvig on the basis of the principle in Article One was deferred until negotiations could take place between the two parties under British mediation. Article Three laid it down that Holstein and Lauenborg were to remain part of the German Confederation, but that their status otherwise would be decided by negotiations between Denmark and Prussia in view of the reorganization of the Confederation which was going on. An attempt was also to be made during these negotiations to maintain the non-political connections between Slesvig and Holstein as far as this was consistent with the principle in Article One and with Holstein's status in Germany.

The two final Articles dealt with the question of the succession

¹ F.O. 64/300: 8/7, No. 270. – Reedtz's report 10/7, Nos. 16 and 17.

² Westmorland. IV, p. 479 f. and 481 ff.

³ The Convention of the 10th of July is printed in *Danske Traktater efter 1800*. I, p. 191 ff. – *Krigen 1848–50*. II, p. 1056 ff. – Cf. Hjelholt. II, p. 27 ff., and Löfgren, p. 244 ff.

and with a guarantee of peace by the Great Powers. Article Four stated that the Danish King immediately after the final peace would take the initiative in proposing the arrangement of the succession in agreement with the Great Powers. Moltke wanted this Article omitted. Westmorland explained in a letter of the 3rd of July to Wynn¹ that Schleinitz had suggested it "as the only mode in which he could meet the pretensions of both parties;" for Germany admitted "no doubt as to the succession of Holstein and very little as to Slesvig, while Denmark admits no doubt *the other way* as to the succession to Slesvig, but insists also as to doubt with regard to that of Holstein." In addition Schleinitz stressed that a congress would probably be composed of powers who were friendly towards Denmark. — Regarding the maintenance of the non-political ties between the Duchies Westmorland stated in his letter that "Prussia is almost under an obligation to require that they shall be maintained," but that Schleinitz quite understood that Slesvig and Holstein should not be admitted into the German Customs Union.

The armistice was to run for six months. After this time it could be terminated with six weeks' notice, but was to continue if notice of termination were not given. During the armistice North Slesvig was to be occupied by neutral troops, which Sweden would be requested to provide. South Slesvig was to be occupied by Prussian troops. The line of demarcation was to run between Flensburg and Tønder, Tønder being south of the line and Flensburg north of the line. Prussia was to withdraw her troops behind the line of demarcation within twenty-five days, and could maintain a force of up to 6000 men there. The Danish military occupation of Als and Ærø was to continue as hitherto. The armistice, naturally, contained more detailed stipulations about the raising of the blockade, the liberation of prisoners of war, the release of captured ships, and compensation for the German requisitions in Jutland.

During the armistice Slesvig was to be administered "in the name of His Majesty, the King of Denmark" by an Administrative Commission (*commission administrative*) of two members, one appointed by Denmark, the other by Prussia. In addition, Britain would be requested to appoint a Commissioner, who, as umpire,

¹ Westmorland. IV, p. 353 ff.

was to decide matters in which differences of opinion arose. As mentioned above, Palmerston had stated that he was prepared to do this. The Commission was to have no legislative powers, but was to administer the country according to the existing laws. The Commission was free to decide which of the laws, regulations, etc., passed by the Revolutionary Government it would cancel or retain. The Danish, the neutral, and the Prussian troops were to render all the support necessary for the maintenance of law and order.

To the Convention were adjoined a number of secret Articles which, however, did not remain secret very long. Their main object was to ensure that the Convention was carried into effect, even if the Slesvig-Holsteiners "against all expectations" opposed it.

When Westmorland sent Palmerston the documents in question, he stated that it was his definite opinion that during the negotiations Reedtz had "obtained from the Prussian Government every concession which under the present circumstances he could possibly obtain."¹ He also believed that the objections of the Danish Government "to conclude these arrangements with Prussia alone have been as effectually guarded against as the nature of the case would allow." Reedtz had got the words "liens matériels" changed to "les liens non politiques des intérêts matériels," and the question of the maintenance of the Court of Appeal and the University of Kiel as joint institutions was deferred until the final peace treaty. Westmorland emphasized the conciliatory conduct of Schleinitz and Reedtz, and said that the confidence they had shown him during the negotiations "has enabled me, as Your Lordship's representative, to render some service towards arriving at the present conclusion of these difficult arrangements."

Of course Reedtz did not either think that he could have obtained more for Denmark.² During the last few days of the negotiations he was able to consult Treschow, who was returning from London to Copenhagen via Berlin.³ In his letter of the 10th to Moltke, Reedtz stated "that our bow has been bent as far as

¹ F.O. 64/300: 10/7, No. 272.

² Reedtz's report 10/7, No. 16.

³ Cf. Lundqvist, p. 32.

it can without breaking." He thought, too, that a comparison with Meyendorff's memorandum would show that Denmark had received much better terms for the preliminaries and the armistice.

Copenhagen was far from satisfied with the terms, and at the meetings of the Council of State on the 13th and 14th, where the ratification was discussed, Reedtz' arbitrary conduct was the object of severe criticism.¹ Treschow, however, who had been summoned to the meetings, defended him warmly. Wynn believed that it would not have been possible for Moltke to have had the Convention approved without Treschow's help.² Finally it was decided to submit the Convention for the King's ratification, and he ratified it on the 15th. An exchange of ratifications took place in Berlin on the 17th.

The Ministers of the Friendly Powers in Copenhagen had urged Denmark to sanction the arrangements made in Berlin. On the 14th Wynn wrote to Palmerston, while the meeting of the Council of State was in progress, that he expected that "the strong opinions expressed individually without consultation by all my Collegues as well as myself in favour of the ratification will be attended to."³ Two days previously he had written to Westmorland about the agreements saying that there was "certainly much which *I could have wished* less vague . . . I have only *very cursorily* read them over with Count Moltke, and strongly advised him to ratify."⁴

Palmerston told Westmorland that he was pleased that the Convention had been concluded, and expressed his gratitude to him for his assistance.⁵ In addition he directed him to express satisfaction with Prussia's promise to carry the stipulations of the Convention into effect, and confidence that "if the Prussian Government is firm, Slesvig Holstein will not stand out."⁶

¹ Statsrådets Forhandl. II, p. 186 ff.

² Westmorland. IV, p. 471 ff. – Wynn to Palmerston 15/7. P.P.

³ F.O. 22/173: 14/7, No. 154. – Cf. Westmorland. IV, p. 467 ff. – Sternberg's dispatch 15/7, No. 106.

⁴ Westmorland. IV, p. 439 ff.

⁵ F.O. 64/295: 13/7, No. 185. – In letters of 21st and 26th of July to his brother, Wynn voiced a certain discontent with the approval fallen to Westmorland's share, whereas his own considerable efforts (in Copenhagen) for the good result was not stressed. – The National Library of Wales. MSS. 2806 D.

⁶ F.O. 64/295: 17/7, No. 187.

Palmerston received quite an overwhelming letter of congratulations from Brunnow,¹ who wrote "Je Vous ai prédit que Vous conduiriez l'affaire Danoise à bonne fin." Westmorland had given excellent services during these difficult negotiations. "Les soins de notre Legation à Berlin ne lui ont pas fait défaut pour accomplir ce Succès. Je suis certain que Vous en tiendrez compte." He had himself striven to obtain this result without being discouraged by the obstacles "que nous avons rencontrés sur notre chemin." When Britain and Russia, together, wanted "un résultat, conforme à leurs intérêts communs" he was convinced that they had power to obtain it. "Voilà ma politique. Je n'en aurai jamais d'autre."

9. The Appointment of Britain's Commissioner. The Seat and Form of the Final Peace Negotiations.

Palmerston's satisfaction with the Convention in Berlin was not shared by the British Court and its German friends.

On the 11th when Brandenburg informed Bunsen of the Convention he stressed that the raising of the blockade and the resumption of trade were of such great importance that the Convention had been concluded although they knew that it would not satisfy [the Slesvig-Holsteiners and the German national circles].² In another letter of the same date Brandenburg sent Bunsen, highly confidentially, the secret Articles and mentioned what was advantageous as seen from a German point of view.

Two letters which Bunsen received from Abeken and Bülow, officials of the Berlin Foreign Ministry, were in a very different tone. Copies of these letters are to be found in The Royal Archives at Windsor, and testify to the close connection with the Prussian Legation.³ The armistice was, Abeken wrote, "jämmerlich genug, viel schlechter als der Malmöer," but it had not been possible to obtain a better one. Bülow considered it "eine bedeutende politi-

¹ F.O. 65/374: [16/7].

² Brandenburg's dispatch 11/7 to Bunsen.

³ R.A.W. I 15/112 and I 15/118: Abeken to Bunsen 11/7 and Bülow to Bunsen [17/7]. — Abeken's letter is printed in Bunsen. III, p. 19 (note), and described as a letter "von befreundeter Hand." Bülow's letter is printed in Bunsen. III, p. 29 (note**).

sche Niederlage": "Im ganzen ist es mir sehr schmerzlich, dass wir mit Schimpf und Hohn aus der Sache herausgehen." He mentioned at the same time that Schleinitz had become Foreign Minister: "Er thut es ungerne, aber man lässt ihn nicht los. Er ist nicht der Mann dazu und fühlt dies selbst."

On the 15th in a letter to Prince Albert Bunsen gave his verdict on the Convention: "Ein Abkommen war *nothwendig*: was dabei erreicht werden konnte, *ist erreicht*, nach den Umständen. Die Dänen haben vieles nachgegeben."¹ Remarking on the secret Articles he wrote: "in Berlin ist nichts geheim!" – He acted accordingly when he communicated them to Samwer, the Statthalter's Envoy in London.²

A few days later, Bunsen stated in a letter to the Prince that the only good thing about the armistice was that the Statthalter-schaft, although not recognized, was to remain in Holstein.³ Britain ought to force Denmark to give Slesvig "a liberal, independent Constitution", but, Bunsen added dejectedly, according to the Convention it was to be the subject of further negotiations with the Great Powers, that is to say, with Russia! On the 20th Bunsen thanked the Prince for his invitation for the following week, and gave him various pieces of news about the opposition of the Slesvig-Holsteiners to the Convention.⁴

Quite in line with Bunsen's views, Prince Albert stated in a letter of the 24th of July to Prince Wilhelm of Prussia that the Convention with Denmark and the peace preliminaries were for Prussia undeniably "wenig ehrenvoll und für die deutschen Hoffnungen wenig befriedigend."⁵ About a month later the Prince expressed himself in considerably stronger terms to Bunsen: "Ist man in Deutschland nicht glücklich, eben erst mit Schimpf und Schande aus dem Kriege zur Unterstützung der constitutionellen Rechte Schleswigs herausgekommen zu sein?"⁶ "Schimpf und Schande" seems to have been taken from Bülow's "Schimpf und Hohn."

Bunsen stated in one of his above-mentioned letters to the

¹ R.A.W. I 15/111. – Cf. Bunsen. III, p. 17 ff.

² Hjelholt. II, p. 29.

³ R.A.W. I 15/116.

⁴ Ibid. I 15/123.

⁵ Kurt Jagow: Prinzgemahl Albert, p. 199.

⁶ R.A.W. I 16/34: 21/8.

Prince that Slesvig will, in all reality, be placed under British rule.¹ This was a reference to Palmerston's willingness for Britain to appoint the third member of the Administrative Commission – the member who was to act as umpire in case of disagreement between the Danish and German members. It was obvious that both Denmark and Prussia were specially interested in the choice of this third member. Both parties also attempted to influence the choice.

The Danes wished Francis Emanuel Coleman MacGregor, the former British Consul in Elsinore, to be appointed. The MacGregor family was originally Scottish but had come to Germany. In a private letter of the 15th of July to Palmerston Wynn supported the Danish wish.² I do not know, he wrote, whether Westmorland has mentioned "a suggestion from me as to the Person whom you might select to act as English Umpire. I have not had any communication direct or indirect with MacGregor, but as he is bred and born a German it has struck me that you will not easily find any other Englishman so competent to encounter the long Danish and German acts etc. which will be submitted to him. He would be very acceptable here as he was supposed to be very conciliatory in the Sound Business."

At the end of July Count Moltke informed Reventlow that the Danish Government would prefer MacGregor as the British Commissioner, but that they had full confidence in Britain's choice.³ Reventlow had already tried to persuade Palmerston to decide on MacGregor, but Palmerston did not consider him to be qualified and said that he would suggest Britain's Consul General in Hamburg, Colonel Lloyd Hodges.⁴

Hodges was far from being a desirable candidate in the eyes of Bunsen and the Slesvig-Holsteiners. In a letter written in May, Bunsen described Hodges in his usual absurdly exaggerated fashion: he is "bekanntlich nicht allein ein mit allen deutschen Verhältnissen gründlich unbekannter, eitler, eingebildeter, hochfahrender und überhaupt unangenehmer Mann, sondern auch (und mit Recht) persona ingrattissima in den Herzogthümern, diesseits und jenseits der Eider. Er sieht und hört in Hamburg

¹ R.A.W. I 15/116.

² P.P. – Cf. Westmorland. IV, p. 481 ff.

³ Moltke's dispatch 28/7, No. 75.

⁴ Reventlow's dispatch 24/7, No. 83 [84]; cf. dispatch 10/8, No. 87.

nur Dänen und Dänen-Freunde. . . .”¹ I do not know on what information, Bunsen based his statement. Reventlow-Criminil, the Lord Lieutenant (Oberpräsident) at Altona, was one of Hodges’ friends, but he had recognized the Provisional Government.

At the beginning of August Schleinitz directed Bunsen to try to prevent the appointment of Hodges as British Commissioner: “Die Gründe sind Ihnen hinlänglich bekannt.”² The order came post festum, but Bunsen had, a long time before, moved heaven and earth – the Queen and Prince Albert – to have someone else than Hodges appointed.

His favourite candidate was evidently John Ward, the British Consul in Leipzig, but, he wrote to Prince Albert on the 17th of July, as Berlin was against Hodges, Palmerston, in revenge, would not send Ward, but perhaps Sir Harry Verney.³ The Danes would, however, probably refuse to accept him, Bunsen thought, on account of his “Letter on Germany”. Nevertheless Bunsen persuaded Harry Verney to ask Palmerston for the post of British Commissioner, but Palmerston replied that he would not send anyone from Britain but someone who was already in Germany.

On the 24th of July, Palmerston suggested to the Queen that Lloyd Hodges be appointed Britain’s Commissioner.⁴ The Queen replied that she would prefer someone else, but Palmerston kept to his suggestion. The Queen then gave in, remarking that she had not expected that her objections would change Palmerston’s decision. She had, though, “mentioned them as she has the satisfaction to recollect that she has always done whenever she saw that a mistake was going on to be made, which she thinks *Col. Hodges’* appointment will be.”

On the 31st of July Hodges was informed of his appointment as British Commissioner, but it was not until the 21st of August that he was sent his terms of reference.⁵ Hodges sent a letter of

¹ Bunsen’s dispatch 10/5, No. 21 (confidential).

² Schleinitz’s dispatch 3/8.

³ R.A.W. I 15/116. – Ward’s strong Slesvig-Holstein sympathies are evident in his book “Experiences of a Diplomatist, Being Recollections of Germany. . . 1840–1870” (1872). Verney held the same views as Ward. His “Letter on Germany” must be his “Some Observations on the Affairs of Germany, in a Letter addressed to . . . Palmerston” (May 1849). – Bunsen calls him Henry Verney.

⁴ R.A.W. I 15/130 and 15/139–141.

⁵ F.O. 33/117: 31/7, No. 24, and 21/8; cf. Hjelholt. II, p. 43.

thanks on the 3rd of August with the assurance that: "I shall be guided by the strictest impartiality, and that I shall be solely actuated by the most scrupulous sense of justice."¹ The Administrative Commission with F. F. Tillisch representing Denmark, and Count B. H. Eulenburg as Prussia's member, was installed on the 25th of August in Flensburg. The Commission functioned for nearly a year and encountered great difficulties. As mentioned above, the neutral – Swedish-Norwegian – troops in North Slesvig and the Prussian troops in South Slesvig, were to contribute to the maintenance of its authority; the latter troops, however, completely disregarded their task, and in Holstein the Statthalter-schaft persisted in rejecting the Convention.

I have elsewhere given a detailed description of these conditions and have given there an estimation of Hodges' part as umpire. It cannot be disputed that he kept his promise in view. He was praised many times both by the Danes and the Germans for "impartiality" – when his decisions were in favour of the party in question! On the 4th of September, for instance, Schleinitz directed Bunsen to inform Palmerston that the Prussian Government was extremely satisfied with Hodges' conduct during the negotiations before the installation;² and at the end of October Reventlow was directed to tell the British statesman that Denmark appreciated Hodges' "uprightness, impartiality and goodwill."³

After Hodges' appointment had become known Baron Stockmar wrote on the 23rd of August to Prince Albert that it appeared to him "schlimm, sehr schlimm. Wäre ich anwesend gewesen, ich würde Alles versucht haben sie zu verhindern. Ich glaube, dass dies ein Fall war, wo ein persönliches Veto hätte in Anwendung gebracht werden dürfen, als es rein dem Kreise der Executive angehört."⁴

It was presumably this letter that caused the Queen to give new expression to her dissatisfaction with the appointment of Hodges. On the 4th of September John Russell wrote to Palmerston: the Queen "wishes me . . . to say that Colonel Hodges is considered

¹ F.O. 33/119.

² F.O. 64/308: Bunsen to P. 11/9 and P. to Bunsen 20/10. – Bunsen's dispatch 11/9, No. 148.

³ Moltke's orders No. 86 and Reventlow's dispatch 2/11, No. 97.

⁴ R.A.W. I 16/39.

very partial to the Danes. – I told her I thought it difficult to make any change in a temporary appointment.”¹

A week later, however, Palmerston received through Bunsen the above-mentioned communication from the Prussian Government stating their great satisfaction with Hodges. With a certain triumph, and with unmistakable irritation at the Court’s perpetual interference in his foreign policy, he wrote on the 16th to Russell that he did not understand how Prussia could have complained about Hodges “in private Communications to the Queen, at the moment when as you will see by the accompanying note from Bunsen they were going out of their way to instruct their Minister here to express officially in strong terms their satisfaction at Col. Hodges’ Conduct.”² “Will you send on Bunsen’s Note to the Queen”, he added. He also remarked in connection with Hodges’ appointment that both parties had wanted another umpire but “it seemed to me better not to take the Recommendation of Either of the two Parties for a Person who was to arbitrate between them.” – The Queen must have protested against Palmerston’s remark that the Prussian Government sent private communications to her, for on the 30th of September Palmerston sent a letter from the Queen to Russell about Hodges back to him [Russell] saying “. . . what led me into the mistake was your saying in your letter, that the Queen said the Prussians complained of Hodges’ Partiality for the Danes.”³

In a dispatch at the end of June Wynn had mentioned that it appeared from talks with Moltke and some of his colleagues that they found “that no successful final result of the Negotiation can be anticipated, under the sole Mediation of Her Maj. Gov., not holding out any security for the future.”⁴ They would like a Congress to be held in London to deal with the whole matter including the question of the succession. Wynn believed that Reventlow should try through Brunnow to obtain Palmerston’s consent to this. On the 3rd of July Palmerston replied to Wynn, saying that the British Government had no objection to “a general Congress to be assembled in London” to discuss the matter.⁵

¹ P.P.

² P.R.O. 30/22. 8 A.

³ Ibid.

⁴ F.O. 22/172: 27/6, No. 135 (confidential). – Regarding the plans for a Congress cf. Lundqvist, p. 88 ff.

⁵ F.O. 22/170: 3/7, No. 136.

In a private letter of the 15th of July to Palmerston¹ Wynn described the opposition in the Danish Government to the ratification of the Convention of the 10th: "The ratifying Party made great use of your consent to a General Congress, and it would tend to pacify their opponents if you would not only *not object* but *press* such a measure in which this Government see their only defence against the bad faith of Prussia." The same day Moltke informed Reventlow – probably because he identified Wynn's views with those of Palmerston – that the British Government would now support the Danish desire that both the peace negotiations and the question of the succession be made the subject of a formal Congress in London. Reventlow underlined the word *now* in the dispatch and put an NB and a question mark beside it. After speaking to Palmerston he had to inform Moltke that there was little hope that Palmerston would do more than agree to a Congress or Conference of Ministers, if this could otherwise be arranged.² "For a moment it seemed to me that His Lordship inclined to the opinion that it would be best for the forthcoming negotiations to take place in Berlin."

The same opinion was expressed in a letter of the 24th from Westmorland to Wynn.³ Palmerston said officially that the negotiations could take place "wherever it is thought best," but he had said privately to Lady Westmorland, on complimenting her on her husband's assistance in concluding the Convention, that it was better to leave the matter to those who had brought it to the present position. He added that Bunsen, who had published a pamphlet and was on bad terms with Reventlow, "would be a bad negotiator for the Peace."

In this letter Westmorland asked Wynn to let him know as soon as possible the views of the Danish Government on the best place and time for the opening of the peace negotiations. He was very anxious to go on leave to England, but it looked as if he would have to wait for some time as neither Denmark nor Prussia were in any hurry to begin the final peace negotiations.

At the end of July, continuing the part he had played as umpire at the drawing up of the Convention, Westmorland helped Schleinitz and Reedtz with two difficult questions. One concerned

¹ P.P. – See also Westmorland. IV, p. 471 ff.: Wynn's letter 15/7.

² Reventlow's dispatch 24/7, No. 83 [84]; cf. 10/8, No. 87.

³ Westmorland. IV, p. 485 ff.

the determination of the line of demarcation between North and South Slesvig. On the 30th of July, in the presence of the two negotiators, Westmorland drew a line, a compromise which was accepted.¹ The other question dealt with the increase in the number of the Swedish-Norwegian troops occupying North Slesvig (from 2000 to up to 4000 men), which Sweden made a condition for agreeing to the arrangement.² The appeal made by Reedtz and Schleinitz to Westmorland about this question was the reason for the official letter, "drawn up in the presence of the two above named negotiators, and with their consent to every word," which Westmorland sent to the British Minister in Stockholm, Cartwright. Westmorland wrote privately to Cartwright that he did not believe that as many as 4000 men were necessary, "but under that amount whatever the King of Sweden decides will be gratefully received by both parties." In a letter to Wynn, Westmorland mentioned his two decisions and remarked: "If I had not such well intentioned People as Reedtz and Schleinitz to deal with the termination of such discussions would not be so easy."

Westmorland received a letter from Frederik VII in which the King expressed his appreciation of the part Westmorland had played in drawing up the Convention.³ Stierneld, the Swedish Foreign Minister, also thanked him.⁴ When Westmorland sent Reedtz his letter of thanks to the King he assured him of his readiness "at all times to render what services I am able to the reestablishment of those relations of Peace between Prussia and Denmark, which are so necessary to the prosperity of both Countries."⁵ He also stated that without Reedtz's "conciliatory tact and judgement . . . ability and decision" the negotiation would not have led to its present fortunate termination.

In the middle of August, when Westmorland spoke to Schleinitz and Reedtz, they both agreed that no negotiations would take place during the next six weeks.⁶ They advised him to carry out his intention of going on leave to England. Neither of them knew, for that matter, where the negotiations were to take place, or

¹ See map in Hjelholt. II. – Westmorland. IV, p. 525 f. and 529 ff.

² Lundqvist, p. 39 ff.

³ Westmorland. IV, p. 549 f.: Copy of Fr. VII's letter 5/8.

⁴ Ibid. p. 545 ff.

⁵ Ibid. p. 587 ff.

⁶ Ibid. p. 611 ff. and 615 ff. – F.O. 64/301: 17/8, No. 333.

what they were to include. Westmorland wrote that Reedtz wanted the negotiations "delayed, in order to see if the Danish Government cannot of itself come to an agreement with the Duchies."

On the 19th of August Westmorland left Berlin for England.¹ His duties were taken over by the British chargé d'affaires, Henry Howard, whose judgment of the Danish-German dispute was not to Bunsen's liking, at any rate. Westmorland did not return to Berlin until the 2nd of December.² Then more than twice the time – at least six weeks – had passed during which Schleinitz and Reedtz had stated in August that no negotiations would take place.

Conditions in Germany at that time hardly encouraged either Prussia or Denmark to accelerate negotiations. There was still uncertainty as to the outcome of the efforts for National Unity after King Friedrich Wilhelm had refused the Emperor's crown which had been offered him. In May the Kings of Prussia, Saxony and Hanover had formed an alliance and approved a draft for a constitution for a closer Prussian-German Union from which Austria was excluded. An Administrative Council was, for the time being, to preside over the Union, which eventually included 17 states. Bavaria and Württemberg refused to join. In October the Administrative Council decided to hold a Reichstag election on the 31st of January, but Saxony and Hanover then recalled their representatives from the Council.

To succeed the Central Power at Frankfurt Austria and Prussia had agreed on the 30th of September to establish a provisional Central Power, called Interim. It was to consist of two Commissioners from each of the two Great Powers, and the different German states were invited to join the arrangement. The Danish Government received an invitation on behalf of Holstein and Lauenburg and accepted. The Interim did not begin its work until the 20th of December, and the Regent, Archduke Johann, resigned his authority.

Prussia's policy, of course, was aimed at linking Holstein and Lauenburg (and possibly South Slesvig) to the Prussian-German League. Britain's Minister in Copenhagen urged the Danish

¹ F.O. 64/302: 19/8, No. 1.

² F.O. 64/304: 3/12, No. 343.

Government to agree to this as a means of re-establishing the good relations between the two countries. On the 26th of July he wrote that he had previously suggested to the Danish Government that the King should immediately declare "his adhesion as Duke of Holstein, to the League under Prussian supremacy. The situation of the Dutchy must ultimately render this necessary. . ."¹ Palmerston approved of this suggestion.² A month later Wynn stated that he had again advised Count Moltke to enter into a close alliance with Prussia.³ Denmark only needed, Wynn said, to join the League "on the same terms as Hanover and their other neighbours." Moltke admitted that circumstances and the position of Holstein could make a new connection necessary, but it would be painful to impair the old close connections between Austria and Denmark. He wanted time to consider, an appeal "so unfortunately brought forward on every occasion of the Government," Wynn wrote. But one must certainly admit that as seen from a Danish point of view there were good reasons for careful consideration.

Wynn's appeal to Moltke, which had been approved by Palmerston, showed that the British Government was friendly disposed towards Prussia's plans for hegemony. John Russell's views on foreign policy appear from some notes made by him about the same time.⁴ The notes stated that the armistice in Slesvig and the peace between Austria and Sardinia [6th August] gave "breathing time to Germany and Italy of which it is to be hoped due advantage will be taken." Prussia's plans for a liberal constitution for the League ought to be supported by Britain's "good wishes and friendly concurrence." But this rather noncommittal point of view was far removed from the active policy which Bunsen and Prince Albert wanted Britain to pursue in support of Prussia.⁵ In November and December Prince Albert wrote two memoranda on the German question and sent them to Russell.⁶

In spite of Palmerston's above-mentioned (p. 137) passive attitude to the Danish wish for a Congress or Conference of

¹ F.O. 22/173: 26/7, No. 162.

² F.O. 22/170: 31/7, No. 151.

³ F.O. 22/173: 21/8. No. 173.

⁴ Russell's "Thoughts on Foreign Affairs". Aug. 49. P.P.

⁵ Cf. Bunsen. III, p. 57 ff.

⁶ R.A.W. I 17, Nos. 63-65, 70 and 74.

Ministers to arrange the final peace negotiations, Moltke laid the proposal before the Prussian Envoy in Copenhagen, Werther, in August.¹ Berlin adopted an unsympathetic attitude; she, naturally, did not desire any "interference of the great Powers."

On the 5th of September Wynn stated in a private letter to Palmerston: "I am much annoyed at the time which we are losing before the commencement of what I trust will be the final negotiation."² He had seized every opportunity "to press Moltke for a positive decision as to place and conference the former of which points was left by you to their action, and to the latter of which you did not express any objection." Wynn was very anxious to learn what Palmerston's "wish *and advice* is respecting the further negotiation. At present both Parties are waiting for one another. Reedtz is not doing anything at Berlin. . ." The previous day when Wynn had asked Count Moltke whether Reedtz had spoken to Schleinitz about the negotiations, Moltke had replied that Reedtz "was *waiting for Meyendorff's arrival from Warsaw.*"

As Howard understood from a talk with Schleinitz about the 1st of September that he thought that Denmark ought to take the initiative in opening peace negotiations, he wrote a private letter to Wynn on the subject.³ This resulted in Wynn's again reminding Moltke of the matter.⁴ Moltke now held out prospects of an official note "accepting Berlin as the seat of the negotiation, and mentioning the course which they wish it to take." As Reedtz was obliged to leave Berlin for a time on account of private affairs, and did not wish to take on the responsibility of sole negotiator, Wynn, together with Sternberg and Lagerheim, had urged Moltke to send Pechlin to Berlin at once "where he could commence the negotiations and afterwards be joined by . . . Reedtz with whom he is on the most intimate terms. He is without doubt the person in His Danish Majesty's service best acquainted with German affairs. . ."

Four days later Wynn had to contradict his statement about the note which Moltke had promised.⁵ Moltke, he wrote, "agreed

¹ Lundqvist, p. 88. – F.O. 22/173: 9/9. No. 182. – Schleinitz's dispatch 31/8 to Bunsen with enclosure.

² P.P.

³ F.O. 64/302: 2/9, No. 27.

⁴ F.O. 22/173: 9/9, No. 183.

⁵ *Ibid.*: 13/9, No. 184.

with me (as he generally does on other occasions to save discussion) in the arguments I brought forward in favor of the seat and the nature of the negotiation as well as of the persons to be charged with it," but no decision had been made by the Government, or rather another decision had been made to send Carl Moltke to Berlin to deliver the King's reply to Friedrich Wilhelm's letter, which Werther had brought. Berlin had meantime stated that "another person would be more agreeable." Wynn also expressed to Moltke his surprise at the choice of Carl Moltke. He also stated in his dispatch that he had never been able to get a satisfactory reply from Moltke to his question concerning the constitution for Slesvig.

In spite of Prussia's rejection of the idea of a Congress, the Danish Government sent a circular dispatch to their Ministers in London, St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Paris on the 16th of September requesting them to prepare the ground for a Congress or Conference of Ministers.¹ A remark was made in the dispatch, however, that the Government was waiting to hear Meyendorff's opinion on the matter.

When it was finally decided to send Pechlin to Berlin to relieve Reedtz for a time, he was not given the task for the time being as a peace negotiator, but was to deliver Frederik's VII's reply to the King of Prussia.² He did not leave Copenhagen until the 2nd of October, and at the same time Carl Moltke was sent to the Tsar with a letter of sympathy on the occasion of the death of Archduke Michael. He had, Wynn wrote, "been charged with this unusual and unnecessary mission as a means of getting out of the dilemma in which the Government found themselves in consequence of his having been designated for Berlin."³ Wynn did not mention that the Danish Government also had a political purpose in sending Moltke: to influence Russia to support a Congress or Conference.⁴ As the object was not achieved, the mission can, as far as that went, be called unnecessary. When Moltke left St. Petersburg at the beginning of November Bloom-

¹ Moltke's dispatch 16/9, No. 80 to Reventlow. — Lundqvist, p. 92. By a misunderstanding L. here refers to a dispatch 8/9 48 to Reventlow as being from 1849.

² Statsrådets Forhandl. II, p. 259. Line 2 and 9 above. By a misreading there is written 'Thursday' (Torsdag) instead of 'Tuesday' (Tirsdag), and Line 4 there is 'before' (før) instead of 'here' (her).

³ F.O. 22/173: 2/10, No. 195.

⁴ Cf. Lundqvist, p. 96.

field stated that it did not seem that Nesselrode had given him "any further promises to support his Government, or that his Mission has produced any change whatever in the opinions hitherto entertained by the Russian Government on the Affairs of Slesvig."¹

As early as the 23rd of September Wynn had been able to tell the British Government that Pechlin would be sent to Berlin.² At the same time he mentioned that the Danish Minister in Stockholm, Christian Bille, was to be appointed "Under Secretary of State, an office which to the great inconvenience of my colleagues and myself, has been so long vacant." The appointment took place the same day.

A week later Wynn wrote that Bille was unwilling to leave Stockholm ". . . he assures me that it is only from a sense of duty which he considers incumbent on him to do all in his power to rescue the Foreign Relations from their present lethargic state."³ Bille was, continued Wynn, very friendly with Pechlin, and they are agreed on the course to be followed in Berlin. With the qualifications his former post as Danish Minister to the Confederation in Frankfurt gave him, Pechlin was "prepared for every responsibility and not dreading the most difficult parts of the question now at issue." The question of the succession "is the most prominent, embracing all the others." Pechlin's "conservative opinions in favor of legitimate sovereignty are very decided, but these he would make subservient to the great object of maintaining the integrity of the Danish dominions. . ." Pechlin found that the King's adoption of the Heir Presumptive of Oldenburg would be "the preferable method of securing the perpetual union of the Kingdom and Dutchies."

If Berlin were to be the seat of the forthcoming peace negotiations, Russia's Minister there, Meyendorff, would come to play a principal part, even if he were not a direct participant in the negotiations.⁴ He had returned to Berlin just before the middle of September. On the 16th of September Howard informed the British Government that Reedtz wanted Pechlin sent to Berlin and later associated with him at the negotiations; but the Danish

¹ F.O. 65/367: 6/11, No. 34.

² F.O. 22/173: 23/9, No. 192.

³ *Ibid.*: 29/9, No. 193.

⁴ Cf. Lundqvist, p. 92 ff. for what follows.

Government had not yet made any decision about the negotiations.¹ Howard like Westmorland and Meyendorff, wanted Reedt as a negotiator as his "abilities and disposition so well qualify him for undertaking it." Meyendorff was "anxious to see the negotiators named and the place and time for the conference fixed. . ." London would have been the natural place for the negotiations if Bunsen had not been there. It would therefore be better to choose Berlin. — A few days later Howard wrote in a dispatch that Schleinitz intended to negotiate with Denmark about Holstein's position in regard to the Prussian proposal for a restricted Federal State.²

At the end of September it became known in Berlin that Pechlin would be sent there to relieve Reedt temporarily.³ Reedt did not expect to be able to return for a month, but Howard was of the opinion that a short postponement would hardly do any harm during the present confused state of affairs in Germany.

During the second half of September a deputation from some of the parishes in Angel, which lay north of the line of demarcation, arrived in Berlin.⁴ The friendly reception given to the deputation, which brought an Slesvig-Holstein address, by both Schleinitz and King Friedrich Wilhelm caused great indignation in Denmark. During a talk which Howard had on the 1st of October with Schleinitz in connection with Schleinitz's statements to the deputation, he emphasized the dangers in mentioning the possibility that the peace preliminaries would be set aside.⁵ Schleinitz then stated, as his private opinion, that it would be extremely difficult to establish Slesvig as an independent Duchy. Denmark would oppose the arrangement which Prussia alone could agree to, and which he had outlined in his memorandum of the 4th of June. By such an arrangement Slesvig would, moreover, he believed, be a source of perpetual trouble for Denmark. "I am persuaded," Howard wrote, "that this is Baron Schleinitz's sincere opinion." Germany wanted, continued Howard, to get something out of their military campaign, an extension of their terri-

¹ F.O. 64/302: 16/9, No. 53. — Westmorland. IV, p. 643 ff.: 17/9 from Howard to Westmorland.

² F.O. 64/302: 19/9, No. 56.

³ Westmorland. IV, p. 647 ff.: 27/9 from Howard to Westmorland.

⁴ Hjelholt. II, p. 115 f.

⁵ F.O. 64/303: 1/10, No. 76.



ALEX. V. SCHLEINITZ

(1807–85)

Painted by Adolph Menzel. Sammlung Georg Schäfer, Schweinfurt (Germany).



JOHN FANE

11th Earl of Westmorland (1784–1859)

Engraving by Alfred Roffe after the Original by Fritz L'Allemand

tory, but if they got a part of Slesvig "they would never rest satisfied until they obtained the whole."

On the 9th of October Palmerston wrote to Howard, telling him that he agreed with his dispatch of the 1st.¹ You are, he wrote, to urge upon Schleinitz "that the Prussian Government by encouraging the notion that the basis of settlement which has been formally agreed upon will be set aside must necessarily give plausible ground for the party in Denmark who distrustful of the views and intentions of Germany impute to the Prussian Government the unavowed design to escape from its engagements." Schleinitz must realize that the negotiations can never bring about any result as long as each party suspects the good faith of the other. Prussia ought to avoid all that can give Denmark the impression that she will set aside "the Basis which she has agreed to." — There was plenty of opportunity in the time that followed for Palmerston to repeat or vary the theme of this dispatch.

No description will be given here of the talks which Pechlin had on his arrival in Berlin with Schleinitz concerning active help from Prussia to prevent anarchy in South Slesvig. His discussions, especially with Meyendorff, on the possibility of concluding peace on the basis of the preliminaries resulted in Meyendorff's drawing up a sort of compromise proposal which will be mentioned below. On the 1st of November Howard had another lengthy talk on the matter with Schleinitz.²

It was evident, Schleinitz said, that Denmark wanted to incorporate Slesvig and loosen the ties between Holstein and Germany. But Prussia would never take part in solving the question of the succession "to perpetuate such a state of things." If Prussia stated that she was prepared to discuss the question of the succession together with the peace, and come to an understanding about an heir to the whole of the Monarchy (the Duke of Augustenborg excepted), this was a concession for which Denmark ought to give something in return. She ought to guarantee the indissoluble connection between Holstein and Slesvig "from which the Preliminaries was a deviation." Otherwise the succession would have to be arranged later. And then the question would

¹ F.O. 64/296: 9/10, No. 29. — Schleinitz was informed of the dispatch. See F.O. 64/303: 16/10, No. 111.

² F.O. 64/304: 1/11, No. 150.

arise of the terms on which Prussia would go in for the separation of Slesvig and Holstein. Schleinitz again here referred to his memorandum of the 4th of June. If Denmark rejected this, Slesvig would have to be divided. However, he let it be understood that an arrangement could be made more easily if Holstein and Lauenburg "were to join the proposed restricted Federal State." He was sorry that Denmark had hesitated to open the peace negotiations. Howard ended his report by pointing out the great difficulties which would be met with in the course of the negotiations on account of the different views held by Schleinitz and Pechlin. Howard believed that it would "ultimately require the united action of the great Powers to overcome them."

On receiving Howard's report Palmerston replied that Prussia and Denmark obviously both wanted to depart from "the Middle term to which in principle they both have agreed."¹ The Danish Government still aimed at a virtual incorporation, while Prussia's intention was to perpetuate the union of Slesvig with Holstein. Britain's duty as mediator was to get both parties to sanction a final arrangement which agreed with the principle which both had accepted.

On hearing of Palmerston's dispatch from Howard, Schleinitz said, as he had done before, that Prussia could not then agree to discuss the succession "at once, but must defer its consideration, as provided for by the Preliminaries, until the definitive Peace."²

In a private letter written in the middle of November to Palmerston Howard gave a lengthy description of Pechlin's views of the matter, although Pechlin had asked him not to communicate these views officially.³ Pechlin attached the greatest importance to preserving the integrity of the Danish Monarchy by securing the succession at once, and he was therefore prepared to recommend his Government to make far-reaching concessions regarding the connection between Slesvig and Holstein. If Slesvig were established as an independent Duchy, he did not think that it could be kept longer for Denmark "unless it were connected by very strong ties to Her, for otherwise the German Party would

¹ F.O. 64/296: 9/11, No. 61.

² F.O. 64/304: 13/11, No. 168.

³ *Ibid.* 15/11.

never rest until it had succeeded in separating it altogether.” – When Howard wrote this letter Pechlin had left Berlin several days before. He reached Copenhagen on the 14th of November, having gone home through Slesvig.

On the 30th of October Palmerston directed Wynn to stress to the Danish Government “the great importance of not delaying unnecessarily the final settlement of these long pending affairs.”¹ More than three months had elapsed since the ratification of the peace preliminaries and “no progress whatever has hitherto been made towards the conclusion of a definitive arrangement.” Wynn then approached Bille who assured him that when Pechlin reached Copenhagen instructions would be drawn up for him as soon as possible, and he would be sent back to Berlin to begin the negotiations.²

“No time would be lost in drawing up his Instructions,” Bille had told Wynn. Nevertheless nearly a month passed before the Danish delegation to the negotiations, consisting of Pechlin, Reedtz, and Scheel, a prominent jurist, were able to leave for Berlin, which they reached on the 13th of December.

In the course of the autumn the Danish Government had discussed in detail the draft for a constitution for Slesvig by which Slesvig was secured “a separate legislature and administration for all its affairs except those which it has in common with the Kingdom of Denmark.”³ While Slesvig was to have its own Diet for its special affairs, as far as the common affairs were concerned, it was to have – quite a strong – representation in the Danish Parliament. The common affairs, and matters which Slesvig might possibly have in common with Holstein, were laid down in broad outline.

After Pechlin’s arrival the proposal for a solution which had been discussed by him in Berlin with Meyendorff was discussed by the Government.⁴ The proposal suggested a sort of division of Slesvig by linking North Slesvig to the Kingdom of Denmark, South Slesvig to Holstein – without, however, letting it become a member of the German Confederation. The Government flatly

¹ F.O. 22/170: 30/10, No. 181.

² F.O. 22/173: 9/11, No. 214.

³ See Statsrådets Forhandl. II, for an account of this.

⁴ Cf. Lundqvist, p. 98 ff.

refused to accept such a proposal. The instructions for the Danish delegation to the negotiations then were to the effect that they were to obtain an arrangement in agreement, on the whole, with the draft which had been discussed for the constitution for Slesvig.¹

It is unlikely that the British Minister had any detailed knowledge of these Danish negotiations – or any influence on them. On the 16th of November Wynn wrote,² after having only a short talk with Pechlin, that he (Pechlin) believed that the negotiations would bring about good results; Pechlin was also “pleased with the increased spirit of conciliation which he finds prevailing in His Danish Majesty’s Council, and hopes to receive sufficiently extensive Instructions to enable him to make such concessions respecting the constitution of Slesvig,” so that they would facilitate the British mediating Power’s attempt to find a solution in agreement with the principles accepted by both parties if the Prussian negotiators were conciliatory. – This was not a very informative statement.

A week later Wynn stated that he had advised Pechlin to return to Berlin immediately.³ Pechlin, however, was of the opinion that “for a few days longer [it was more than a fortnight] his time was more profitably occupied here in drawing up and obtaining the consent of the Ministers to such instructions as will enable him and M. de Reedtz to act freely.”

When the delegation to the negotiations finally left Copenhagen on the 11th of December Wynn expressed his fear that “no immediate Progress in the Negotiation can be expected.”⁴ On the 17th he informed Palmerston confidentially of the Danish draft for a constitution for Slesvig.⁵ Although this draft did not, he wrote, satisfy the extravagant demands of the Provisional Government, he believed, however, that Palmerston would find it very different from the draft which he had rightly rejected before. In addition he gave assurances that “further Concessions would still be made if necessary.” The only difficult point – and the Danish Government had to insist on that point – concerned “a general Diet, for common affairs.” – Palmerston did not study

¹ Krigen 1848–50. III, p. 180 ff.

² F.O. 22/173: 16/11, No. 217.

³ *Ibid.* 23/11, No. 222.

⁴ *Ibid.* 11/12, No. 229.

⁵ *Ibid.* 17/12, No. 233.

the draft thoroughly – if at all. In January when Reventlow asked him for his views on it he said that he had not read it carefully.¹ He was concerned with its acceptance and not if it were acceptable or not acceptable! I regret, Reventlow wrote, to have to report “de tels propos d’un homme d’état de tant d’esprit et de talents. . .” But now and again Palmerston treated the most important matters so lightly when they were not concerned with the interests of Britain or his own political position. Palmerston had, indidentally, at the end of December informed Wynn that the Government did not feel called upon “in the present stage of this business to pronounce any opinion on this proposed constitution.”²

Wynn sent a letter to Westmorland, who was now back in Berlin by the Danish delegation.³ “If they fail in the negotiation,” he wrote, “it will not certainly be for want of cooks.” All that he could tell him about A.W. Scheel, the third member of the delegation was “that he bears the Character of being a good Jurist.” As for the rest, Westmorland could “hear all” from Reedtz.

Westmorland did not show much enthusiasm at having to set to work on the Danish-German conflict again. “. . . it really is a shame that we should still have to go on upon this abominable theme of Holstein,” he wrote privately to Wynn.⁴ “We have been at it now for nearly two years, and when I left Germany in August thought the affairs relating to it had been, to a considerable degree, at least, arranged. I find them, however, pretty nearly where I left them; what may be the next shape they will presume is difficult to foresee.” But he would do his best; and as Reedtz had now arrived, he entertained “hopes of some conclusion.”

10. Prussia Fails to Support the Administrative Commission.

The Letter from the Statthalterschaft to the King.

As mentioned above, Westmorland’s expectations in August that affairs in the Duchies were “to a considerable degree, at least, arranged” were not fulfilled. The Statthalterschaft refused to

¹ Reventlow’s dispatch 29/1, No. 4.

² F.O. 22/170: 28/12, No. 213.

³ Westmorland. IV, p. 697 ff.: 11/12.

⁴ Ibid. p. 705 ff.: 13/12.

recognize the Convention of the 10th of July as did also the now somewhat powerless Central Government in Frankfurt. They urged civil servants and the population of Slesvig to disobey the Administrative Commission, and in the period after the rebellion the Provisional Government had had many loyal officials replaced by Slesvig-Holsteiners. When the Commission entered upon its duties, Hodges, the British umpire, by his vote prevented the reinstallation of the officials who had been replaced.

According to Article XI of the Convention the Prussian troops stationed in South Slesvig were at the disposal of the Commission for the maintenance of its authority. On the whole they disregarded this task, and an almost chaotic state of affairs arose in South Slesvig. The complaints of the Commission or the urgent notes from the mediating power to Berlin were a waste of time. Perhaps Berlin's passive attitude was due, in some measure, to the differences between the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry for War, but it had probably more fundamental causes. Berlin's politics were influenced both by the popularity of the Slesvig-Holstein cause in Germany, and by the wish to incorporate Holstein with the projected restricted Federal State. In consequence Prussia took a miserably weak line with the Statthalterschaft. On the 16th of October, for instance, the Prussian Under-Secretary of State, Abeken, wrote to Bunsen: "Die Statthalterschaft behandelt uns mit wahren Hohn, ich finde, wir sind viel zu nachsichtig gegen dieselbe; wir könnten gegen Dänemark viel stärker auftreten, wenn wir stärker gegen die Statthalterschaft aufträten. . ."¹ He took comfort in the thought that when the Federal Central Commission was installed a settlement would be reached automatically: "Die Statthalterschaft muss ihren Widerstand und ihre Intriguen, die sie hauptsächlich auf ihre Einsetzung durch die Centralgewalt baut, aufgeben." Abeken was wrong there, and the Central Commission did not become a reality until December.

Britain's Ministers in Copenhagen and Berlin were completely in agreement in condemning Prussia's attitude to the Slesvig-Holstein revolution. In his letter of the 11th of December, mentioned before, Wynn, among other things, wrote to Westmorland: 'I hope you will be able to keep the slippery Gentlemen you have to deal with in a strighter and less disgraceful course than they

¹ R.A.W. I. 17/20. Cf. I 17/52.

have hitherto pursued in Slesvig. . . No assistance has been given to the Government and the Holsteiners have now acquired the conviction that they may do what they like. . ."¹ About a week later Wynn expressed himself still more forcefully to his brother: "Prussian Policy has never been *very* honorable or straightforward, but her Conduct has never been so disgraceful as from the *beginning* (I wish I could say) to the end of this unfortunate Holstein business. The original Invasion speaks for itself, but it was at least open aggression prompted by the prevailing German Sentiments. . ."²

In his reply Westmorland mentioned Schleinitz's hope that the Central Commission would dismiss the Statthalterschaft.³ But, Westmorland continued, "it is but little to be expected from this measure unless the Party, who originated the Revolution in both Duchies is put down. It was put down in Hamburg by the strong arm of military Power, so it has been put down in Berlin, in Dresden, in Baden, in Paris etc. etc." The difficulty in South Slesvig was due to the fact that the Prussian troops fraternized with the Revolutionary Party. The statement that the troops did all they could when there was an outbreak of disturbances elicited from Westmorland only the remark, "that until Wrangel marched into Berlin and disarmed the Burgher Guard and declared the town in a state of Siege, the same disorders would have taken place in this capital. As long therefore as the Prussian Government cannot make up their minds, or bend their policy, to do something like what Wrangel did in Berlin the Government of the Administrative Commission never can be established in the South of Slesvig." A week later Westmorland in a letter to Hodges remarked among other things: "I wonder Lord P[almerston] is not more hurt, that after consenting to name a Member of the Administrative Government, that Government should not be placed in a situation to fulfil the duties [it] was charged with."⁴

A question which took up a considerable amount of space in Prussian and Danish dispatches after the installation of the Commission was whether Prussia was within her rights, during the armistice, to move the frigate "Gefion", which had been captured

¹ Westmorland, IV, p. 697 ff.

² The National Library of Wales. MSS. 2806 D.

³ Westmorland, IV, p. 705 ff.; cf. his letter to Hodges 13/12, p. 713 ff.

⁴ Westmorland, IV, p. 729 ff.: 20/12.

by the Germans on the 5th of April (see p. 80) at Egernförde, to a Prussian port. The Danish Government protested against the plan. Prussia then asked Britain for her opinion. The matter was brought before the Queen's Advocate, and on the 4th of December the Foreign Office informed Bunsen that the removal of the "Gefion" against the wish of the Danish Government would be a violation of the armistice.¹ The Danish Government "would be justified by International Law in retaking the "Gefion" if that Vessel should be found upon the open Sea, even though escorted by a Prussian Ship of War on a voyage to a Prussian Port or elsewhere."

Even after the conclusion of the armistice Palmerston was liberal with sharp rebukes to the Danish Government warning them to be as conciliatory as possible towards their opponent. The information which Wynn, as mentioned above, sent him that the Government intended sending Carl Moltke to Berlin to hand over the King's letter gave occasion to a fulminatory dispatch.² Wynn was directed to inform the Government that he was "instructed most urgently to represent to them how essential it is that the Danish Government should infuse a spirit of conciliation into all their Proceedings and Communications on this Slesvig Affair, and you should impress upon them that unless their Acts and Measures manifest an earnest desire to make every just and fair concession to the feelings and opinions of the Parties with whom they have to deal, there can be little hope that this long pending matter can be brought to a satisfactory conclusion." The Governments which were friendly towards Denmark wanted to help her to obtain a settlement as favourable for her "as may be consistent with a due regard to the just rights and interests of other parties." It would not pay Denmark to delay the remaining negotiations with unnecessary difficulties.

On learning from Wynn at the beginning of September that Prussia had rejected the Danish proposal for a Congress or Conference of Ministers, Palmerston replied that he was to "strongly urge the Danish Government to abide strictly by the Stipulations of the Convention."³ On the other hand there was no question

¹ F.O. 64/308: 4/12. – F.O. 22/173: 13/12, No. 232.

² F.O. 22/170: 25/9, No. 162.

³ Ibid. 25/9, No. 166.

of this in the so-called Title Case, in which Prussia and the Slesvig-Holsteiners wanted the stipulation stating that Slesvig was administered in the name of the King of Denmark changed to 'as Duke of Slesvig'. Both Wynn and Sternberg advised the Danish Government to agree to this, and when they did, in some measure, Palmerston expressed his satisfaction.¹

In November the Statthalterschaft decided to make a direct approach to the "King-Duke", whose "rights" they still formally asserted they recognized.² They suggested in their letter of the 16th of November that deputies from Denmark and the Duchies should meet at a neutral spot and negotiate for a settlement of the conflict. As can be seen, the proposal implied that Denmark was to recognize the Insurrectionary Government as a partner having equal rights. When the Central Government in Frankfurt sent Cowley a copy of the letter to the King, they made a request at the same time, that the British Government would advise the Danish Government to accept the proposition of the Statthalterschaft.³

The letter from the Stadtholders reached Copenhagen on the 18th, and was discussed the following day at a meeting of the Council of State.⁴ Before the meeting Bille asked the British Minister what attitude they should adopt to the proposition.⁵ Wynn who, incidentally, agreed with Bille that the request was hardly likely to give any result strongly advised "that a conciliatory acknowledgement of the receipt of the letter should be returned . . ." as well as the King's agreement to the proposition, "but of course previously insisting on their acknowledging the Armistice and discontinuing their Armaments." In somewhat contradictory terms, Wynn wrote in his dispatch of the 23rd of November that, as the letter from the Stadtholders was not official, he had strongly advised that the King should make no mention in his reply of either the armistice or the Administrative Commission, and should just agree to hear "any conciliatory ouverture from

¹ F.O. 22/170: 27/9, No. 167, and 9/10, No. 171. – F.O. 22/173: 20/9, No. 188, and 2/10, No. 195. – Hjelholt. II, p. 131ff. – Lundqvist, p. 52 and 72 ff.

² Krigen 1848–50. III, p. 111 ff. – Lundqvist, p. 112 ff.

³ F.O. 30/131: 31/11, No. 554.

⁴ Statsrådets Forhandl. II, p. 316 f.

⁵ F.O. 22/173: 20/11, No. 220. – Cf. Hoetzsch. II, p. 242: Meyendorff's dispatch 7/12.

His subjects.”¹ This was just what the Council of State had resolved to do at their meeting on the 19th, although Wynn gave a somewhat different account.² On the 27th when Wynn sent Palmerston copies and translations of the letter from the Statthalterschaft and the King’s reply, he wrote that both were conciliatory and there ought to be expectations of an arrangement which, however, “the revolutionary Party will do their utmost to prevent.”³

The King’s reply (of the 24th) stated that he must first know the names of the persons who were to state the wishes of the Duchies, and if these were men unaffected by party passions, they would be accepted as negotiators, but the negotiations must take place in Copenhagen.

It was not until the 8th of December that the Statthalterschaft replied with a letter which interpreted the King’s letter as an agreement to negotiations between the Kingdom and a “Slesvig-Holstein.” On the 12th Wynn wrote that only one of the three persons suggested by the Statthalterschaft as negotiators, F. Christian Prehn, the Syndic, was on the list, compiled in Copenhagen, of persons considered suitable as representatives for the Duchies.⁴ “No great objection can be made against M. Mommsen excepting his being a person of no weight or importance, but the last (M. Steindorff) is a Slesvig physician without reputation, belonging to the most ultra radical party in the Duchies, who would only come here to prevent reconciliation.” The Danish Government, he continued, “naturally wished that at least one of the persons sent should belong to the Ritterschaft or to the landed proprietors, and that the others should have the recommendation acquired by talents or other good qualities.”

In spite of his criticism of the suggested Slesvig-Holstein delegation, Wynn was very dissatisfied with the reply which was sent to the Stadtholders on the 21st, and which demanded a written statement of possible proposals before the delegation was received. On the 18th Wynn wrote that he had strongly advised Moltke not to make such a demand, but he did not know if he had made any impression on him, “as he is in general of the

¹ F.O. 22/173: 23/11, No. 223.

² *Ibid.* 20/11, No. 221.

³ *Ibid.* 27/11, No. 224.

⁴ *Ibid.* 12/12, No. 230.

opinion of the last Person, who speaks to him.”¹ Bille and Treschow had, he stated, “the same view of the Matter as myself.” Meyendorff, on the other hand, advised the Danish Government to demand written proposals before the delegation was received.²

When the reply was known, Wynn thought that Palmerston would find it “far different from what it ought to be . . . it is filled with ambiguous expressions to which any desired meaning can hereafter be given, and it will without doubt be so considered in the Dutchies.”³ Bille “regrets the nature of it as much as myself. . .”

In a private letter to Palmerston a few days later Wynn complained that the reply had been put off so long that it had “lost all character of being returned with good grace and in a spirit of conciliation” even if it had been different.⁴ You know, he wrote, what effect “one of your short *emphatic* Dispatches” has: “we were never more in want of one, conveying your opinion as to the *Home* Negotiation, and as to the Government of the two Dutchies, of which I could give Moltke a Copy for the *instruction* of his *Danish* Collegues.”

Palmerston did not need to be told this twice. On the 8th of January he provided the bull which Wynn wanted: The British Government regrets “that this reply was not framed in a more conciliatory Manner; and you should say that Her Majesty’s Government after all the Pains they have taken to bring the differences between His Danish Majesty and His subjects in the Dutchies to an amicable settlement, deem themselves entitled to expect from the Danish Government a more willing and cordial cooperation than this communication is calculated to lead them to hope for.”⁵

On the 27th of December the Slesvig-Holstein negotiators had refused to give a written statement of their proposals. It was not until the 11th of January that they received the answer that the King could not withdraw his demand and, naturally, there could be no question of negotiations between subjects of the same Sovereign; the King would, however, like to hear “mit landes-

¹ F.O. 22/173: 18/12, No. 234; cf. 20/12, No. 235.

² Hoetzsch. II, p. 253: dispatch 24/1.

³ F.O. 22/173: 25/12, No. 238.

⁴ 28/12. P.P.

⁵ F.O. 22/180: 8/1, No. 12; cf. 1/1, No. 5.

väterlicher Huld die Wünsche und Ansichten der wohlgesinnteren dortigen Unterthanen durch Männer . . . , die sich getrauen, eine wahrhaftige Darlegung derselben zu unternehmen.”¹

Wynn thought that the Slesvig-Holsteiners' letter of the 27th was “very proper and respectful.”² He did his best to convince Moltke that the King should, at least, receive them, but the result was as stated above. On the 12th when Wynn informed Palmerston of the reply he wrote that he would find “this consent to receive the Deputies conveyed on the whole in conciliatory terms, tho' a useless and ungracious mention is still made of *written* Propositions which they are to bring with them.”³ Strangely enough a few days later he had to send Palmerston a better translation of the letter.⁴ He wrote that a passage had been omitted in the first copy given to him, a passage which “tends to make the answer less conciliatory as it declares all negotiation between subjects of the same Sovereign as impossible, tho' His Majesty is not disinclined to receive their propositions.”

When Wynn received Palmerston's “emphatic dispatch” it was, in a way, too late, as the reply had been sent. But he sent Moltke a note on the matter,⁵ and wrote to Palmerston: “I cannot expect that any expression, however strong, of Your Lordship's opinions can make the Government retrace this unadvised step, but it will have its due influence in the Conference if it takes place.”

The Conference did not take place. On the 26th the Slesvig-Holsteiners answered that the object of their wishes was an independent Slesvig-Holstein, and the verbal negotiations were to have dealt with the realization of this wish. They considered it would serve no purpose to give a written “mediation proposal”. Wynn found the letter “far superiour unfortunately, both in style and substance, to any of the letters which have proceeded from here.”⁶

On the 12th of February Palmerston sent Wynn a new strongly-worded condemnation of the way in which the Danish Govern-

¹ Actenstücke zur Schleswig-Holsteinischen Frage. 2tes Heft (Kiel, 1850), p. 15.

² F.O. 22/182: 3/1, No. 3. — Cf. Statsrådets Forhandl. II, p. 352 f. and 357 ff.

³ F.O. 22/182: 12/1, No. 7.

⁴ Ibid. 16/1, No. 10.

⁵ Ibid. 25/1, No. 12.

⁶ Ibid. 4/2, No. 21; cf. 2/2, No. 19.

ment had treated the Slesvig-Holstein proposals.¹ Wynn sent Moltke a note with a summary of Palmerston's dispatch, "the only certain Method of having Your Lordship's sentiments conveyed to those of his Collegues, who are so opposed to Conciliation."² He was thinking of the National-Liberal members of the Government. Bille had told Wynn that he did not approve of the replies to the Slesvig-Holsteiners, but stressed the difficulty in retracing imprudent steps: "the only method which had suggested itself to him was to announce thro' Baron Blome and their other Friends in the Dutchies that the King and Government would receive and listen to any Persons who would come in an un-official Manner from the Dutchies."

What did the Prussian Government think of the step that the Statthalterschaft had taken by initiating direct negotiations with the Sovereign? Several statements from a confidential exchange of letters between Schleinitz and Bunsen about the middle of December will serve to illustrate this question.³

On the 15th of December Schleinitz sent Bunsen copies of the correspondence between the Slesvig-Holsteiners and the King. We do not fail to appreciate, in any way, he wrote, the possibility that the Duchies could make an arrangement with Denmark in a way that was at variance with the interests of Prussia and the projected Federal State. The Government would therefore follow further developments carefully. It would also insist that the peace negotiations were carried on in Berlin and not in Frankfurt. "Die Interessen Preussens, Norddeutschlands und des ganzen engeren Bundesstaates sind dabei zu sehr betheiliget." Prussia intended to ask the Central Commission in Frankfurt for authority to carry on the negotiations and to request them to declare that the Statthalterschaft's mandate for Slesvig had ceased and to recognize the armistice. In *confidence* he could, however, promise Bunsen, "dass wir diese Anerkennung nicht allzusehr zu treiben wünnen," for thereby Denmark would obtain "einen neuen[!] Vortheil und eine gesicherte Stellung. . . ." Usedom had been chosen to act as Prussian negotiator. Prussia would not press the

¹ F.O. 22/180: 12/2, No. 35.

² F.O. 22/182: 19/2, No. 28.

³ Schleinitz to Bunsen 15/12 and B. to Schl. 18/12, No. 50.

discussion of the question of the succession, "da wir bei der Lösung derselben offenbar ein viel geringeres Interesse haben als Dänemark."

In his reply Bunsen stressed that the Federal Commission ought to be kept quite out of the peace negotiations, and should not either give Prussia authority to carry on the negotiations. The Statthalterschaft should be invited to make a statement about their relation to Germany, and Holstein should hold elections for the German Parliament. He laid strong emphasis on the importance of Hamburg and Holstein for Prussia's policy. He thought that Denmark and Austria had agreed that Holstein should not join the restricted Federal State, and he considered it impossible that Russia would allow Kiel to become Germany's Baltic naval port if it could be prevented.

Schleinitz, however, did not find, as he informed Bunsen on the 28th, that it was possible for the time being to get Holstein to apply for membership of the restricted Federal State: what authority should do this for Holstein? The wish expressed by the Duchies for a mutual connection was an obstacle for Holstein's membership of the Prussian-German Federal State. Especially in view of this, Prussia would have to carry on the peace negotiations herself, and in order to avoid the interference of the Federal Commission she would only apply for "eine ganz allgemeine Vollmacht." At the negotiations the Prussian Government would certainly not allow any solution of the question of the succession which could make it more difficult for Holstein to join the restricted Federal State. As can be seen, Holstein and Kiel were the Alpha and Omega of Prussia's policy.

Bülow, the Under-Secretary of State, made statements quite in line with this during a talk with the Slesvig-Holstein Envoy in Berlin, Baron Lilieneron, who gave an account of the talk in a letter written on New Year's Eve.¹ Bülow laid strong emphasis on his view that: "Preussen, wenn es seine und Deutschlands Zukunft einigermassen im Auge halte, dürfe niemals etwas thun, um zur Gesamtstaatsidee die Hand zu bieten; geschweige denn die Aussicht auf ein einstiges ganz selbständiges Holstein oder resp. Schleswig-Holstein durch Einwilligung in eine veränderte Erbfolgeordnung aus der Hand geben. . ." As long as Denmark,

¹ EE. 50: 31/12.

retained the Sound Dues and was not forced to abandon the attempt to incorporate both Duchies or Slesvig alone, she was the enemy of Germany. Under these circumstances Prussia could pursue only one object: "Dänemark zu zertrümmern; und was zu diesem Ziel führe, zu ergreifen, sei die gebotene Politik. Darum kein Gesammtstaat, vor Allem aber keine dänische Erbfolge in Holstein."

11. Prussia is Authorized to Negotiate.

The Federal Commission Refuse to Recognize a Danish Minister for Holstein. The Question of the Prolongation of the Armistice.

The Danish negotiators had arrived in Berlin on the 13th of December. On the 20th Westmorland informed London that little had happened regarding the opening of the peace negotiations.¹ The Prussian negotiator, Usedom, had been ill, and had not yet received his terms of reference. A week later Westmorland wrote to Wynn that he had been invited by Pechlin and Reedtz to attend "the Conferences they expect to be opened immediately."² "Immediately", in this case, meant "in three weeks' time", for the first conference was not held until the 17th of January.

As mentioned at the end of the last chapter, Schleinitz considered it necessary for Prussia to obtain a warrant from the new Provisional Central Power, which had been installed in Frankfurt on the 20th, in order to carry on negotiations with Denmark. This warrant was issued on the 20th of January,³ and Prussia was authorized, in the name of the Confederation, to carry on peace negotiations with Denmark, "unter Wahrung der dem Bunde zustehenden Rechte" and under Britain's mediation and subject to the final approval of the peace treaty by all the states in the Confederation. Schleinitz's wish for "eine ganz allgemeine Vollmacht" was, on the whole, fulfilled.

The warrant, however, was accompanied by a letter of the same date from the Federal Commission to Brandenburg. This

¹ F.O. 64/304: 20/12, No. 357.

² Westmorland. IV, p. 749 ff.

³ Schleinitz's dispatch 7/2 with enclosure to Bunsen. - F.O. 30/136: 28/1, No. 30. - Lundqvist, p. 221 f.

letter stated that the peace preliminaries could not be recognized, nor could the armistice as the peace preliminaries were mentioned in this. The reason was that according to Article 49 in the Wiener Schlussacte approval must be given by a plenary assembly, and that the peace preliminaries were not in agreement with the Federal resolution of the 17th of September 1846. As can be seen, the decision of the Commission was wholly based on legal conditions before the German Revolution. But, the letter continued, as Prussia had declared that she was willing to carry on negotiations on the basis of the rights of the Confederation and those recognized by the resolution of the 17th of September 1846 the warrant was hereby issued.

When Brandenburg replied on the 5th of February to the Federal Commission he declared that Prussia accepted the warrant and would safeguard the rights of the Confederation recognized by the resolution of the 17th of September 1846 at the negotiations. But he asserted that the basis of the peace preliminaries was not at variance with the resolution. Schleinitz also stated in his letter of the 7th of February to Bunsen that the Prussian Government were convinced that the peace basis was not at variance "mit den in der Vollmacht vorbehaltenen Rechten des Bundes, deren Wahrung selbstverständlich die Pflicht Preussens ist."

On the 23rd of January Cowley wrote to Palmerston that Biegeleben, who had been in the service of the old Central Authority and was now serving the new one, had informed him that it had been decided to give Prussia authority to negotiate, but a demand had been made "that the matter shall be taken up where the old Diet left it on 17. Sept. 1846, which if assented to by Prussia will, I presume, completely alter the basis of the negotiation."¹ Britain's mediation had been recognized. Five days later Cowley sent a copy of the warrant issued by the Confederation, remarking that, although it was dated the 20th it was not sent to Berlin until the 27th.² He emphasized that an important change had been made in the warrant from the draft which he had seen first, as the Federal resolution of the 17th of September 1846 "as the basis of the negotiations is no longer insisted upon. The rights of the Confederation only are reserved." Biegeleben

¹ F.O. 30/136: 23/1, No. 27.

² Ibid. 28/1, No. 30.



FR. V. PECHLIN

(1789–1863)

Painted by Just Holm 1846.



Reetz

HOLGER CHR. REETZ
(1800 - 57)

Drawing by G. Salomon.

had also given Cowley a summary of the letter from the Commission to Brandenburg, and Cowley's account of this letter agrees with the one given above. When Cowley asked Biegeleben how far the passage concerning the 17th of September fettered Prussia's actions, Biegeleben replied that he did not think "it fettered her in any way." Cowley found that the negotiations must now be completely in the hands of Prussia, "and she can no longer pretext the necessity of referring to the Central Power upon every difficulty that arises."

The Danish Government had expected that the new Central Authority would acknowledge the Convention of the 10th of July and displace the Statthalterschaft in Holstein, but they were disappointed in both respects. Neither Prussia nor Austria proved conciliatory. In a letter to Wynn of the 27th of December (see above p. 159) Westmorland said that he had discussed the question both with Schleinitz and Prokesch, Austria's Minister in Berlin.¹ Prokesch thought that "the Central Power should not take upon itself the ungrateful task of acknowledging the Armistice etc. and displacing the Statthalterschaft as he thought Prussia was desirous of putting these measures upon others. . . ." Westmorland summed up his talk with Schleinitz by stating that Schleinitz's "great object is to avoid being called upon to act with a Prussian Military Force to reestablish the King of Denmark's authority. . ." – After Prussia had done everything to overthrow this, the matter was not so simple, either.

Westmorland was requested by Pechlin and Reedtz to write to Cowley to ask him "to press the recognition of the Armistice and Preliminaries by the Central Power." He was willing to do this, he wrote in his letter to Wynn, but at the same time he would inform Cowley of Schleinitz's views, and, as he had informed Palmerston of the matter, it lay with him to give "instructions with regard to the line he wishes Cowley to take."

The Danish Government had been requested by both Prussia and Austria to recognize the Interim – and had done so. At the end of November Bernhard von Bülow was appointed Minister in Frankfurt, but was directed to act more or less according to

¹ See also Westmorland's dispatch 27/12, No. 366. F.O. 64/304.

Pechlin's orders.¹ He arrived at Frankfurt about the middle of December.²

Bülow was, as Cowley informed Palmerston on the 31st, in possession of full powers to act as Plenipotentiary from Holstein to the new Central Government.³ The Central Government, however, refused to recognize him as such, but stated that they were willing to treat with him unofficially. Cowley wrote that Bülow thought that they would recognize the armistice immediately and "he does not anticipate much opposition to the dismissal of the Statthalterschaft."

At the beginning of January Bülow told Cowley that, at Pechlin's request, he had sent the Federal Commission a memorandum on the wishes of the Danish Government: the recognition of the armistice and the preliminaries, the dismissal of the Statthalterschaft, the disbandment of the Slesvig-Holstein army and the dissolution of the Provincial Assembly.⁴ Bülow remarked that there was "great hesitation both at Berlin and here to take any step against the Statthalterschaft." Cowley also emphasized the dangers of such a step and advised him to content himself with trying to obtain the recognition of the armistice and – if possible – the preliminaries.

As Cowley wrote to Westmorland, he found Bülow "wrong in asking for so much at once."⁵ In the confidential memorandum which he sent on the 9th of January to Biegeleben he did no more than request the Federal Commission to recognize immediately the armistice of the 10th of July.⁶ Before this had been done it was to be feared that the Statthalterschaft would continue to throw difficulties in the way of its fulfilment, and recognition would give Europe "a fresh guarantee that this question was not likely again to provoke hostilities."

When Cowley spoke to Biegeleben after sending him the memorandum he received the impression that there was little prospect of obtaining the recognition he wanted. Biegeleben himself was very much against it. Incidentally Cowley was convinced that if

¹ Statsrådets Forhandl. II, p. 316, 324 and 338.

² Bülow's dispatch 18/12. U.Min. Frankfurt. II. Depecher.

³ F.O. 30/131: 31/12, No. 584, cf. 24/12, No. 575.

⁴ F.O. 30/136: 4/1, No. 4.

⁵ Westmorland. V, p. 31 ff.: 9/1.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 27 ff. – F.O. 30/136: 15/1, No. 13.

Prussia had really wanted the armistice recognized by the Commission it would have been done immediately. He was of the opinion that Prussia, in consideration of the fact that a peace on the basis of the preliminaries would be very unpopular, was not sorry to have "a means of escape by keeping the federal commission still in abeyance." Austria was not likely to help her rival out of her difficulty.

Among other pieces of evidence the letter from Harbou, an important Holstein civil servant, written from Berlin on the 18th of December to Stadtholder Reventlou testified to the fact that Prussia did not wish Frankfurt to recognize the armistice which she (Prussia) herself had concluded.¹ You do not need to fear a speedy recognition of the armistice, Schleinitz said to him: I have already instructed Radowitz – one of the two Prussian Commissioners in Frankfurt – and advised him against it, "die den Dänen Vorschub leisten könnte." Numerous communications from the Statthalterschaft's Envoy showed that Prussia would also definitely oppose Bülow's recognition as Minister in Frankfurt.²

Cowley wrote his memorandum after receiving requests from Westmorland and Bülow, but without positive orders from Palmerston. He anticipated by this memorandum such orders as were issued on the 16th, and a later dispatch approved, naturally, of his conduct,³ but it did not give any result. Mention must be made here of the difficulties which Cowley met in his negotiations with the Federal Commission, as all four members had to be informed and as, in addition, they only made decisions according to instructions obtained from their Governments.⁴

In a dispatch written in the middle of January Cowley mentioned the unpleasant situation in which Bülow was placed "by the refusal or rather the avoidance of the Federal Commission to receive him as Plenipotentiary from Holstein."⁵ He put forward the pros and cons, but ended by saying that it was perhaps best "not to press the question of . . . Bülow's official recognition for the present." Palmerston replied that Cowley should take

¹ EE. 64 b.

² EE. 64 b: letters 5/1, 7/1 and 9/1 from Harbou.

³ F.O. 30/134: 16/1, No. 20, and 29/1, No. 33.

⁴ F.O. 30/136: 15/1, No. 14. – F.O. 30/134: 29/1, No. 32.

⁵ F.O. 30/136: 15/1, No. 15.

“such steps thereupon as you may think likely to be useful for the purpose.”¹ Cowley then approached the members of the Commission on the subject but made, he wrote, no impression on them.² This was perhaps due to the fact that Cowley was not much interested in the matter himself, and that the Commission did not consider it necessary to respect a British wish. Westmorland’s enquiries in Berlin on the same matter did not either give any results.³ On the 20th Schleinitz informed Bunsen that Prussia would not take any action, but that Bülow could have a semi-official connection with the Federal Commission; Bunsen might tell Palmerston this.

Nesselrode gave much stronger support to the matter of Bülow’s recognition than Palmerston. On the 11th of February he sent Brunnow a dispatch in which he did not doubt the British Government would be interested.⁴ The dispatch stated that the Tsar had decided to reopen diplomatic relations with the Provisional Central Power now established in Frankfurt, but had found that this decision would serve to straighten out the Slesvig difficulties, and had therefore laid down certain conditions before resuming relations. These appeared from the enclosed dispatch to the Russian Minister in Würtemberg, Prince Gortschakoff, who had been appointed Minister Extraordinary in Frankfurt. He was to proceed to Frankfurt, inform the Federal Commission of his appointment, but was not to hand over his credentials until the Commission had declared that they were prepared to receive Bülow, had recognized the armistice, and given the necessary orders for its being carried faithfully into execution, and had also accepted the peace preliminaries and authorized Prussia “à négocier et à conclure sur cette base.” If the Commission did not give a satisfactory answer, Gortschakoff was to return to Stuttgart. – If Cowley found that Bülow was “wrong in asking for so much at once” he must certainly have had the same opinion of Nesselrode.

On the 16th of February Nesselrode sent Brunnow another letter concerning the refusal of the Federal Commission to re-

¹ F.O. 30/134: 13/2, No. 44.

² F.O. 30/136: 24/2, No. 68. – F.O. 30/137: 11/3, No. 101.

³ F.O. 64/314: 21/2, No. 68.

⁴ F.O. 65/385. – Cf. Bloomfield’s dispatch 23/2, No. 52, and 26/2, No. 62. F.O. 65/376.

cognize the armistice.¹ Brunnow was requested to urge Palmerston to use strong measures to influence Berlin and Frankfurt. Nesselrode enclosed with his dispatch copies of his letters to the Russian Ministers in Vienna and Berlin requesting them to urge the respective Governments to have the armistice recognized in Frankfurt. Meyendorff was directed to represent to Prussia the possibility of a European war, and Count Médem was to get Austria to insist that the passage in the resolution of the Confederation of the 20th of January concerning the 17th of September 1846 did not get "une extension ou une interprétation que les Puissances non Allemandes, et surtout la Russie ne pourraient point admettre." Russia would not tolerate – and Austria could not allow – the encroachment of the German Confederation "sur les droits d'autrui" on the pretext of the assertion of her rights. "Et c'est cette prétension qui a été l'origine de la guerre de Slesvig," and which constitutes an obstacle for any peaceful solution. Austria ought to urge the Federal Commission to receive Bülow.

At the end of February when Gortschakoff arrived at Frankfurt and laid his conditions before the Commission a long, lively debate ensued; finally it was decided that instructions should be obtained from Berlin and Vienna.² Gortschakoff, naturally enough, approached Cowley for support in his demands as he thought "the views of the British and Russian Cabinets were . . . identic on this question." Cowley, however, refused to make "any peremptory demand in regard to the armistice" and was of opinion that the recognition of Bülow did not concern Britain as mediator. But he declared that he was willing to repeat "in a milder form the advice which I had already given on both these points." When he then spoke to Biegeleben again on the matter the latter referred to the fact that the decision lay with Vienna and Berlin. Biegeleben thought incidentally, that a recognition of Bülow would "cause a popular outbreak" in Holstein, and that, in order to avoid war, a change should be made in the administration of Slesvig which had been arranged by the Convention of the 10th of July.

¹ F.O. 65/385: 16/2 (copy).

² F.O. 30/137: 3/3, No. 85. – Hoetzsch, p. 265. – Bülow's dispatch 1/3. U.Min. Frankfurt II. Depecher.

Cowley's Government fully approved of his refusal to associate himself with Gortschakoff's action.¹ The dispatch in question stated that the Government "entirely approve of your not having made any peremptory demand upon the Federal Government." It would have been "inconsistent with the position which Great Britain occupies as mediating Power. . ."

The Prussian Government would not agree to Bülow's recognition and informed their Minister in St. Petersburg of their decision.² As no replies were received in Frankfurt from Berlin and Vienna, Gortschakoff returned about the 20th to Stuttgart.³ Cowley wrote that Gortschakoff – undoubtedly in contrast to Cowley himself! – in the Danish question has "assumed a very high tone, and had taken every opportunity of declaring" that the Tsar would never allow a single Slesvig village to be incorporated with Holstein, and that the Russian Fleet, if again ordered into Danish waters, "will not be to remain as heretofore an idle spectator of what is passing." Gortschakoff's statements agreed with those the Tsar made about the same time to the Prussian Minister, Rochow.⁴ Rochow did not believe, however, as he told Bloomfield, that the Tsar "would involve Himself in a war with Germany on this account, and he therefore still hopes that the threats which He has pronounced will not be carried into execution."

Bülow, who had then waited in vain to be recognized, left Frankfurt on the 17th of March "on leave of absence."⁵ About a month later Austria told her Commissioners to state that they were in favour of Bülow's recognition.⁶ However, on the 1st of May the political activity of the Federal Commission came to an end. At the end of April Austria had invited all the former members of the Confederation to negotiate at Frankfurt about a new Federal organisation to replace the Commission. Bülow arrived at Frankfurt again in May as Denmark's representative, and was accepted now as such in spite of objections from Saxony and

¹ F.O. 30/134: 8/3, No. 69. – Cf. Brunnow to Nesselrode 23/3. Westmorland. V, p. 199 ff.

² Copy of dispatch 7/3 to Rochow with Schleinitz's dispatch 15/3 to Bunsen. – Cf. Hoetzsch, p. 277.

³ F.O. 30/137: 19/3, No. 113. – Cf. EE. 67: Stemann's letter 17/3, No. 40.

⁴ F.O. 65/376: 4/3, No. 66.

⁵ F.O. 30/137: 19/3, No. 111. – EE. 67: Stemann's letter 19/3, No. 42.

⁶ See among other things Stemann's letters 14/4, No. 57, and 19/4, No. 60. EE. 67.

Bavaria.¹ Prussia continued her efforts to form a restricted Prussian-German League and the conflict between her and Austria became more acute in the course of the summer. As is well-known, at the end of the year Prussia was forced by Austria, supported by Russia, to give up her plans for a League and put up with the reintroduction of the German Federal Constitution as it was before the revolution.

On the 17th of January the six months had passed for which Denmark and Prussia had concluded the armistice. As it had not been terminated it continued automatically with six weeks' notice of termination. In Slesvig-Holstein quarters the resumption of hostilities was hinted at, and in Holstein extensive military preparations had taken place. The numerous Prussian officers, with General Bonin at their head, who were serving in the Slesvig-Holstein army were of great help. On the other hand by recalling these officers it was possible for Prussia to quench the Slesvig-Holsteiners' thirst for war – and she had promised Denmark in the Secret Articles to do so if the Statthalterschaft commenced hostilities during the armistice.

About New Year Sweden brought up the question of the prolongation of the armistice for Britain's consideration.² Sweden was directly interested in the matter as there were Swedish and Norwegian troops in North Slesvig. On the 15th of January the British Government, accordingly, requested Wynn and Westmorland to suggest to Denmark and Prussia a prolongation of six months.³

The proposition was met with goodwill in Copenhagen, but on the condition that the armistice was really carried into effect as it had been concluded.⁴ No mention was made of details. In Berlin Westmorland spoke about the prolongation to the Swedish Minister, who, however, said that he had no instructions.⁵ The

¹ Bülow's dispatch 9/5 and the following. – Lundqvist's statement p. 207 that Prussia recognized Bülow as Holstein's representative at the end of April, is due to a misunderstanding of the remarks in *Krigen 1848–50*. III, p. 255.

² See the detailed account in Lundqvist, p. 154 ff. for a description of what follows.

³ F.O. 64/310: 15/1, No. 20.

⁴ Statsrådets *Forhandl.* II, p. 378 ff. – F.O. 22/182: 28/1, No. 14, and 2/2, No. 20. – Moltke's dispatch 2/2, No. 5. – Reventlow's dispatch 12/2, No. 8, and 14/2, No. 10.

⁵ F.O. 64/313: 24/1, No. 26.

Danish peace negotiators had, Westmorland wrote to Palmerston on the 24th, no intention of terminating the armistice, but did not wish to negotiate for a prolongation "as they have so much reason to complain of the manner, in which it has been observed by the Prussian Government." Westmorland, however, added that he had not put the proposal before them as he would first inform Schleinitz of it. Two days later he stated that nothing could make the Danish negotiators approve of a prolongation unless the Prussian troops in South Slesvig were replaced by Swedish, and the Statthalterschaft were dismissed.¹

As Schleinitz was ill, Westmorland was unable to speak to him about the prolongation, but had to content himself with laying the proposal before Abeken, the Under-Secretary of State,² who, however, informed him that Schleinitz found the proposal unnecessary and negotiations on the matter hopeless.

On receiving Westmorland's dispatch of the 24th Palmerston had misgivings about the usefulness of his proposal. On the 1st of February he wrote to him: if the peace negotiations continue "it will perhaps be better not to interrupt and retard that negotiation by interposing a negotiation for a formal and definite prolongation of the Armistice."³ There would in all probability be great differences in opinion between the parties, and it was unlikely that hostilities would begin at that time of year. When Wynn heard of Palmerston's changed attitude he informed him that Moltke agreed with it.⁴

However, at the beginning of February Palmerston had been told that the Danish Government were willing to prolong the armistice and he expressed his great satisfaction to Reventlow.⁵ On the 13th of February he therefore informed Westmorland of this directing him to recommend it to Prussia, as it would be "an easy and simple transaction not involving any discussion as to modifications of the former stipulations."⁶ The previous day he had requested Westmorland to ask Schleinitz to have Frederiksort and Rendsborg occupied by Prussian troops "in con-

¹ F.O. 64/313: 26/1, No. 34.

² Ibid. 30/1, No. 40. – F.O. 64/314: 7/2, No. 47.

³ F.O. 64/310: 1/2, No. 35.

⁴ F.O. 22/182: 9/2, No. 23.

⁵ Reventlow's dispatch 14/2, No. 10.

⁶ F.O. 64/310: 13/2, No. 54. – Lundqvist's criticism p. 161 of Palmerston is due to his ignorance of this dispatch.

formity with the terms of the Convention of 10 July."¹ Both these garrison towns were still occupied by Slesvig-Holstein troops.

On the 16th Reventlow wrote to Copenhagen stating that a false rumour had arisen that Denmark had refused to prolong the armistice, and that in consequence notice of a question had been given in the House of Commons.² This question, put by G. Sandars, was discussed on the 18th.³ Palmerston replied that Britain had suggested a prolongation of six months, but, at first, both parties had raised objections. Later the Danish Minister had stated that his Government were willing to prolong the armistice "upon condition that all the parties concerned should concur in acknowledging that Armistice, and that the conditions of the Armistice should be faithfully carried into execution." Palmerston thought that Denmark meant Prussia and the Federal Commission by "the parties", and that difficulties might arise regarding the latter. He had instructed the Ministers in Berlin and Frankfurt to recommend a prolongation. Moreover, the armistice was still running with six weeks' notice of termination and he did not think that either party "at present, at least" had the intention of renewing hostilities. He believed that the Danish Government were willing to prolong the armistice until the end of the year.

In consequence of Palmerston's new request Westmorland approached Abeken again about the 20th.⁴ Schleinitz was still ill, and Westmorland's inquiry was fruitless. His request made at the same time about the removal of the Slesvig-Holstein troops from Frederiksort and Rendsborg was also unavailing. Abeken replied that this could not be done without the use of force and Prussia was not willing to use this.

On the 20th of February Schleinitz instructed Bunsen about Prussia's views on Denmark's willingness to prolong the armistice if its conditions were carried into execution. Schleinitz acknowledged Palmerston's good intentions, but declared openly that Prussia could not guarantee the execution of the conditions. Experience had shown that this was not possible in a peaceful manner. The Statthalterschaft were, however, doing everything

¹ F.O. 64/310: 12/2, No. 47.

² Reventlow's dispatch 16/2, No. 11.

³ Hansard's Parliamentary Debates Vol. CVIII. 3rd Series, p. 970. – Reventlow's dispatch 19/2, No. 12.

⁴ F.O. 64/314: 21/2, No. 68.

to prevent the resumption of hostilities. To give an idea of public feeling in Slesvig he enclosed a copy of a petition sent from there to Prussia. The petition made a violent attack on the Administrative Commission. The dispatch stated that the Prussian Government "kann sich nicht verhehlen, dass die Einführung einer mehr auf nationalen Basen[?] ruhenden Verwaltung allein eine sichere Bürgschaft für die Erhaltung des Friedens geben kann." They were willing to agree to a prolongation, but, in that case, changes would have to take place in the administration of Slesvig. Another dispatch of the same date dealt with Bülow's position in Frankfurt.

On the 27th Bunsen read to Palmerston a memorandum he had drawn up on conditions in Slesvig.¹ It made a very violent attack on the Administrative Commission in explanation of Prussia's refusal to prolong the armistice. The memorandum was described as the "Substance" of Schleinitz's two dispatches of the 20th.

Bunsen's memorandum proved to be, in reality, a misrepresentation. Palmerston sent copies of it to Westmorland and to Hodges for consideration.² Hodges let Eulenburg and Tillisch read it, and then he sent Westmorland, on the 7th of March, and Palmerston, on the 9th, a detailed indignant protest against Bunsen's account of the work of the Commission.³ "What in Heaven's name," he wrote in his letter to Westmorland, "could lead me to be partial towards Denmark. — I have never set a foot in that Country." If he had any partiality it must be for Germany, where he had lived for such a long time, and where he had received "kindness, hospitality, and even friendship." "But My Lord, it is not my habit silently to submit to unjust accusations, nor do I think it my duty to do so, though I am aware that I have the honor of serving a Government that will afford me protection so long as I faithfully fulfil the trust they have confided to me. . . ." Both in this letter and in his letter to Palmerston, Hodges pointed out how small an active part he had taken in the work of the Commission. But, he wrote in the dispatch to Palmerston with which he enclosed reports from Eulenburg and Tillisch, "speaking

¹ Bunsen's dispatch 1/3, No. 37.

² F.O. 33/123: 28/2, No. 25.

³ Westmorland, V., p. 139 ff. — F.O. 33/124: 9/3, No. 28.

generally of the proceedings of my Colleagues I think they have carried on their Administration with the greatest lenity, temperance and forbearance."

When Westmorland asked Schleinitz for an explanation of Bunsen's criticism, Schleinitz was, Westmorland wrote to Hodges, "at a loss to explain how the Chev. Bunsen could have embodied in a Memorandum, stated to be extracted from his despatches, words and expressions which he had never dreamt of."¹ Schleinitz asked Westmorland to tell Hodges this, "as he would take care to do to the other persons joined with you in the Administrative Commission."² He asked to see Bunsen's memorandum "that he might with the more accuracy call for explanation with regard to it." As Bunsen had sent Schleinitz a copy, the request must be understood as a temporization.

Hodges then stated to Westmorland that he was satisfied that Schleinitz "seems disposed to see my efforts in a true light, but as it is, a very pretty quarrel exists now between him and . . . Bunsen, who, however, as he is so dexterous a diplomatist, I have no doubt will find some by-door for escape."³

After the conference with Westmorland Schleinitz was forced to dissociate himself from Bunsen. On the 14th of March he sent him a confidential dispatch stating that his (Bunsen's) memorandum contained "eine in den schärfsten Ausdrücken gefasste Anklage des Verfahrens der Landesverwaltung," and he laid emphasis on the fact that Prussia found it "more impossible than ever" to support such an authority. But you (Bunsen) will see on a closer inspection of the letter of the 20th of February that "diese Auffassung den Ansichten der Königlichen Regierung gerade zu widerspricht, und dass es niemals in unserer Absicht gelegen haben kann, dergleichen Anklagen gegen die Landesverwaltung vorzubringen. . ." He had only been informed of the Slesvig petition to give him an idea of public opinion there, and the Prussian Government did not share its opinions. If they had done so they would have recalled their Commissioner a long time ago, as he had taken part in the administration in question.

¹ Westmorland, V, p. 159 ff. – F.O. 64/315: 13/3, No. 97.

² Eulenburg received, of course, such an explanation. See F.O. 33/124: 14/3, No. 35.

³ Westmorland, V, p. 167 ff.

Palmerston must, continues Schleinitz, believe that the memorandum was a complaint from Berlin, and he had therefore sent it to Westmorland and to Hodges, who had told his colleagues of it. Schleinitz had, therefore, been obliged to inform Westmorland and Eulenburg of the dispatch of the 20th of February to show "dass um eine Rechtfertigung gegen Anklagen, die die Königliche Regierung erhoben hätte, nicht die Rede sein könne." He directed Bunsen to give Palmerston accurate copies of the two dispatches of the 20th of February, and explain to him that the memorandum was not official. He ought to be careful in any communications of the same kind not to get away from the Government's views. This was all the more necessary "da gerade in dieser Angelegenheit uns schon mehrfach der Vorwurf der Zweideutigkeit und Tergiversation gemacht werden, für welchen in dergleichen Vorfällen nur zu leicht ein Vorwand gefunden werden könnte, der uns den schlimmsten Verdächtigungen aussetzen würde."

Bunsen had no other choice than to send Palmerston copies of Schleinitz's two dispatches.¹ But, as Hodges had expected, he got out through a "by-door". Broadly speaking, he did not go beyond asking Palmerston, "as there seems to have been a misunderstanding" to "interpret the Memorandum in strict conformity with the tenor of those despatches" – or, more correctly, to understand that it was a misrepresentation. He defended his conduct in a letter to Schleinitz. The fact that, on receiving from Palmerston Hodges' refutation of the memorandum, he replied that he thought it confirmed his statements, throws further light on Bunsen's character!²

After this digression on Bunsen's arbitrary conduct as the spokesman for the Slesvig-Holsteiners I shall return to deal with Palmerston's efforts to obtain Prussia's agreement to the prolongation of the armistice. On the 25th of February he requested Westmorland to get Berlin to prevent the outbreak of hostilities.³ There were two ways of doing this: (1) a speedy conclusion of peace and (2) the renewal of the armistice for six or eight months.

¹ Bunsen's dispatch 23/3, No. 22 (confidential) with enclosure. – F.O. 64/324: 23/3 and 28/3. – Cf. Bunsen. III, p. 130 f. which undoubtedly has relation to his falsified "Substance".

² F.O. 64/324: 19/3 from Bunsen to Palmerston.

³ F.O. 64/310: 25/2, No. 71.

The slow-moving negotiations gave no prospect of a speedy peace. But Denmark seemed to be willing to prolong the armistice. Prussia ought to consider all the misery which the renewal of hostilities would cause even if the war should only concern the present participants. And it was possible that others would take part! "It cannot be necessary to specify more in detail those Considerations which Her Majesty's Government would thus wish to submit to the sound judgment of the Prussian Government, but those Considerations are much too weighty in regard to their intrinsic importance, and much too urgent in regard to time, not to deserve the most deliberate attention." By this statement Palmerston, naturally, held out the threat of Russia's possible intervention, and he made dispositions for her troops obviously a little too off-handedly – in Meyendorff's opinion.¹

On the 26th when Palmerston had received Westmorland's dispatch about his talk with Abeken, he asked to be informed of the changes which Prussia wanted to be made in the armistice; but he laid emphasis on the fact that it would probably be more difficult to negotiate with Denmark when navigation began in the Baltic and she could effect a blockade.² Palmerston used the same argument in a renewed request to Berlin on the 8th of March.³ Westmorland again brought the matter before Schleinitz, who referred to his dispatch of the 20th of February to Bunsen which had mentioned possible changes as a condition for a prolongation.⁴

What changes? asked Palmerston,⁵ but Schleinitz would not divulge them. Westmorland stated that Schleinitz entertained no hopes that the Danish negotiators "would adopt the changes he would require in its stipulations."⁶ But if Palmerston would "propose such modifications in the present Administration of Slesvig as should be founded on a more National basis, he would have great pleasure in assisting to carry them out." Palmerston can hardly have felt "great pleasure" in being hoodwinked in this way.

While Palmerston, as mentioned before, tried to influence Prussia by conjuring up a Danish blockade, on the other hand,

¹ Hoetzsch. II, p. 292.

² F.O. 64/310: 26/2, No. 76.

³ *Ibid.*: 8/3, No. 86.

⁴ F.O. 64/315: 13/3, No. 99.

⁵ F.O. 64/310: 19/3, No. 106.

⁶ F.O. 64/315: 24/3, No. 119.

for the sake of Britain's trade, he strongly advised Denmark not to start one.¹

Cowley's efforts in Frankfurt to have the armistice renewed were just as fruitless as Westmorland's in Berlin and only a brief mention will be made of them.

At the beginning of February after he had been informed that the Danish Government were prepared to prolong the armistice, Cowley approached the Federal Commission on several occasions.² For instance on the 22nd of February he drew up a confidential memorandum to Biegeleben referring to his earlier memorandum of the 9th of January. He stressed how important it was for trade that the Commission recognized the armistice, and he was of the opinion that this could be done without going into the question of the peace preliminaries.

At their meeting on the 5th of March the Federal Commission gave assurances of their peaceful intentions, but did not go in for the proposal. Cowley then submitted a new memorandum which stated, among other things, that "The continual interpellations made to Her Majesty's Ministers in Parliament on this subject prove the interest taken in it by the British public;" other Powers, too, were interested in the question. Cowley thought that the Austrian Commissioner was more conciliatory than the Prussian representative as "the Prussians are afraid that if the Federal Commission acquiesces in a renewed armistice, its acquiescence may be used by the Mediating Power as an arm against the Prussian Government." But, Cowley added, "It may perhaps with equal fairness be asked, whether the Prussian Government does not make use of the hesitation of the Federal Commission as a reason for its own backwardness in meeting halfway the pacific propositions of the Mediating Power."

To his last memorandum Cowley received only the answer that the Commission considered itself bound "to maintain a suspension of hostilities", and they referred to their communication to Berlin on the 20th of January. Cowley's honest efforts in support of his Government's proposal remained fruitless.

¹ Reventlow's dispatches 7/3, No. 19, and 12/3, No. 21.

² F.O. 30/136: 10/2, No. 50; 18/2, No. 63; 24/2, No. 67. — F.O. 30/137: 11/3, No. 100, and 19/3, No. 108.

12. Peace Negotiations on the Basis of the Preliminaries.

On the 17th of January the first conference between the Danish negotiators and Usedom, the Prussian Commissioner, was held at Westmorland's home.¹ Pechlin put forward the Danish proposal for the future position of Slesvig – partly regarding its special constitution, and partly regarding the affairs which it had in common with the Kingdom, which were assumed to appear from the political union between Slesvig and the Kingdom laid down in the peace preliminaries.

At the end of December the Statthalterschaft, after consent had been obtained from Usedom and Schleinitz, had given Karl Samwer, Slesvig-Holsteinism's theorist, orders to proceed to Berlin to take part there, unofficially, in the negotiations on the Prussian side.² I shall not go into detail about Samwer's participation, but only emphasize that, in reality, the negotiations came to take place between the Danish delegation and a staunch Slesvig-Holsteiner, and were, therefore, doomed to failure before they began.

As Harbou had told Count Reventlow at the beginning of January, Usedom intended to take his time about the peace negotiations.³ As mentioned before, they did not begin until a month after the Danish delegation had arrived in Berlin. The day after the Danish delegation had put forward their proposal Usedom discussed it with Samwer, and Baron Liliencron, the Statthalterschaft's Envoy in Berlin.⁴ Liliencron wrote that the Danish proposal was "natürlich völlig unannehmbar"; and on the 24th he was able to inform Kiel of his and Samwer's conferences with Usedom who seemed willing to put forward a counter-proposal "welches für die Dänen grade eben so unannehmbar sein wird, als es das ihrige für uns ist."⁵

Prussia was authorized by Frankfurt to carry on the peace negotiations with Denmark after the first conference had been

¹ F.O. 64/313: 17/1, No. 20. – Lundqvist, p. 223 ff. – Krigen 1848–50. III, p. 187 ff.

² EE. 64 b: Liliencron's letter 25/12 and the Foreign Department's letter 28/12 to Samwer.

³ EE. 64 b: Harbou to Reventlow: 7/1 ("wird sie [the peace negotiations] aber nicht übereilen").

⁴ EE. 50; Liliencron's dispatch 18/1.

⁵ Ibid. 24/1; cf. 7/2, 14/2, 17/2, 18/2 and 20/2.

held (see p. 159). On the 26th of January Westmorland reported that the Danish delegates were disappointed that Frankfurt had adopted the Federal resolution of the 17th of September 1846 as the basis of the negotiations.¹ He had suggested to Usedom that the negotiations should continue, but Usedom had excused himself on account of pressure of work in the Cabinet. He thought, however, that Prussia would put forward a counter-proposal, but, he added, "under all the circumstances, attending the position which Prussia has assumed in the Duchies, it is difficult to foresee how the Prussian Government will propose to execute any determination in conformity with the preliminaries which may be come to." Schleinitz is supposed to have said himself "that he really did not himself know, how a satisfactory conclusion was to be arrived at."

When Westmorland inquired when the negotiations would be resumed, he received many promises from Prussia that they "would immediately be resumed."² But as he wrote on the 14th of February to Palmerston in relation to one of these promises: "I have so often been disappointed by similar statements, that I can hardly venture to give Your Lordship any assurance that they will be adhered to." This last promise was not kept either, but on the 19th of February, however, the negotiations were resumed when Prussia put forward her counter-proposal.³ It was as the Slesvig-Holsteiners had predicted, quite unacceptable for Denmark as it made Slesvig independent of Denmark, analogous with the position of Norway to Sweden.

In the previous chapter it was mentioned that while Denmark demanded that Prussia should carry into execution the Convention of the 10th of July, Prussia stated that she was unable to do so on account of opposition from the Slesvig-Holsteiners. From January 1850 Berlin tried to find a way either to meet the Slesvig-Holstein wish for a connection between the Duchies or also to withdraw formally the authority of the Administrative Commission from South Slesvig. At the end of February Schleinitz said to Westmorland that a new Government for the Duchy, different

¹ F.O. 64/313: 26/1, No. 34.

² *Ibid.*: 30/1, No. 40. – F.O. 64/314: 7/2, No. 47, and 14/2, No. 54.

³ F.O. 64/314: 19/2, No. 62, and 20/2, No. 63. – Westmorland. V, p. 131 f. and 135 f.

from the Administrative Commission, was an absolute necessity.¹ If this was not arranged in the course of the next month "Prussia would withdraw altogether and leave the two parties in the Duchies to fight out their differences."

Westmorland thought it was better for Prussia to conclude the final peace at once, but Schleinitz said that this would probably take six months. Westmorland replied that he could not understand this "unless the system of delay now in practice should continue." For instance Usedom had still not yet handed in the memorandum which was to accompany his counter-proposal, and which he had promised to do within three days – and now ten days had elapsed! During the talk in question Westmorland read to Schleinitz Palmerston's dispatch of the 19th of February to Cowley, stating the impossibility of now returning to the protocol of 1846.² This dispatch stated: since then events have taken place "which cannot be recalled, and the influence of which on the present state of things cannot be set aside. A preliminary Treaty was concluded last year by which it was settled that the Basis of the final arrangement between Denmark, Germany, and the two Duchies should be that Slesvig should have a separate constitution uniting it integrally neither to Denmark nor to Holstein. It was on an agreement to this Basis that hostilities ceased and the Blockade of the German Ports was raised, and it is on that Basis only that a final pacification is attainable."

At last on the 4th of March Usedom handed in his memorandum.³ Westmorland urged the Danish negotiators not to postpone their answer to the Prussian counter-proposal until they had had time to answer the memorandum but "to enter without loss of time into the discussion of the former." He also tried to convince Schleinitz "that it is now no longer possible that this Negotiation should be protracted in the way it has hitherto been." It was, he said, not very correct of Prussia as a Great Power not to be firm in her maintenance of the peace preliminaries signed by herself, and she ought to make it quite clear to the parties in the Duchies that she would not allow changes in the preliminaries. She ought also to support, if necessary by force, a definitive peace or an

¹ F.O. 64/314: 28/2, No. 79 (confidential).

² F.O. 30/134: 19/2, No. 51.

³ F.O. 64/315: 4/3, No. 88, and 6/3, No. 90.

extended armistice. — Probably a couple of days before this talk, Westmorland had mentioned to Schleinitz a statement which Radowitz was said to have made to Gortschakoff to the effect that the peace preliminaries were “une conception malheureuse,” which Prussia must be allowed to change when she had discovered her mistake.¹ Schleinitz, of course, assured Westmorland that he “in no way partakes” of Radowitz’s views.

According to his dispatch of the 6th of March Westmorland’s attempt to influence Schleinitz to accelerate the negotiations and maintain the peace preliminaries had the result he wanted. Schleinitz said that he felt the necessity of taking Westmorland’s advice, and he had requested Usedom to speed up the negotiations. Furthermore he would “with the view of proving to the so-called German party in the Duchies, that Prussia would not allow the Holstein Army to disturb the existing state of things as established by the Armistice,” give the Prussian troops in South Slesvig orders “to concentrate themselves upon any supposed line of operations that army might take and to accompany this measure by a declaration that it was done with a view of proving to all parties that Prussia was determined to maintain the engagements” which she had entered into by the Convention of the 10th of July — or which she would enter into.

Would Westmorland accept such a measure, Schleinitz asked. “I said certainly; he then enquired whether I thought the Danish Plenipotentiaries would not object to it, I said I was convinced they ought not” but would ask them. He did so and received their full approval. Schleinitz then said that he would attempt to have the measure carried into effect, and this was done.²

On the 8th of March Westmorland wrote to Hodges that General Rauch, the King’s “confidential Secretary”, had been sent to the Duchies to warn the Statthalterschaft, in no uncertain terms, not to begin hostilities.³ “He will announce the concentration of the Prussian troops upon the line of operations the invaders Army might be expected to take. . .” Rauch would also inform the Statthalterschaft, Westmorland wrote, that if its troops invaded Slesvig, Prussia would appeal to Frankfurt to take meas-

¹ Extract of Gortschakoff’s dispatch with Westmorland’s of 4/3.

² Cf. Hjelholt. II, p. 216 f.

³ Westmorland. V, p. 147 ff.

ures, by the march of a considerable Army to reestablish the King of Denmark's authority."

After discussions with Rauch Hodges expressed his pleasure at talking to "so impartial and able a Person as this officer."¹ Hodges' statements in his letter to Westmorland were just as realistic as Westmorland's above-mentioned statements were divorced from reality: "But my Soul, has not General Rauch arrived too late? Does he express the sentiments of the Prussian Government or of the King only? and in face of the perseverance of the Statthalterschaft in their plan to invade this Duchy, will his threats be carried into immediate execution?—I see besides General Hahn is concentrating his troops, not to oppose the Holsteiners, but to retire altogether. . ."

Contrary to what Schleinitz had made Westmorland believe, the Prussian troop concentration aimed at avoiding a conflict with the Slesvig-Holstein troops if these should invade. Its object was also to lay open larger areas of South Slesvig to the agitation and influence of the Statthalterschaft. Where there were no Prussian troops the Administrative Commission could not request their support to maintain its authority. That such support, incidentally, was given unwillingly or was refused was another matter.

How cunning Schleinitz considered his action in getting Westmorland and the Danish negotiators to agree to the troop concentration appeared from his dispatch of the 24th of March to Bunsen. He stated, however, as his opinion in this dispatch that the concentration would make a possible invasion by Holstein troops more difficult. Through Westmorland, he continued, he had procured the agreement of the Danish negotiators to the concentration: "Der letzere Umstand hat auch die Bedenken überwinden müssen, welche dadurch hätten entstehen können, dass eine der unvermeidlichen Folgen dieser Concentrirung die Entblössung mancher Orte von Truppen sein wird, wo nur durch die Anwesenheit der letzteren die Autorität der Landesverwaltung aufrechterhalten wurde. Dadurch wird die Action der letzteren freilich um so mehr paralytirt, und manchen Bestrebungen der entgegengesetzten Parthei freieren Spielraum gelassen werden." But considering the importance of the concentration and the approval

¹ Westmorland. V, 151 ff.: 14/3.

of the Danish negotiators, "*welchen eben jene unvermeidliche Folge nicht wohl entgegen konnte*" [underlined by me], there was no use in worrying over that. This has hardly given Schleinitz any worry and the underlined sentence shows his triumph over the naivety of the Danish negotiators.

When it appeared how unfortunate the consequences of the troop concentration were for the Administrative Commission, the Danish negotiators and Westmorland wanted the decision revoked. But Schleinitz would not agree to this.¹ In his dispatch of the 2nd of April Westmorland wrote that he had said to Schleinitz that he now regretted having supported the proposal for the concentration.² "I should never have given such an opinion if I could have conceived that by their concentration these troops were to be withdrawn from the duty imposed upon them of assisting" the Administrative Commission "and were not to oppose the hostile advance of the Holstein Army, but in case it took place to retire from the Duchy." His statements made no impression on Schleinitz.

In his dispatch to Bunsen Schleinitz stressed the fact that the concentration of the Prussian troops gave "more scope" to the activity in South Slesvig of the Slesvig-Holsteiners. At the beginning of March, the Statthalterschaft, in pecuniary distress, began to levy taxes here, and, as the majority of the revolutionary civil servants, thanks to the passive Prussian forces, had remained in office, large amounts of money went south to the Treasury at Rendsborg.³

Schleinitz had been informed beforehand of the action of the Statthalterschaft. Hodges wrote in his above-mentioned letter of the 14th to Westmorland: "I have discovered from a source in which I can place full reliance that before the Statthalterschaft took this step they first consulted the Prussian Government as to whether they thought that if they – the Statthalterschaft – were to send orders to the Slesvig agents under the Administrative Commission not to pay any more taxes or duties to them but to send them to Rendsburg it could be considered as a *casus belli* – Baron Schleinitz told them *to try it at all events*." Westmorland had

¹ See e.g. his dispatch 15/4 to Bunsen.

² F.O. 64/316: 2/4, No. 125.

³ Hjelholt. II, p. 232 ff.

received similar information at the same time from another source, and Rauch, too, had heard of this step during his stay in the Duchies.¹ However, to Westmorland Schleinitz gave "the statement the most positive contradiction" and complained about "the manner in which the violent Partizans in the Duchies misrepresent him." It is certain that he himself was not without blame in the matter. The officials of the Statthalterschaft, who discussed the matter with him, returned home with the opinion, and rightly so, that Prussia would not interfere with this step, but give them free scope where there were no Prussian troops.

Hodges' question as to whether Rauch represented the Government or the King had a bearing upon the well-known difference between Friedrich Wilhelm IV and his Conservative surroundings, and the more liberal German-National Government with its Slesvig-Holstein sympathies rooted in the hope of Prussian expansion. Rauch belonged to the out-and-out Conservatives, was highly esteemed by Meyendorff, and, as Hodges wrote, he had the same opinion as he, "that sooner or later Prussia would have to deal with those people [the Slesvig-Holsteiners] as She has had to do with the Baden insurgents. . ."

Rauch cannot possibly have entertained any friendly feelings towards Usedom, the Prussian negotiator, who was infected with Slesvig-Holstein sympathies. After his arrival home Rauch was said to have complained in a letter to Schleinitz that Usedom, according to a statement made by Frau Usedom to Westmorland, had declared that he would not conclude peace with Denmark on the basis of the preliminaries.² This resulted in Frau Usedom's sending a long, indignant letter to Westmorland protesting that she had never spoken to him about "preliminaries", and demanding the name of the person "who has so grossly misunderstood some expression of mine on a subject on which I should never open my lips, were I not always so violently attacked by others in the person of my Husband and the conduct of his Government." Westmorland then asked Rauch about the matter, and Rauch assured him that he had never connected his name with Frau Usedom. On hearing this from Westmorland Frau Usedom thanked him and invited him to a cup of evening tea:

¹ Westmorland. V, p. 179 ff.

² *Ibid.*, p. 183 ff.

“Usedom and I are too much attached to Yourself and Lady Westmorland . . . to allow a shadow to arise between us without asking an instant explanation.” – According to Westmorland’s notes the affair made a very painful impression on Rauch. The Conservatives suffered a great loss by his death shortly afterwards. Meyendorff wrote to Nesselrode: “Comment se passer d’un tel homme dans un moment où plus que jamais il nous fait défaut?”¹

On the 8th of March the Third Conference took place at Westmorland’s home,² and at its opening Westmorland pointed out the importance which Palmerston attached to “the prompt conclusion either of a definitive Peace between Germany and Denmark, or a fixed prolongation of the Armistice at present existing.” He was, he wrote in his report, specially prompted to mention this on account of the rumours which had sprung up to the effect that Britain was deliberately spinning out the negotiations “with the view of forwarding their own interests by keeping all German Commercial Speculation in suspense.” – He wrote to Cowley: “The negotiations here are moving a little but I fear at any rate they must be referred to Copenhagen before being brought to any thing like an understanding.”³

Before the next Conference took place on the 17th Westmorland had received news of Palmerston’s opinion of Usedom’s proposal concerning Slesvig’s “independence” in a dispatch of the 12th of March.⁴ While the parties were negotiating, the dispatch stated, Britain did not wish “to interpose any opinion of their own with a view to interrupt or bias the course of the Negotiation.” However, for Westmorland’s information Palmerston would make the following remarks in connection with the memorandum: (1) Britain had never wished to use the word “Independence” about Slesvig’s relation to Denmark. It had “indeed inadvertently” been used by Cowley in a note to Gagern, but had not been authorized by the British Government “and was disavowed by them” (see p. 23). Britain’s proposal was that Slesvig should have “an internal constitution” separate from

¹ Hoetzsch. II, p. 287.

² F.O. 64/315: 10/3, No. 96.

³ Westmorland. V, p. 163 f.: 14/3.

⁴ F.O. 64/310: 12/3, No. 92.

Denmark and Holstein "but the proposal that Slesvig should be erected into an independent State never came from [England] and conveys an idea much beyond what they meant to recommend." (2) Norway's relation to Sweden could not be the model for Slesvig's relation to Denmark as the respective sizes were very different. The frontier between Norway and Sweden was also much more well-defined than that between Jutland and Slesvig which, incidentally, on many old maps was called Southern Jutland (Sønderjylland). Slesvig had for a long time been "politically united with Denmark," and almost half the population was Danish.

Palmerston continued by saying that he would intentionally refrain from going into details about the Danish and German plans for a Constitution for Slesvig. He remarked, however, that "much practical inconvenience" would arise from Prussia's proposal for "a separate naval establishment for Slesvig," and he was opposed to only one legislative assembly in Slesvig. He directed Westmorland to emphasize that it was of the greatest importance for Prussia herself and for the peace of Europe that the matter be settled as soon as possible. A new war might cause an extension of hostilities. The main point was that the population of Slesvig, as far as their own local administration was concerned, was secure against decisions passed by a Parliament in Copenhagen where its representatives were in the minority.

On the 16th Westmorland informed Schleinitz of this dispatch of Palmerston's.¹ Schleinitz expressed his disappointment at Palmerston's dissociating himself from the expression "independence" used by Cowley in his memorandum to Gagern, but Westmorland referred to Palmerston's dispatch of the 13th of March 1849, published in the Prussian Government's own communication to the Chambers. Westmorland wrote that he had "so strongly represented against" the point concerning "the Naval Arsenals" at the last Conference, and Schleinitz had now told him that it had been given up. Schleinitz was also willing to accept Palmerston's proposal for two Chambers in Slesvig. Westmorland also reported that both Brandenburg and Schleinitz had spoken to him about Tsar Nicholas' threatening statements to Rochow. However, they did not seem to attach any serious importance to

¹ F.O. 64/315: 17/3, No. 107.

them and believed that Nesselrode was opposed to "any more active interference with regard to them than has hitherto taken place." But they asserted that they would like to see the matter brought to an end.

On the 17th, as mentioned before, the Fourth Conference was held and Schleinitz, too, was present. The Danish negotiators reviewed the points on which there was disagreement, and put forward a detailed proposal on the position of Holstein and Lauenburg as "parts of the German Confederation."¹ On the 22nd they handed in their answer to the Prussian counter-proposal.

On the 21st Schleinitz had a long discussion with Westmorland about the Danish proposals of the 17th which on the part of the Danes seemed to be considered an ultimatum.² Schleinitz said that it would be impossible for Prussia to sign a treaty in which they would be adopted. They would be interpreted by Germany as Slesvig's incorporation with Denmark, and Prussia would be considered a traitor. He was therefore inclined to "give up the idea of exacting any conditions and simply to make a Treaty of Peace with Denmark and to withdraw the Prussian troops and officers from the Duchies as stipulated in the Secret Articles." In this way he would, at least, avoid reproaches for having accepted terms which the Slesvig-Holsteiners considered injurious to their interests. By way of justifying his point of view, he mentioned that he could see from Palmerston's last dispatch that he did not interpret Slesvig's independence as he (Schleinitz) did "and therefore that he could not count upon your support of the interpretation he had given to it, nor could he do so from the Cabinet of St. Petersburg. He therefore felt it would be useless for him to attempt to enforce his views." When Westmorland referred to the fact that he had been acquainted with Palmerston's interpretation a long time ago through the dispatch of the 13th of March, Schleinitz admitted this, but seemed to have believed that "Your Lordship might not strictly have maintained this definition."

During the conversation several differences in the Danish and Prussian proposals were touched upon. Schleinitz stated, for

¹ Krigen 1848-50. III, p. 211 ff.

² F.O. 64/315: 21/3, No. 113. - F.O. 64/310: 28/3, No. 120.

instance, that he could not agree to the unity of Army, after which Westmorland gave it as his opinion that the Danish negotiators must be able to accept an arrangement with Slesvig battalions if only the officers belonged to the common Army; this would be advantageous for them as seen from the point of view of promotion! Schleinitz would not either have common rights of citizenship, although Westmorland stressed the point that "the present Law gave equal rights of Nationality to the Natives of the Duchy and of the Kingdom." A common representation for the discussion of common matters was "a stipulation he should find great difficulty in agreeing to," and he was against common Custom duties for the Kingdom and the Duchies. On Westmorland's mentioning the discussions previously held on this point (see p. 28) Schleinitz said, however, that he would not make a stand upon this question. When Westmorland requested him to conclude the matter, he replied that he must take some time to consider what line he should adopt. — Westmorland mentioned in his dispatch that Rauch wanted him to speak to the King about the state of the negotiations: Rauch "is strongly impressed with the necessity of arriving at an early conclusion of Peace with Denmark."

On the 23rd a new Conference, the fifth, was held.¹ It did not bring the parties any nearer to one another, and Schleinitz said of the Prussian proposal put forward here that if Denmark did not accept it, he would suggest a simple peace. Westmorland said of the proposal that it did not agree with Palmerston's above-mentioned dispatch, and that the Danish negotiators considered it "very difficult for them under their present instructions to carry on the negociation in face of the Prussian propositions." Pechlin was opposed to the proposal for a simple peace as there was therefore a risk of "a bloody civil war between the Subjects of the King. . ."

Westmorland tried to prevent the breakdown of the negotiations and he informed Palmerston of this on the 2nd of April.² He tried to convince the Danish negotiators that there were many points in the Prussian proposal which could be discussed, and that they ought to make sure as to "how far they are to be con-

¹ F.O. 64/315: 24/3, No. 120.

² F.O. 64/316: 2/4, No. 125.

sidered as an ultimatum." He said to Schleinitz that he thought the proposals he (Schleinitz) had put forward were not to be considered "as his final decision, to which he did not dissent." However, Schleinitz again put forward his proposal for a simple peace, to which Westmorland answered that this was far removed from the preliminaries which he himself had signed. Schleinitz, however, said that he had understood these on the lines of his proposal at the meeting on the 4th of June (see p. 113). — Westmorland informed Schleinitz of Palmerston's views of a separate Army which Palmerston had given in his dispatch of the 26th of March: there "seems much reason in the objection made to a separate Army for so small a State as Slesvig."¹ Palmerston's dispatch mentioned Bloomfield's report of the 8th of March giving an account of his talk with Nesselrode.² Nesselrode had said that Usedom's counter-project was quite unacceptable for Denmark, and that no settlement would be reached before the Great Powers intervened: "Prussia was only endeavouring to gain time in order to facilitate the carrying out of Her ambitious schemes in Germany."

On the 3rd of April another Conference was held at Westmorland's home at Usedom's request.³ The next day Westmorland wrote to Hodges: "I think some progress has been made, but I cannot yet say much has been gained. I live in hopes of an arrangement but that is all."⁴ At the Conference Westmorland had put forward a proposal to the effect that a Commission comprised of an equal number of negotiators from Slesvig and the Kingdom should discuss what affairs were to be common.⁵

On the 7th Westmorland informed Palmerston that he had had another talk with Schleinitz and read to him Palmerston's two dispatches of the 28th of March and the 2nd of April which urged Prussia to bring the matter to an end.⁶ With the last dispatch was enclosed a copy of Nesselrode's dispatch of 16/28 February to Brunnov, which Brunnov had handed to Palmer-

¹ F.O. 64/310: 26/3, No. 117.

² F.O. 65/376: 8/3, No. 71.

³ Westmorland. V, p. 231. — F.O. 64/316: 3/4, No. 126.

⁴ Westmorland. V, p. 235 ff.; cf. letter of same date to Wynn, p. 239 f.

⁵ Krigen 1848–50. III, p. 222.

⁶ F.O. 64/316: 7/4, No. 129. — F.O. 64/310: 28/3, No. 120. — F.O. 64/311: 2/4, No. 125.

ston.¹ Referring to Nesselrode's dispatch Palmerston wrote: "If a definitive Peace is not now concluded, it is next to impossible that hostilities should not again break out in the Duchies." If Denmark could not quell these hostilities, it was extremely likely that Russia would help her. If Prussia abandoned the preliminaries in order to ingratiate herself with the Slesvig-Holsteiners she would "risk inconveniences, which would far outweigh any advantage which she could hope to gain by such a course."

Obviously this was not Schleinitz' opinion. He stated to Westmorland that he was prepared to conclude a simple peace with Denmark, but if the peace were to be based on the preliminaries he upheld his definition of Slesvig's independence. He admitted that the Danish negotiators had never adopted or consented to his interpretation of that basis. He was of the opinion that he had made some concessions at the last Conference, while the Danish negotiators had made none.

On the 9th, at the request of Schleinitz and Usedom, "a meeting, not a conference" was held between them and Pechlin and Reedtz.² The Prussians suggested at this meeting that the dispute about the contents of the Political Union should be decided by a mixed commission, but according to Pechlin's and Reedtz's assurances to Westmorland the proposal was "so limited and so unsatisfactory that they could not come to any understanding with regard to it." Then Schleinitz returned to the idea of making peace without reference to the Duchies, and when Reedtz said that such a proposal had never been put forward in writing, Schleinitz promised to do this.

At the meeting Schleinitz asked Pechlin why he did not put forward a proposal that Holstein and Lauenburg join the Prussian League! Pechlin expressed his surprise that Prussia suggested to the Danish King to make such binding decisions, and at the same time, in Frankfurt, refused to recognize Bülow as Holstein's representative, and negotiated with the Statthalterschaft which had usurped the King's authority. Until Denmark was in possession of her lawful rights, she could hardly "take engagements which would restrict their future liberty of action."

On the 11th Westmorland wrote that the Danish negotiators

¹ Copy in F.O. 65/385.

² F.O. 64/316: 11/4, No. 134. — Krigen 1848–50. III, p. 222 ff.

had no hopes of an early conclusion of Peace, and on the 14th, after speaking to Schleinitz, he stated that he [Schleinitz] did not see much chance of the peace negotiations going on.¹ Westmorland had informed Schleinitz of Palmerston's dispatches of the 9th which dealt with the Statthalterschaft's violation of the armistice and Prussia's failure to oppose this.² Although the dispatches made no impression on Schleinitz I shall mention Palmerston's view of the correct course to be taken by Prussia: even if she "may find itself in much embarrassment in regard to these matters, in consequence of the conflicting nature of the Engagements which they have taken towards Denmark by the Convention of Armistice on the one hand, and of the relations which have grown up between them and the Stadtholders on the other, yet the simplest and at the same time most honourable way of getting out of these difficulties would be to carry fully into execution the Engagements to which the Prussian Crown has bound itself by the Convention of Armistice, and which have never yet been entirely fulfilled."

At the same time as he had remarked to Westmorland that the peace negotiations seemed to have no prospect of success, Schleinitz had mentioned his promise to the Danish negotiators of drawing up a proposal for a separate peace. But he said to Westmorland that he did not expect much of it, and if it were not accepted, he was inclined to advise the King to give up the negotiations and return the warrant authorizing Prussia to negotiate to Frankfurt. Westmorland advised him not to do this, and said that he thought that the parties had come a little closer to one another at the last Conference. Schleinitz, however, did not expect any result: "He stated that Prussia was threatened with a Russian Army and a Fleet in the Baltic to blockade her Ports, he thought of appealing to England and to France to know if they would suffer such a proceeding." He had learnt of these threats from statements made by the Tsar, he said, but Westmorland reassured him that Britain had received quite different information from St. Petersburg.

Westmorland's reassurances have hardly been quite in the spirit of Palmerston, for in a new dispatch of the 12th he again

¹ F.O. 64/316: 14/4, No. 139.

² F.O. 64/311: 9/4, No. 131 and 132.

threatened Prussia with the results of the non-fulfilment of the armistice: "the consequence will probably be the occupation of Slesvig by a Russian force, and the Settlement of all questions connected with the Duchies by the forcible interference of Russia."¹

The same day Palmerston expressed his opinion of the conduct of the Prussian negotiators at the sixth Conference: they "seem to be pressing the Danes too hard on Matters in regard to which Prussia can have no real or legitimate interest."² Prussia seemed to want to separate Slesvig from Denmark. But it was Britain's wish, and in the interests of Europe, to maintain the Union of "those States" which constituted the Danish Monarchy. Britain wanted to use her influence to obtain the most suitable arrangement to maintain this connection without abandoning the basis of the preliminaries. France and Russia, and especially Sweden, shared the same opinion, and Palmerston thought that Austria also held the same view. It was then only Prussia and "that Party in Germany upon which Prussia relies for the furtherance of Her German Views, who appear to seek by the nature of the Arrangement to be established for Slesvig to lead to the Dissolution and Decomposition of the Danish Monarchy."

13. Prussia's Proposal for a Simple Peace.

At the Seventh Conference, held on the 17th of April, a draft, prepared by Usedom, for an "empty" peace between Prussia and Denmark and a memorandum were submitted.³ According to Article 3 of the draft both parties were to reserve their rights and, in the case of Germany, special mention was made of the Resolution of the Diet of the 17th of September 1846. A week later Westmorland wrote about this to Hodges: "The Prussian proposal to throw over the Preliminaries, and to make a simple Peace with Denmark, reserving all the Rights of Germany, as stated in the resolution of the Diet 1846 is rather of an arbitrary character. I do not suppose the Danish Government will agree to it, as they

¹ F.O. 64/311: 12/4, No. 135.

² *Ibid.*: 12/4, No. 133.

³ F.O. 64/316: 17/4, No. 144; 18/4, No. 145, and 21/4, No. 151. — Lundqvist, p. 239 ff. — Krigen 1848–50. III, p. 227 ff.

would then have to engage in a desperate civil War, and after all they would have the German pretensions still hanging over them.”¹

At the Conference Westmorland had opposed the Prussian proposal to throw over the peace preliminaries, and had emphasized the arbitrariness of this action “without consultation with the other Party or with Your Lordship under whose mediation it had been effected.” His representations, however, made no impression on Usedom, and the dispatches from Palmerston (see above p. 189), of which he had informed Usedom and Schleinitz, respectively, after the Conference, had evidently no effect either.

During his talk with Schleinitz on the 18th Westmorland was, however, happy to learn that Schleinitz did not think that Prussia had precluded all further discussion on the basis of the peace preliminaries. He therefore expressed the hope that “the original basis of the Negotiation might be resumed in case the Danish Plenipotentiaries required it.” When he mentioned Palmerston’s dispatch expressing the wish of the Great Powers to preserve the integrity of the Danish Monarchy, Schleinitz said that Prussia would be glad if the Great Powers took the matter into their own hands for “what could Prussia do more than she was doing at present.” Westmorland thought, however, that she could do more and advised her, as none of the points she was now fighting for “were of any real or legitimate interest to her,” to sign “the Peace nearly on the terms which had been prepared.” She ought furthermore to declare to the Statthalterschaft and to the Revolutionaries that she would effect the peace, if necessary, with force. Such was “the wise and disinterested act of a Great Government;” it would prevent civil war, and Schleinitz would gain credit with “all such persons as were actuated by the feeling of sound policy, of justice or of humanity.”

Schleinitz thanked Westmorland for his good advice, but thought it would be difficult “to realize such a line of Policy.” Perhaps he doubted that many persons were animated by the feeling just mentioned, and hardly either considered Prussia as “disinterested” in the Slesvig-Holstein Revolution. The only statement he made in favour of the suggestion was that he was willing for the “separate Treaty” to include a condition to the

¹ Westmorland. V, p. 277 ff.

effect that, if the Statthalterschaft began a Civil War in Slesvig, Prussia would station a Corps along Holstein's German frontier and prevent German Free Corps from crossing the frontier and she would also persuade Hanover to do the same. He would also renew the assurance in the preliminaries of the reestablishment of the King's authority in Holstein and Lauenburg.

In a private letter of the 20th, Westmorland, as so many times before, drew Schleinitz' attention to the precarious state of affairs in South Slesvig.¹ The concentration of the Prussian troops, he wrote, was not enough to justify the surrendering of the greater part of South Slesvig to the Agitators and the Agents of the Stadt-holders. However, five days later he informed Hodges resignedly that, as he had received no answer from Schleinitz, "I may suppose my letter has had no effect."²

The appeals which the French and Russian Ministers made on the 21st to Schleinitz had hardly any special effect either.³ Cintrat remarked in his report that Schleinitz was always giving assurances of his good faith and of the impossibility "de se faire l'exécuteur de gens dont il a defendu la cause." He wanted France to use her influence in Copenhagen in favour of "une paix pure et simple." But, Cintrat remarked, no lengthy consideration was necessary to see "tout ce que ce moyen a non seulement d'illusoire, mais même de préjudiciable pour le Danemark." Peace should be concluded on the basis of the peace preliminaries. — During his talk with Schleinitz Meyendorff strongly advised him against a "paix inhaltslos", but stated that he was prepared to draw up a proposal for a compromise.

With reference to Schleinitz's less categorical statement about the impossibility of continuing the peace negotiations on the basis of the preliminaries, Westmorland advised the Danish negotiators to stick to this, but to make what modifications they thought possible.⁴ Pechlin suggested to Westmorland that the question of the Political Union between Slesvig and Denmark should be laid before a Commission comprised of Danish and Slesvig members, "chosen by election," and that a decision made by this Commission with a 2/3 majority should be binding for the King, who

¹ F.O. 64/316: 23/4, No. 153 with enclosure.

² Westmorland. V, p. 277 ff.

³ Cintrat's dispatch 22/4, No. 40. — Hoetzsch. II, p. 287 ff.

⁴ F.O. 64/316: 25/4, No. 157.

should possibly be able to "appeal to a friendly Sovereign" to mediate. Westmorland approved of the idea and also – at Pechlin's request – gave instructions for the procedure that the Danish negotiators should follow, instructions which he, however, stressed were "suggestions" and no "interference with the line of conduct he [Pechlin] thought it right to adopt."

On the 25th Westmorland informed Peter Browne, the British *chargé d'affaires* in Copenhagen – Wynn had gone to England – of the intention of the Danish negotiators to call a new Conference and to try to continue the negotiations on the basis of the preliminaries, "until they get instructions from their Government."¹ He continued – like an echo of Palmerston's dispatch – "I have made every effort in accordance with Lord Palmerston's instructions to engage this Government to sacrifice some minor points regarding the Political Union for the purpose of arriving at such a settlement as would leave the Countries forming the Danish Monarchy as much united as they have hitherto been, in accordance with the views of England, France and Russia, probably of Austria and certainly of Sweden. But I have not as yet made the impression I could have desired."

On the 28th the new Conference, called by the Danish negotiators, was held at Westmorland's home and the proposal mentioned above was put forward.² The discussion between Schleinitz and Westmorland returned again, naturally enough, to the interpretation of the peace basis. In support of his interpretation Westmorland was able to refer to Palmerston's dispatch of the 23rd.³ This dispatch emphasized that the proposal for a constitution for Slesvig, put forward by the Danish negotiators, "cannot be regarded as a virtual incorporation of that Duchy with Denmark." It also gave full approval to Westmorland's argument that Prussia's communication to the Chambers of Palmerston's dispatch of the 13th of March 1849 to Cowley "must fairly be considered as adopting the interpretation therein given of the basis to be argued upon."

Schleinitz could not dispute Westmorland's remark that Palmerston must be the best interpreter of the basis he himself had

¹ Westmorland, V, p. 285 ff.

² F.O. 64/316: 30/4, No. 161.

³ F.O. 64/311: 23/4, No. 146.

proposed, but said that he was not bound by it. He would certainly consider the proposal put forward by the Danes, but thought that it would postpone the settlement of the matters at issue until Slesvig was separated from Holstein, through which Denmark "would have obtained the object she desired before these important points for the Duchy of Slesvig could be agreed upon." – At the meeting Pechlin put the question, among others, to Schleinitz as to whether Austria and the other German states would sanction a peace concluded by Prussia on the basis of the preliminaries. Schleinitz gave an evasive answer.

The same day Westmorland wrote a private letter to Palmerston informing him of the negative course of the meeting.¹ The reason for this was, he emphasized, that the Prussians would "wait for what luck may bring them. They are in hopes that Foreign Powers will not take any active part against them, they remember the remark of a Neighbour of Your's [Bunsen] about an alarm gun, and they count upon the unwillingness of Russia to undertake a military expedition. If pressure came upon them it might be otherwise, but they know the difficulties which would attend the carrying it into execution. They feel they have time before them. . ."

Two days later Westmorland, provided with two new dispatches from Palmerston, embarked upon a new controversy with Schleinitz about the peace basis.² The more important of the dispatches contained a severe criticism of Usedom's proposal of the 17th for a separate peace.³ It would, the dispatch stated, "as it appears, settle nothing definitely, but would on the contrary leave open almost all the questions which have been the causes of hostilities; or if any of these questions would in any degree be determined by this Treaty, it would be by an indirect admission of the principle asserted by Germany of a Constitutional and Administrative Union between Holstein and Slesvig." It was, then, at variance with the basis to which Prussia had bound herself by the peace preliminaries.

It must have been this dispatch of which, on the 26th, the Queen remarked to Palmerston that Prussia "who has made war

¹ P.P.

² F.O. 64/316: 30/4, No. 162.

³ F.O. 64/311: 25/4, No. 153. – R.A.W. I 19/101.

upon Denmark in support of the Demands of Slesvig, can really not be bound by us to make a Peace by which she engages to enforce the Demands of Denmark upon Slesvig."¹ After some critical statements about the Convention of the 10th of July 1849 it was stated that, for the sake of Europe, peace, however, ought to be reestablished and "the Queen must deprecate our preventing this by attaching to it the condition that it is to solve the Slesvig question, one of uncommon intricacy and difficulty," on which so many superficial and undigested opinions existed. The implication was, of course, that Prince Albert knew better!

Russell promised, naturally, to let Palmerston have the Queen's remarks, but on the 27th wrote to her² that it appeared to him that the Prussian proposal for a separate peace was "contrived in such a way as to leave open a cause of war to be resumed by Prussia at any convenient moment."³ This is not likely to suit either Denmark nor Prussia." It was not easy to see how the question could be solved, "but a Treaty of Peace in different terms might have a chance of success."

On the 29th when Palmerston returned the Queen's memorandum to Russell, he wrote, and rightly so:⁴ "The sum and substance of it is that the preliminary Treaty concluded by Prussia last year upon full deliberation, is now to go for nothing because it would be convenient for Prussia to get rid of it. This is rather a queer doctrine; and one which I certainly cannot back." But he added: "My draft to Westmorland is not absolutely necessary and so to avoid Discussion it shall be dropped." However, it had been sent off four days before!

At the Conference on the 30th with Westmorland Schleinitz maintained his point of view that Slesvig should be independent of Denmark apart from foreign politics, war and peace. Westmorland opposed this view but "I cannot flatter myself with much success." Regarding the proposal for a separate peace Schleinitz was, however, willing to omit the reservation of Germany's rights (Resolution of the Diet of the 17th of September 1846) as stated in Article III – a concession to Palmerston's

¹ R.A.W. I 19/100.

² R.A.W. I 19/102.

³ A similar point of view was expressed in Russell's letter 11/5 to Palmerston P.P.

⁴ P.R.O. 30/22. 8D.

criticism mentioned above. If none of the Prussian proposals were accepted, Schleinitz would, he said, advise the King to withdraw completely from the affair and declare that "he would give no assistance to either Party if the War continued." Westmorland found that this was not at all in keeping with Prussia's "high position." But Schleinitz thought that the King of Denmark could then call on his allies for help, and as no proposal for the separation of the Duchies could be carried out without force "he did not see why Denmark should desire to have Prussian rather than Russian Soldiers to carry out the establishment of his authority."

In his dispatch to Palmerston telling him about the Conference Westmorland also touched on the schism which had occurred between Austria and Prussia by the cessation of Interim on the 1st of May. He also mentioned Schwarzenberg's dispatch of the 15th of April to Baron Lederer, the Austrian chargé d'affaires in Copenhagen.¹ In this dispatch it was stated that the negotiations between Denmark and Prussia could not be a question of the position of Holstein and Lauenburg in the forthcoming "Federal Constitution". Schwarzenberg warned Denmark against Prussia's intention of including these Duchies in the restricted Prussian League, and he stated that the Provisional Central Power had not authorized Prussia to carry on peace negotiations on the basis of the preliminaries, but, on the contrary, on the basis of the Resolution of the Diet of September 1846.

Westmorland commented on this in his dispatch by saying that the Prussian negotiators, although Pechlin had asked at the various Conferences for the letter accompanying the warrant (cf. p. 159f), had always avoided answering but had asserted "that there was no restriction in it of any importance." Prussia had, then, from the beginning negotiated on a basis which she knew the Central Power did not recognize, and regarding her proposal for the entry of Holstein and Lauenburg into the Prussian League "She must have been convinced that the Central Commission had never given her any Authority to insert any claims to that effect" in a treaty concluded in the name of the German Confederation.

The Conference on the 28th and the discussion following between Westmorland and Schleinitz showed that it was useless to

¹ Extract of dispatch. See Westmorland. V, p. 269 f.

continue the negotiations on the basis of the peace preliminaries. The Prussian "ultimatum" of the 17th had really made this clear. On the 29th Peter Browne wrote to Westmorland:¹ "The late rejection of the Preliminaries – by *wholesale* has thrown this Government into dismay: both they and the People are at their wit's end – not knowing what to do or how to deal with People who appear influenced by none of that uprightness of Principle which guides men in general." Browne believed that Schleinitz could not be ignorant of Palmerston's peace basis. He continued: "I am persuaded that there is little use in our endeavouring to keep them to the Preliminaries: out of them they will manage to escape by one means or other. Usedom now wanting to send us back to 1846 (running his Pen over all since said and done) turns all diplomacy into ridicule and renders all arrangement of differences between men an impossibility, because there can be no faith reasonably felt in Engagements however solemnly and positively made." Browne was afraid that the new proposal for a separate peace must be taken "into consideration as the only choice we have," but did not think "an arrangement impossible by its Means."

In this letter Browne also mentioned that the Danish Government had summoned Reedtzt to Copenhagen to discuss with him "this new state of things," "this most unexpected Crisis." On the 3rd of May a lengthy discussion, in which Reedtzt participated, took place in the Danish Council of State.² The discussion was concerned partly with the question of a "separate peace" and partly with the above-mentioned proposal for a mixed Commission to decide what connections there should be between Denmark and Slesvig.

On the 2nd of May Westmorland thanked Browne for his long letter.³ He wrote, among other things: "I certainly have done my best to assist the efforts which with so much perseverance and ability have been made by the Danish Plenipotentiaries to arrive at a satisfactory arrangement. I am very sorry our endeavours here have been crowned with so little success." Nothing had happened since the last Conference, but Schleinitz had promised to answer the Danish proposals on Saturday [the 4th].

¹ Westmorland. V, p. 295 ff.

² Statsrådets Forhandl. II, p. 453 ff.

³ Westmorland. V, p. 315 ff.

In a letter to Hodges,¹ written at the same time, Westmorland mentioned Prussia's pride at having built up the Slesvig-Holstein Army which, it was assumed, would be at Prussia's disposal: "The contest in the Duchies commenced with great hopes of conquest, territorial as well as Naval. The hope now of getting a large territory into the Bund, and thus commanding territorially as well as commercially the neighbouring States has succeeded to larger views; as there is no immediate pressure such as a blockade and its consequences, to counteract the ambitious tendency, it is persevered in notwithstanding distant menace."

Saturday passed without the promised answer, but on Monday the 6th Westmorland was able to inform Palmerston that Friedrich Wilhelm IV had told him that he wanted to end the matter and had decided to send General Below to Copenhagen with a letter to the King of Denmark.² "It was impossible to have chosen a fitter person to be the bearer of His Majesty's intentions," Westmorland said to the King. He spoke later to Schleinitz, who said, however, that Below had no other task than to hand over the letter, and that the peace negotiations were still to be carried on in Berlin.

The next day when Westmorland wrote to Browne he assured him that Below "is not charged with any negociation of Peace, that will still continue to be carried on in Berlin." But Below was to ascertain the "feelings" of the Danish Government especially in regard to the replacement of the Statthalterschaft by a Government appointed by the King.

Westmorland also mentioned this point in his dispatch of the 6th and said that, as members of the new Government, Schleinitz would recommend the Holsteiners who, on behalf of the Statthalterschaft, had come to Copenhagen on the 18th of April to obtain by direct negotiations the union between the Duchies which the basis of the peace preliminaries would prevent. In a dispatch of the 4th of May Meyendorff said of these negotiations: "À Copenhague on traite de l'union des deux Duchés; si on y réussit d'établir une entente sur cette base, à quoi bon traiterait-on ici sur la base de la non-union?"³ The dispatch showed that he was a supporter of a connection between the Duchies, probably

¹ Westmorland. V, p. 319 ff.

² F.O. 64/317: 6/5, No. 168. — Westmorland. V, p. 343 f.: 7/5 to Browne.

³ Hoetzsch. II, p. 291 ff.

strongly influenced by men from the conservative Slesvig-Holstein landed aristocracy.

In a dispatch of the 6th Westmorland stated what the Prussian peace proposal now aimed at. The conditions mentioned here for a separate peace are fairly favourable for Denmark, and agree, on the whole, with what Schleinitz had told Meyendorff and Pechlin.¹ But there is no reason to mention these, for if Schleinitz had really been sincere when he held out prospects of them, they were at any rate not normative for Below's mission. The French Minister in Berlin reported on the 6th that Pechlin had been greatly satisfied with the information Schleinitz had given him and "a éprouvé une véritable surprise."² But he added wisely: "Cependant les Danois ont été si souvent trompés qu'ils osent à peine se livrer à cet espoir."

According to the instructions issued to Below on the 7th he was to remain in Copenhagen only for a week.³ The instructions stated that the Resolution of the Diet of the 17th of September 1846 was not prejudicial to the interests of Denmark: "es ist *Deutschland*, welches diese Rechtsbasis anerkennt, nicht Dänemark. Die Erwähnung derselben thut Dänemark keinen Schaden." Although mention of it was important to obtain Germany's ratification, it was not to be a *conditio sine qua non*, as it could be included in the ordinary reservation in Article III in the proposal for a separate peace.

Below also brought with him a letter from Usedom to his [Usedom's] "intimate friend", Peter Browne, containing a lengthy defence of Prussia's conduct.⁴ Browne commented on this letter by saying that it showed that Prussia wished "to retreat as decently as she could out of a concern in which with so little benefit to herself and so much injury to others, she has been interfering for the last three years." Below had also with him Usedom's sharply-worded rejection of the 6th of the proposals made by the Danish negotiators on the 28th of April – the negotiators in Berlin were not told of this until later! – and Schleinitz's dispatch of the 7th to Baron Werther, the Prussian Minister in Copenhagen.

¹ Lundqvist, p. 250. – Krigen 1848–50. III, p. 238.

² Dispatch 6/5, No. 51. – Cf. Reventlow's dispatch 10/5, No. 39.

³ Copy of instructions with Schleinitz' dispatch 23/5 to Bunsen. – Lundqvist, p. 251 ff.

⁴ F.O. 22/183: 9/5, No. 22 with enclosure. – Lundqvist, p. 252 f.

On the 8th Schleinitz sent a copy of this dispatch to Bunsen requesting him to persuade Britain to support the proposal for the simple peace.¹ This proposal, Schleinitz wrote to Bunsen, made no mention of the "peace basis", but no demand could be made that Prussia should endorse the Danish interpretation of it. By a separate peace the matter would come to concern only Denmark and the Duchies. Schleinitz emphasized that the present Prussian Cabinet was not responsible for the events of 1848–49. "Wir können unsere Auffassung nicht aufgeben, aber wir wollen um sie durchzusetzen keinen Krieg machen. Dies ist die einfache Bedeutung unsres Friedens Vorschlages." He asserted, furthermore, that Prussia had not had egoistic aims in fighting the war. The rights of the Confederation must be reserved in the Treaty. The proposal was Prussia's final step and the utmost she could do, and if it gave no results Prussia must reserve her decisions.

Considering the instructions given to Below there was certainly no prospect of his negotiations with Reedt and Moltke in Copenhagen where he remained just under a week – he arrived on the 8th – being successful.² After his departure the Danish Government stated this in a dispatch to Reventlow mentioning that Below seemed to be unacquainted with the conditions which Schleinitz had put forward during his discussions with the Danish negotiators and Meyendorff, and in which there was undoubtedly a basis for an understanding.³ Hodges, who spoke to Below as he was passing through Flensburg on his way home, also found that he knew nothing of the Prussian concessions to Denmark mentioned in Westmorland's above-mentioned dispatch.⁴ "The General, I learn," he continued, "states himself to be highly dissatisfied with the result of his mission, but why, I cannot precisely learn. . ." Meyendorff's dispatch of the 15th of May⁵ stated: "Nous avions tous sans exception sur les paroles de Schleinitz et des personnes qui entourent le Roi, envisagé la mission de général Below comme un pas décisif vers une paix séparée, mais acceptable par le Danemarck." But the news received the previous evening was of the sort that made hopes of this vanish. – Bille

¹ Cf. F.O. 64/308: 15/5.

² Cf. Statsrådets Forhandl. II, p. 472 ff.

³ Orders 18/5, No. 19, to Reventlow.

⁴ Westmorland. V, p. 363 ff.

⁵ Hoetzsch. II, p. 217.

thought that Below's whole mission "had absolutely no other aim than to give the Prussian Government, face to face with Russia, a chance of pleading it as a rejected attempt at conciliation."¹

In his dispatch of the 23rd of May to Bunsen Schleinitz corrected the "misunderstandings" which had arisen in connection with Below's mission, and in this way repudiated – one might say – his own statements which had brought about these misunderstandings. The dispatch stated that the mission's only object was to accelerate Denmark's decision on the Prussian peace proposal of the 17th of April, in which no mention was made of Germany's relinquishment of her rights: "Preussen konnte keine Rechte Deutschlands oder der Herzogthümer vergeben, aber er konnte erklären, dass er *in diesem Augenblicke* [underlined by me] um dieser Rechte willen keinen Krieg führen wolle; das ist der einfache Sinn unsres Vorschlages und der Zweck der Sendung des Generals v. Below."

During his stay in Copenhagen Below had several talks with Peter Browne, the British chargé d'affaires.² Before he left, Below told Browne that his mission "had not been satisfactory in any important degree." He added: "I have now nothing to recommend but an early and joint demonstration on the part of England and Russia. Such a measure is the only one which remains to quiet the angry spirits in the Kingdom and Duchies." According to Browne, Syndic Prehn, the most moderate of the Holstein negotiators in Copenhagen, held the same view and wanted Palmerston to "send us a formidable Demonstration in concert with Russia (we deprecate Russia *alone*)." If this did not happen quickly "blood and ruin will be the consequence to Thousands."

In connection with this, mention must be made of the fact that Browne informed Palmerston³ the day before Below's arrival that Bille had said to him privately: "Tell Lord Palmerston from me that he is only deluding himself if he supposes Matters can now be settled without a previous interference and dictation of the great powers. They must compel us to issue a Commission to settle our differences, and declare at the same time that such as we cannot settle ourselves they will settle for us. I would give my

¹ Statsrådets Forhandl. II, p. 474.

² F.O. 22/183: 14/5, No. 23; 15/5, No. 25; 16/5. Nos. 27 and 28.

³ Ibid. 7/5, No. 21.

right arm to avoid foreign interference, but it cannot be done. I feel ashamed as a Dane to be compelled to make such a confession, but without such interference, we must fight it out between ourselves, until both Parties are nearly annihilated."

The wish for a settlement by the Great Powers to which these statements testify, was not to be fulfilled. On the other hand negotiations had been opened earlier, on the initiative of Russia, to discuss a guarantee by the Great Powers to preserve the integrity of the Danish Monarchy. These negotiations, which will be described in a later chapter, actually led to results, but so late that perhaps this very fact was the reason why Civil War could not be prevented between the Kingdom and the Slesvig-Holsteiners.

In his dispatch of the 12th Westmorland wrote that he had thought that after it had been decided to send Below to Copenhagen, "all discussions which might engender any feeling of irritation on the part of the Danish Government would have been avoided."¹ But the wording of Usedom's memorandum of the 6th, which had just been handed over, was only designed to give rise to irritation. Westmorland sent Palmerston a copy of his critical remarks on this memorandum.

On the 16th Westmorland had a talk with Schleinitz who had just received a report from Below after his return.² This report was to the effect that if Britain and Russia declared "their views as to the ultimate settlement of the relations of Denmark with the Duchies," both parties would probably accept these and Prussia could then renew peaceful relations with Denmark without laying down anything about their mutual relations. Westmorland and Schleinitz also discussed the proposed protocol from the Great Powers.

Four days later Westmorland reported that he had now had several talks with Below³ who, he wrote, was definitely of the opinion that it was Denmark's intention to incorporate Slesvig. Pechlin was also said to have admitted to Below on his return to Berlin that the Danish Government, in view of public opinion, would not be able to sign a peace "which did not stipulate

¹ F.O. 64/317: 12/5, No. 173.

² Ibid. 16/5, No. 179.

³ Ibid. 20/5, No. 184.

for what might be considered as an incorporation of that Duchy."

Westmorland had constantly heard this asserted by Schleinitz and Usedom. After a dinner party on the 20th at which, among others, Below, Reedtz, Pechlin and Wynn were present, he called these gentlemen together. Reedtz had returned to the negotiations in Berlin, and Wynn, who had arrived from London with letters to Westmorland, was on his way back to his post in Copenhagen. Westmorland told them that Palmerston would not hear of incorporation, "that you had decided that Duchy should have a separate Legislature and separate Constitution and Administration, that the political Union with Denmark and the Kingdom as one Power was to be maintained but that this was not incorporation." How did the Danish negotiators look at it? They replied that they shared Palmerston's opinion and when Westmorland asked Below if he were satisfied he replied that he was. Westmorland then requested him to inform the King of the talk.

On the 21st Westmorland spoke to Friedrich Wilhelm at a reception and received a very unfavourable impression of the King's attitude towards Denmark.¹ To Westmorland's question as to what hopes the King entertained of peace with Denmark, Friedrich Wilhelm replied: "Very little." The Revolutionary Party was still the ruling one in Denmark, Tscherning was in charge of the country's politics and demanded the incorporation of Slesvig! Although the King thought that the Duchies had done wrong in beginning the war, he did not think that they had acted in a revolutionary manner, and he considered that their claims were more justified than those of the Danes; they had the right to remain together. Westmorland interposed here that Slesvig belonged to Denmark, Holstein to Germany, and the King admitted "this was true and made some difference," but Denmark had no right to incorporate the whole of Slesvig! Westmorland remarked that there was no question of this, and referred to his discussion the previous day with Below, Pechlin and Reedtz. Friedrich Wilhelm said that Below had informed him of this discussion, but that he doubted whether the Danish Government would approve of the declaration made by their negotiators.

¹ F.O. 64/317: 23/5, No. 186 (confidential).

As Wynn was standing nearby, Westmorland appealed to him to explain Tscherning's position to the King. Wynn did this explaining – correctly! – that Tscherning's position – in this sphere – “was neither influential nor exerted in the direction His Majesty supposed.” – Westmorland remarked in his dispatch that the King's statements showed what influence incorrect information could have on him, and that the statements were very similar to those he had made at the beginning of the war. Westmorland added that there was nothing in the reply from the King of Denmark which justified such remarks.

In his dispatch Westmorland mentioned that Radowitz, the new leader of Prussia's politics, had said to Meyendorff about three months ago that the Duchies ought to be a part of the German system, and that “Prussia could afford to delay any final arrangement with Denmark for ten years, so that at the end she might obtain Her object.” At that time Westmorland had considered the statement as not very important, but, he wrote, the way in which Prussia had carried on the negotiations “has induced me to give more weight to it. . .”

About the middle of May, after his talks with Below, Peter Browne became firmly convinced that Prussia really desired peace, specially before the Tsar arrived in Warsaw, “after which she would appear to be acting from compulsion.”¹ On the 23rd of May Meyendorff left for Warsaw to meet the Tsar, and did not return to Berlin until the beginning of June. The day before he left, Pechlin had a long talk with him about the peace negotiations, and a detailed report of this talk is to be found among Westmorland's papers.² According to Westmorland Meyendorff agreed with Pechlin that, when peace was concluded, Prussia should agree to participate in negotiations on the question of the succession and that “no reservation of rights in regard to Holstein could be admitted, if this was to imply any competency as to Slesvig.” Meyendorff wanted to be able to tell the Tsar that Pechlin was certain that peace would be concluded, but Pechlin refused to allow him to say this: Britain's “consent was in the first place indispensable . . . and in the next place came as deci-

¹ F.O. 22/183: 16/5, No. 27.

² Westmorland. V, p. 371 ff. – Lundqvist, p. 261.

sive into consideration, what was possible for us in Denmark." "A piece of blank paper, leaving all the wounds, which it should cover to break open again, whenever steps were taken to arrange anew the affairs of the Duchies, could not be stiled a peace." In that case Pechlin would prefer "that as the war had only been *de facto*, let the peace also be *de facto*."

During Reedtz's stay in Copenhagen not exactly instructions, but a guide for the Danish negotiators, had been drawn up.¹ Without formally abandoning the peace basis the negotiators were authorized, however, to consider Prussian proposals "for a form for peace which was calculated to ensure the *unverjährliche Rechte* due to me [the King]." It was this passage which informed the conclusion of the memorandum which the Danish negotiators handed in on the 24th of May in reply to Usedom's proposal.² The memorandum stated that although it was impossible to accept the peace proposal of the 17th of April, they would agree to such modified proposals as could facilitate a conclusion of peace "sans porter atteinte à des droits imprescriptibles de la Couronne Danoise." During his above-mentioned talk with Meyendorff on the 23rd Pechlin read the end of the memorandum to him, and received his full approval of it. Pechlin did not conceal his disappointment at the fact that there was no prospect of active Russian help. Meyendorff tried to console him by announcing a Russian Naval demonstration in Kiel Bay, and a British one at the mouth of the Elbe. Just as Palmerston had used the Russian troops to scare Prussia, Meyendorff here used the British Navy.

On the 30th Westmorland sent Palmerston a lengthy dispatch and Wynn a detailed letter about the position.³ The negotiations themselves had made little progress. A few days ago Usedom had requested a private talk with Reedtz to discuss several of the points at issue. However on Reedtz' mentioning that Denmark wanted a guarantee that, on the conclusion of peace, Prussia would not put obstacles in the way of an arrangement of the question of the succession, Usedom broke off the discussion: such a guarantee would put an end to all negotiations! Westmorland wrote that Usedom, Schleinitz, and Brandenburg had later

¹ Statsrådets Forhandl. II, p. 477.

² F.O. 64/317: 25/5, No. 194.

³ *Ibid.* 30/5, No. 199. — Westmorland. V, p. 403 ff.

made the same statement to him. When Westmorland mentioned the statements made by Friedrich Wilhelm both to himself and to Pechlin they replied – rather disrespectfully – that “the King had not been aware of all the circumstances of the case.”

Some days later Usedom “called upon Reedtz to assist in drawing up some stipulations which might be added to the separate Peace he had proposed. I recommended Reedtz to go to him and to endeavour to get him to draw up these stipulations, in order that it might be seen what Prussia really would agree to, and I advised him for the present to say nothing of the succession. He acted accordingly and Usedom has undertaken to draw up these stipulations.”

Westmorland also mentioned in his dispatch and letter the attempt of the Holsteiners to obtain an arrangement, in a Slesvig-Holstein spirit, by direct negotiations in Copenhagen and Berlin. He supposed that these negotiations would give certain results. He also dealt in much detail with an enquiry from Prokesch, the Austrian Minister, to Pechlin asking whether the Danish negotiators approved of the Danish proposal of the 17th of March concerning the position of Holstein and Lauenburg regarding “the German system”. Westmorland advised Pechlin to reply in the affirmative, but was, besides, sorry that he had not studied the proposal sufficiently thoroughly when it was put forward.

During a talk on the 30th between Westmorland and Schleinitz the latter stated that in view of Copenhagen’s conciliatory attitude towards the Holsteiners he hoped that the Danish Government would no longer oppose a separate peace and come herself to an arrangement about her differences with the Duchies. Westmorland replied cautiously that he would first have to see “the proposals which he intended to bring forward.” A fortnight passed, however, before the proposals were brought forward, although on the 6th of June Schleinitz assured Westmorland that they would be ready in a day or two.¹

When Meyendorff returned to Berlin from Warsaw at the beginning of June, he stated that Russia wanted the negotiations with Denmark to end with acceptable conditions for Denmark.²

Copenhagen and the circles in the Duchies that wished re-

¹ F.O. 64/318: 6/6, No. 211.

² Ibid. 4/6, No. 205.

established the good conditions which had previously existed in the Monarchy, had had expectations of a more forcible decision in Warsaw. A letter of the 5th June from Otto Blome, the Holstein nobleman, to Westmorland testifies, among other evidence, to this.¹ The Government here, he wrote, is desirous that the Great Powers "arrangent nos affaires, et l'on serait trop heureux d'éviter par là une guerre toujours déplorable, mais il faut que cette intervention de la part des puissances soit prompte et décisive et ne remette à un tems éloigné un secours vivement appelé et désiré depuis bien longtems." If Britain and Russia had serious intentions of stopping a war "injustement commencée et prolongée par la politique équivoque d'un cabinet qui sans le vouloir, sans doute, encourage la révolte en se la rendant tributaire," they could easily do it by a declaration in emphatic terms. Present conditions in the Duchies had a demoralising effect, especially on the lower classes, where all respect for lawful authority had disappeared. If these conditions continued much longer, "Vous trouverez tout le royaume réduit en état de faiblesse morale et financière des plus pernicieux." The proposals made by the Holstein negotiators to the Danish Government were described by Blome as "inadmissibles et insolentes" and the negotiators' continued stay in Copenhagen as a possible pretext for Prussia to delay the peace.

After the breakdown of the negotiations, however, two of the Holstein negotiators left Copenhagen on the 8th of June, while the third, Count Reventlow-Farve, only left after the Danish Government had expressly requested him to do so. Wynn, who, it is true, found that the Holstein proposals were unacceptable by the Danish Government if many alterations were not made, nevertheless criticized the Government for breaking off the negotiations.² In his dispatch of the 9th he wrote: "This and the change in M. de Bille's Manner and in the confidential Communication which has hitherto existed with my Russian colleague and myself, are, I fear, but too evident indications of participation in the general opinion of the Public that the question can only be settled

¹ Westmorland, V, p. 427 ff.

² F.O. 22/183: 8/6, No. 58; 9/6, No. 59, and 13/6, No. 61. — Lundqvist, p. 276 ff.

by hostilities.” – If the negotiations in Copenhagen ended negatively it was certainly not due to lack of effort on Wynn’s part, Westmorland wrote to him on the 7th.¹

In a letter of the 11th² Hodges mentioned how eager the Danish Army was to advance against the rebels: “Should the contest take place it will be a sanguinary one – and the allowing it will prove in no degree creditable to the Great Powers.” He was not, however, even now at the eleventh hour, without hope that some intervention or other could prevent the sad catastrophe. Westmorland was less optimistic when he replied on the 13th:³ “I entirely agree with you such ought to be prevented, and I will hope it may, but as I have nothing lately from England, I know not what are the intentions of the Foreign Office upon so difficult a point.” He had heard nothing of a Naval force.

The supplementary proposal which Usedom had undertaken to draw up, was dated the 12th, but Westmorland did not receive it until the next evening.⁴ In regard to Article 3 Usedom would agree to omit the mention of the Resolution of the Diet of September 1846 and instead be satisfied with a general reservation of the rights of the parties. In a protocol between Denmark and Prussia he suggested a clause stating that the parties were waiting for a result from the direct negotiations between the Duchies and their Sovereign concerning Slesvig’s relation to Denmark and Holstein. If the negotiations gave no result Prussia would not prevent Denmark’s advancing into Slesvig. In the name of Germany Prussia would leave an Army corps for the purpose of observation in Holstein.

Meyendorff said of this proposal: “Il n’est ni pur de chicanes et de réticenses, ni “simple” dans les intentions.”⁵ Westmorland whom he called “le meilleur des hommes” had – as he himself – lost patience with the Prussian Cabinet “et il éprouve une répugnance extrême, à revenir sans cesse et sans résultat à la charge auprès de Mrs de Schleinitz et d’Usedom.”

¹ Westmorland, V, p. 467 ff.

² Ibid. p. 471 ff.

³ Ibid. p. 479 f.

⁴ F.O. 64/318: 13/6, No. 219. – Krigen 1848–50. III, p. 257 ff.

⁵ Hoetzsch, II, p. 307 f.

On the 15th a meeting then took place between Usedom and the Danish negotiators, who put various questions about the new proposal. Usedom answered them evasively or in an unfriendly fashion.¹ Westmorland remarked of the meeting that as the Danish negotiators only wished information they did not, as they had to him, point out the difference "between the stipulations now brought forward and those of the Preliminaries and the Secret articles," especially Article I.²

On the 20th Westmorland had a discussion with Schleinitz about Usedom's new proposal.³ He received the impression that there was not much prospect of modifications. Schleinitz was unwilling to let Prussia become involved in the question of the succession and to give up her claim to having the right to station a Prussian Army corps in Holstein after the peace. Westmorland objected to this, saying that "it seemed an unusual measure for one of the parties to require the right of placing a corps d'Armée in the territory of the other for the purpose of observation."

The latest Prussian proposals were discussed at the meeting of the Danish Council of State on the 17th of June and were described by Moltke as "totally unacceptable."⁴ Meyendorff had, however, recommended that a peace proposal should be submitted to Prussia as an ultimatum with a short time-limit, before a demand was made for the Secret Articles to be carried into execution. The Council of State discussed this at the meeting on the 17th and also at meetings on the 18th and 19th, and on the 20th the Danish negotiators were sent the necessary instructions with a draft for an "empty" peace. The draft, however, allowed the Danish negotiators a free hand with regard to possible minor modifications.

The Danish proposals were put forward at a meeting on the 24th, and during the next few days various private conferences took place between the negotiators of the two parties.⁵ The Prussians suggested several alterations some of which were accepted by the Danish negotiators. Westmorland told Schleinitz that he considered the Danish proposals "as moderate as it was possible

¹ Krigen 1848-50. III, p. 260.

² F.O. 64/318: 15/6, No. 220.

³ Ibid. 20/6, No. 224. - Westmorland. V, p. 491 ff.

⁴ Statsrådets Forhandl. II, p. 503 ff. - Krigen 1848-50. III, p. 261 ff.

⁵ F.O. 64/318: 24/6, No. 230, and 27/6, No. 236.

to expect, and certainly much less stringent than upon the basis of the Preliminaries of Peace could have been hoped for." He urged him not to lose this chance of ending the complicated negotiations. Westmorland spoke in the same way to the Danish negotiators although, as he wrote to Palmerston, he remembered his remark about Usedom's proposal for a treaty "which would appear to settle nothing."

When Westmorland asked Schleinitz what he thought the Statthalterschaft would do in the case of a separate peace, he replied that they would begin hostilities. Westmorland did not think this would happen if Prussia definitely dissociated herself from this. He wrote to Hodges¹ on the subject: "I have done all in my power to induce this Government to take a different line, one which I am sure would redound much more to their honour and to the position as one of the great Powers of Europe which they wish to maintain." But his efforts had been in vain.

In his dispatch of the 27th to Palmerston Westmorland wrote that he thought that he would be able to report "a favourable result of these negociations" within a day or two. However, a few more days were to pass. On the 30th Westmorland was present at a very long conference held at the request of Schleinitz at the Foreign Office.² Only two points were left, he wrote. On the 2nd of July he was finally able to report "that after two very long conferences of nearly five hours' duration the treaty such as it was paraphrased last night has this evening at 9 o'clock been signed at my house by the respective Plenipotentiaries."³ He wrote to Wynn the same day: "It is done and I think you and those about you will be satisfied. I will give you no details except that I have worked like a horse having had two conferences yesterday and the day before which lasted nearly 5 hours each."⁴

In his dispatch to Palmerston telling him about the conclusion of peace, Westmorland stressed, and rightly so, the part Meyendorff had played in obtaining the result. He wrote: "fortified by the declarations which have lately emanated from his Government, and guided by his own ability and discretion he has greatly contributed to that result."

¹ Westmorland. V, p. 503 ff.: 27/6.

² F.O. 64/318: 30/6, No. 238.

³ Ibid. 2/7, No. 240.

⁴ Westmorland. V, p. 507 ff.

Nesselrode's dispatch of the 18th of June to Meyendorff¹ must certainly be included among these "declarations". In this dispatch Nesselrode stated that the Russian Navy might sail to Slesvig to render help to the Danes, and, if war broke out between Denmark and the Slesvig-Holsteiners, Prussia would be strongly urged to remain neutral and to see that Germany remained neutral. In a dispatch of the same date to Brunnow, of which Meyendorff received a copy, it was stated that all the powers apart from the Revolutionary Party had the same interest in preventing a new conflict between the Duchies and Denmark. Besides giving information about the Russian Naval demonstration the dispatch suggested that Britain gave a similar demonstration. After two years of fruitless efforts to obtain peace Britain would perhaps now be convinced that she must give her mediation "un caractère plus imposant et plus prononcée." Such an idea was, however, far from the thoughts of the British Government. On the 13th when Nesselrode spoke to Bloomfield on the subject, Bloomfield said that Britain would certainly hesitate to take such a step.² Nesselrode thought that such a Naval demonstration "would also be looked upon by many persons in the Duchies as a means of saving their "amour propre" by the necessity of yielding to a superior force."

On the 2nd of July Brunnow informed Palmerston of Nesselrode's proposal. Palmerston replied the same day that he had informed his colleagues of the proposal, but he thought that the plan was not quite in keeping with Britain's role as mediator "à moins d'une nécessité que nous aimons ne pas prévoir."³

14. The Separate Peace of the 2nd of July 1850.

In the preamble of the Peace Treaty concluded between Denmark and Prussia in her own name and in the name of the German Confederation, are stated the names of the three Danish peace negotiators: Pechlin, Reedtz, and Scheel, the Prussian

¹ Westmorland, V, p. 435 ff.: copy of Nesselrode's dispatch 6/6 (Old Style) to Meyendorff and Brunnow. — Copy of dispatch to Brunnow with his letter of 2/7 to Palmerston, P.P.

² F.O. 65/378: 14/6, No. 194; cf. 22/6, No. 205.

³ P.P.

negotiator: Usedom, and the representative of the mediating power: Westmorland.¹

The Treaty itself contained six articles. According to Article 1, peace and harmony were to prevail between Denmark and the German Confederation; all treaties which had previously been concluded between them, were through Article 2 put into force again. In the highly disputed Article 3 it was stated that the parties "se réservent tous les droits qui leur ont appartenu réciproquement avant la guerre." In Article 4 it was laid down that after the Peace the Danish King, Duke of Holstein, in agreement with Federal Law might claim the intervention of the Confederation in order to re-establish his legitimate authority in Holstein, at the same time communicating his plans regarding the pacification of the country. If the Confederation judged that it would not intervene, or if its intervention remained futile, the King might send his own troops. According to Article 5 the King and the German Confederation were to appoint commissioners to draw the exact frontier between those of the King's possessions which belonged to the Confederation and those which did not. Finally, according to the last article, the Treaty was to be ratified in Berlin within three weeks.

Whereas the Peace Treaty, as mentioned above, was concluded between Denmark and Germany, the concomitant protocol and secret article only applied to Denmark and Prussia. By the secret article Prussia committed herself to participating in the negotiations which the Danish King intended to initiate in order to arrange the succession in his countries. The protocol contained stipulations as to the evacuation of South Slesvig by the Prussian troops and as to Prussia's duty not to prevent the military measures which Denmark intended to take in Slesvig after the evacuation, i.e. the suppression of the Revolt.

In his dispatch of the 2nd of July Westmorland informed Palmerston that at the last conference there had been a vivid discussion about nearly all the articles. It was Usedom who had raised difficulties. In Article 3 he wanted to "reserve the *relations* as well as the *rights* which had belonged to the respective parties before the war." He was also dissatisfied with Article 4 (cf. below), and in Article 5 he wanted the addition: "the *territorial rights*

¹ Danske Traktater efter 1800. I, p. 212 ff.

appertaining to the respective Duchies." Although Usedom's proposals are not remarkable for their clarity, it is evident that his purpose was that they should form a basis of Slesvig-Holstein and German interpretations. As mentioned above, they were turned down.

But why give up? Indeed, the individual articles of the Treaty had at the last conference in the evening of the 1st of July been paraphed, i.e. provided with the initials of the negotiators and Westmorland; but when they met on the 2nd at Westmorland's house in order to perform the formal signing, Usedom offered a declaration which he wanted to be placed as an annex to the minutes of the conference of the 2nd of July.¹ Pechlin and the two other Danish negotiators would have nothing to do with this eyesore, and Usedom appealed to Westmorland in vain. The latter was willing to paraph what the two parties had agreed on, but nothing else. "Usedom then left the paper upon my table and I have got it, he went away."

Westmorland thus was left holding the baby, i.e. Usedom's declaration, in which he [Usedom] as regards Article 3 maintained that the general reservation of rights in the case of the Confederation included the Resolution of the Confederation of the 17th of September 1846. As regards Article 4 he stated that the Danish negotiators and Westmorland at the Conference on the 1st had recognized that the words "pourra . . . réclamer", which were substituted for "réclamera", only referred to the fact that the King might re-establish his legitimate authority in Holstein by peaceful means. As to Article 3 Usedom stated that Westmorland also, at the Conference of the 1st, regarding his proposal "et autres droits territoriaux" had declared that the omission of these words by no means influenced the territorial rights which Slesvig and Holstein mutually might have "l'un sur le territoire de l'autre."

Usedom's plea of Westmorland's statements made the latter draw up one or two documents about his part in the affair. With these he went to Schleinitz, whom he left to decide whether he should present them officially. Schleinitz found that it was the best thing to take as little notice of the affair as possible. It would be sufficient if Westmorland could assure him that the Danish

¹ Westmorland, V, pp. 507 ff. and 515 ff. – F.O. 64/318: 4/7, No. 244.

negotiators did not pretend "to interpret the word "pourra" as relieving the King of Denmark under circumstances from the obligation of appealing to the Confederation before having recourse to hostilities against the Duchy of Holstein." Westmorland was of opinion that he could do so, but he would immediately satisfy himself as to the question by asking the Danes. So he did and then sent Schleinitz a private note, after which Schleinitz averred "that he considers the differences upon this question terminated."¹

They were not so, however; for Usedom's declaration (with Schleinitz's knowledge?) was printed as an official document. Westmorland lodged a protest against this to Schleinitz and submitted a draft for a declaration to him.² In this declaration it says: "With respect to any observations of the mediating Power with the view of conciliating the different views of the parties engaged in the discussion of the articles of the treaty they can in no way be considered as regulating the sense of stipulations ultimately agreed to and signed by the respective Plenipotentiaries."

Schleinitz then had an article published in the "Deutsche Reform" of the 20th of July. It had in advance been shown to Westmorland, who found it satisfactory. About his statements it was said there that it was a matter of course "that all the observations of the Royal British Envoy during the Negotiations could only have the character of a Mediation, and not that of an Arbitration or decision and that the Treaty was only to be interpreted from itself and according to established Right." – As he wrote to Reedtz, Westmorland hoped that "this subject which gave me some annoyance may now be set right." A few years later he expressed his view of Usedom as a negotiator to the effect that Usedom "did everything possible to thwart the policy of, and the instructions I received from, Lord P."³

The ratifications of the Protocol between Denmark and Prussia took place at the time stipulated, whereas the ratifications of the Peace Treaty itself between Denmark and Germany was post-

¹ Cf. Krigen 1848–50. III, p. 270 f.

² F.O. 64/318: 20/7, No. 259. – Westmorland. V, pp. 601, 649 f., and 657 ff. – F.O. 64/311: 15/7, No. 202.

³ The Correspondence of Priscilla, Countess of Westmorland. Edited by . . . Rose Weigall (London 1909), p. 211.

poned until October and then were made with a reservation on the part of the Confederation concerning Article 4. Immediately after the evacuation of South Slesvig by the Prussians the Slesvig-Holstein army invaded Slesvig, but was defeated in the sanguinary battle of Isted on the 25th of July and had to leave the Danish duchy.

Schleinitz assured Westmorland of his endeavours to detain the Holsteiners from aggression, and Friedrich Wilhelm IV. said to him that they had now "for the first time committed an act of rebellion."¹ The question how sincere Schleinitz's statements were, must be left open. On the 1st of July Harbou, Chief of a Slesvig-Holstein Department, wrote home from Berlin that Schleinitz as well as Usedom wondered that in Holstein they were not yet fully armed and gave the advice that the callings up were not postponed.² For the object of the Prussian policy: the dismemberment of the Danish United Monarchy, an incurable rupture between the Slesvig-Holsteiners and the Danes was an advantage.

The conclusion of the peace required a number of more or less sincere congratulations between the parties concerned. In a dispatch of the 5th of July Westmorland received Palmerston's thanks for "the ability and perseverance as well as the spirit of conciliation which Your Lordship has displayed in conducting as Representative of the Mediating Power, this long and difficult Negotiation, and in assisting to bring it to a satisfactory conclusion."³ On the 16th of July he dined at Court and received King Friedrich Wilhelm's most cordial thanks for his co-operation at the conclusion of the Treaty.⁴ He answered diplomatically that he had tried to act on Palmerston's instructions, which were dictated "by an anxious desire to bring about such a settlement of the differences which had unhappily arisen between two Powers so intimately allied to Great Britain as Prussia and Denmark, as would be most conducive to their honor and to their interests."

A sincere appreciation of good collaboration is noticed in a letter of the 19th of July from Westmorland to Reedtz.⁵ He stated

¹ F.O. 64/318: 17/7, No. 254, and 20/7, No. 262.

² EE. 64 w.

³ F.O. 64/311: 5/7, No. 197.

⁴ F.O. 64/318: 16/7, No. 252.

⁵ Westmorland. V, p. 649 ff.

there that two days later he would go to England on leave, then writing, "Pray say a thousand kind things from me to Baron Pechlin and to Mr. Scheel, I never can cease to remember with the greatest interest, the constant agreeable friendly and confidential intercourse I have had with all of you. I anxiously hope we may meet again on more agreeable business."

A few jarring sounds mingled in the chorus of thanks, apart from the sharp protests of the Slesvig-Holsteiners and their German fellow-partisans. One was due to the French emissary in Berlin, F. de Persigny, who was Napoleon III.'s close friend.¹ When in August he read Westmorland's dispatch about the conclusion of the peace in the newspapers, in which Westmorland gave prominence to Meyendorff's efforts – and did not mention Persigny at all – he became highly indignant.² Whether Westmorland had understood this or not, he maintained, France had actually played the main part; for Prussia, who only found support in France, had first decided on another attitude towards Denmark, when he, Persigny, declared that she would be disappointed if she followed an unjust policy against Denmark – and a week after this declaration of his to Schleinitz and Usedom, the peace was concluded! – This assertion does not seem convincing.

The other jarring sound originated from the pro-Slesvig-Holstein Court of the mediating power. After the conclusion of the peace Frederik VII. sent polite letters of thanks to the Heads of the States Russia, Great Britain, Austria, France, and Sweden. When on the 29th of July Queen Victoria replied, she regretted the renewal of the war with Slesvig[!] and expressed her wish for a reconciliation based on "la reconnaissance des droits et des obligations des deux côtes."³ Due to an application to Prince Albert from the Duke of Augustenborg the Queen furthermore asked the King to return to the Duke his estates in Slesvig. The Prince furthermore requested John Russell to take an interest in the matter, and he wrote to the Duke that the Queen and himself would do everything to obtain a favourable result.

¹ On this see Paul Matter, *Les missions de M. de Persigny à Berlin (1849–50)* (*Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique* 12.1898, pp. 62–79).

² Persigny's dispatch 21/8, No. 77.

³ *The Letters of Queen Victoria*. II, p. 307 f. – R.A.W. I 20/Nos. 133, 143, 144, 153, 155, and 156.

15. England and the Question of the Succession.

In the secret article Prussia had consented after the peace to participate in negotiations about a solution of the problem of the succession of the Danish Monarchy. Not until the Warsaw Protocol of 1851 and the London Treaty of 8th of May 1852 was the question solved by the arrangement that Prince Christian of Lyksborg (Glücksburg) (the later King Christian IX.) and his male heirs were entitled to the succession to the Monarchy. The negotiations which led to this result are not to be discussed here. I shall, however, offer a few remarks on England's interest in the question of the succession to the throne during the time before the conclusion of the peace. It is a matter of course that the political interest of England – as well as Russia – primarily concerned the maintenance of the Danish Monarchy, whereas the question of the position of Slesvig within the Monarchy made little difference to the powers.¹

While the House of Hesse according to the female succession of the Danish Act of Succession (*Lex Regia*) had a right of succession to the Kingdom and Slesvig, the House of Gottorp was undisputed heir to, at any rate, parts of Holstein. As the Tsar Nicholas was the head of this House, and as Russia at that time was a kind of European arbitrator, it was of the greatest importance for the Danish Government to secure the Tsar's approval of the choice of a future successor to the throne.

As successor the Danish Government was in favour of Prince Christian, who was married to Princess Louise of Hesse, and who during the Slesvig-Holstein Revolution, as distinct from his brothers, had remained loyal to the King and as a Danish officer had fought against the Insurgents. In October 1849 Carl Moltke on behalf of the Government negotiated in St. Petersburg with Nesselrode about this candidature. Meyendorff, however, had brought up quite another candidate, viz. the son of the Grand Duke of Oldenburg, and then the attitude in St. Petersburg had changed in favour of him.

When the Danish Government in the autumn of 1849 brought up the question of the succession, this did not, strictly speaking,

¹ Cf. Lundqvist, pp. 126 ff. and 306 ff. – Neergaard, *Under Junigrundloven*. I, p. 700 ff.

agree with Article 4 of the peace preliminaries, in which it said that the King would initiate a discussion of it immediately after the definitive peace. In a dispatch of the 20th of November to Wynn, Palmerston, indeed, asked what disadvantages in the Danish Government's opinion were connected with postponing the decision until after the peace.¹ Wynn answered by emphasizing the undisputed importance of the question of the succession and by stating that this was the only subject which under the present circumstances could be negotiated in Berlin, "inasmuch as it is to be referred to the great Powers."² Prussia had not yet by the other German states been given any authority to make "any other arrangement affecting Holstein and Slesvig."

About a week later Wynn in a dispatch to Palmerston definitely advocated the young Duke of Oldenburg as successor to the throne.³ The only candidate to compete with him, he wrote, would be "the young Prince, son of Prince Christian of Glücksbourg, whose only recommendation would be that His Father (married to Prince Frederick's sister) did not, as four of his brothers, join in the Insurrection." As a recommendation of the Duke of Oldenburg, Wynn stated that he, "bringing with Him a most valuable addition to the Danish Dominions would have an equal interest with the King in providing for the continued integrity of the Dominions by conciliating the dispositions both of Danes and Germans." Wynn did not share in the fear of the Scandinavian party that Denmark would be devoured by Germany. On the contrary, he thought that when the two parties – the Danish and the German – in this way were brought "more nearly to an equality there would be more disposition to respect the constitutional and personal Tie which might be established between them." – This view was not held by the English chargé d'affaires Peter Browne. In a dispatch of May 1850 he remarks more realistically, "Indeed the circumstance of possessing three instead of two German Duchies might add to the difficulties of Denmark in case of their combining against her."⁴ For that matter, it was not included in Meyendorff's plan at all that the Duchy of Oldenburg should be united with the Danish Monarchy.

¹ F.O. 22/170: 20/11, No. 199.

² F.O. 22/173: 4/12, No. 226.

³ *Ibid.* 11/12, No. 228.

⁴ F.O. 22/183: 17/5, No. 30.

Wynn's predilection for the Oldenburg candidature was probably directly or indirectly due to Meyendorff. But it was hardly without influence by his connection with the Holstein nobleman Adolph Blöme. In November 1849¹ he wrote that the latter, who was highly interested in a peaceful settlement of the conflict, "is most anxious for the settlement of the succession" and fancies a candidate from the House of Oldenburg. Count Reventlou-Preetz, one of the ringleaders of the Revolution in 1848, was also in favour of Oldenburg.²

Although the proposal for a prince from Oldenburg originated from Meyendorff, it says in a dispatch of the beginning of December from Bloomfield that the Tsar did not dislike the Oldenburg prince proposed by England, and that he was of opinion that the question of the succession ought to be solved as soon as possible.³ Towards the end of the year Bloomfield spoke to Nesselrode, who said that he had not yet studied the case.⁴ He thought that Prince Christian would be "most agreeable to the King of Denmark as His Successor," but that the King would not object to the Heir Presumptive of Oldenburg. The choice of him, added Nesselrode, might be advantageous "on account of his reversionary rights to the Duchy of Holstein." In January Bloomfield, after conversations with the Danish Minister Plessen and Nesselrode, stated that the Tsar completely left the solution of the question of the succession to the Danish King.⁵

These statements are in poor agreement with the fact that Russia just about that time informed the Danish Government that she preferred the Oldenburg candidature.⁶ Nesselrode wrote to Meyendorff that the candidate of the latter, the Heir Presumptive of Oldenburg, with the Tsar had won over the candidate of the Danish King, Prince Christian.⁷

In the beginning of February the Danish Government began acting in conformity with Russia's wishes, to obtain relinquishment of the right to the Throne by those of the House of Hesse entitled to succeed and to enter into negotiations with the House

¹ F.O. 22/173: 23/11, No. 223.

² EE. 28: Abriss der Geschichte der Friedensverhandlungen etc. (Encl. 4).

³ F.O. 65/367: 5/12, No. 57.

⁴ Ibid. 28/12, No. 82.

⁵ F.O. 65/376: 8/1, No. 7, and 16/1, No. 18.

⁶ Cf. Lundqvist, p. 139 ff. – Neergaard, op. cit. I, p. 703 ff.

⁷ Nesselrode. IX, p. 282.

of Oldenburg.¹ By an order of the 14th of February Reventlow was informed that the first steps towards a solution of the question of the succession were being taken.² When on the 25th he read the dispatch to Palmerston, the latter repeatedly interrupted him with expressions of approval: "c'est bien – cela facilitera la solution, et de part et d'autre il n'y aura plus de motifs pour déchirer la Royaume. . ."³ Well over a week later Palmerston expressed his appreciation in writing.⁴

Palmerston does not seem to have informed Reventlow that he already on the 19th of February had sent Wynn a dispatch on the question of the succession, at that time being unacquainted with the Danish decision made in the first half of February.⁵ The slow postal communication, as mentioned several times, caused that the mutual relation between piece of information and reply would fail.

Not exactly in agreement with the above-mentioned dispatch of the 20th of November to Wynn (see p. 217) it said: You are to "press strongly on the Danish Government the great importance of settling without delay the question as to the Succession to the Crown of Denmark, which is the key to the whole of the question between Denmark and Germany." If the succession was settled so that the Kingdom and the Duchies remained under the same ruler, all questions about the future rule in the Duchies would be of secondary importance. But as long as it was probable that Holstein at the extinction of the male line would be separated from Denmark and become a purely German duchy, the Germans would "strive to the utmost to attach as firmly as possible to Holstein as large a portion as possible of the Duchy of Slesvig, in order that such portion of Slesvig may, on the dismemberment of the Danish Monarchy, follow the fortunes of Holstein and become essentially German." Inversely, as long as the possibility mentioned existed, the Danish party in Copenhagen would "not only strive to make the separation between Slesvig and Holstein as complete and final as possible, even to the injury of material

¹ Cf. Statsrådets Forhandl. II, p. 384 ff.

² Dispatch 14/2, No. 6, to Reventlow.

³ Reventlow's dispatch 25/2, No. 15; cf. 26/2, No. 16. – Cf. Montherot's dispatch 25/2, No. 160.

⁴ F.O. 22/186: 6/3. – Reventlow's dispatch 7/3, No. 19, with encl.

⁵ F.O. 22/180: 19/2, No. 42. – Printed in Correspond. resp. the Affairs of Denmark, p. 1 f.

interests of the two Duchies, but so long will they also endeavour to escape from the plain meaning of the basis adopted by the preliminary Treaty for the final arrangement of these matters, and try to connect Slesvig with Denmark as intimately and closely as possible." But if the political union between Denmark and the Duchies was secured by a common Successor to the Throne, "the motives for such conflicting endeavours would cease, and the contending parties would become more reasonable and more likely to concur in some equitable arrangement."

The British Government, the dispatch goes on, had so far intentionally omitted making proposals as regards the question of the succession. It was, however, of great European interest, too, and Wynn was therefore confidentially to ask the Danish Minister whether the King would object to the son of the Duke of Oldenburg.¹ Then it is stated what advantages the choice of him would involve, and that it was assumed that the Russian Emperor would waive his demands in favour of him, but be less inclined "to do so in any other case." Finally Palmerston would like to know something about the rumour that the Danish King would prefer a younger son of the Swedish King, and about possible advantages of such an arrangement.

In the dispatch there are a few expressions which one might be tempted to consider as evidence of Palmerston's sanction of the Slesvig-Holstein theory of a male succession in Slesvig. However, they do not seem quite unambiguous. At the mention of the question whether the Danish King would object to the Oldenburg prince, it says, "He would, it is understood, succeed equally to Holstein; and of course also to Slesvig." And previously it was said that the union ought to be secured by an arrangement as regards the Danish crown for the benefit of the prince who would also succeed in Holstein and in Slesvig. Originally only Holstein was mentioned; "and in Slesvig" is a later addition.

The day before this dispatch was sent, Wynn was in Copenhagen informed by Bille that the King had "at length consented to make overtures to the Duke of Oldenburg respecting the Succession."² In support of his previous remarks Wynn in his dispatch

¹ Already in January Palmerston must have spoken in favour of him to the French Minister Montherot. See Montherot's dispatch of 18/1, No. 131, and the order to him of 22/1, No. 3.

² F.O. 22/182: 19/2, No. 27. — Extract printed in *Correspond. resp. the Affairs of Denmark*, p. 2.

observed that if Oldenburg was added to Denmark, "the two component parts of the Danish Dominions would, in their relations to one another, more resemble that of Sweden and Norway." Wynn had suggested to Bille that the King himself should go to North Slesvig and there receive "a complimentary Deputation" [from Holstein?], which he was to inform of his plans for the succession "and other matters." "The answer I received was, I fear, too just. "L'Individu n'est pas fait pour cela.""

Wynn informed Bille of the contents of Palmerston's dispatch of the 19th.¹ Wynn answered the question of a young son of the Swedish King as Successor by stating that in his opinion the King had no special predilection for such a plan: "If he ever expressed such a wish, it was some time ago, and like many others equally imprudent and impracticable, immediately forgotten."² – On a conversation which Wynn had had about the succession with "one of the most, if not the most influential Member of the Peasants' Party" [Tscherning?], he reported that this man had said that he and his friends would approve of any proposal by the King to that effect, if there were any prospects that it would be received equally well in the Duchies.³ Indeed, the majority of his party and of the nation were in favour of a Scandinavian Union and Empire, but considering the opposition of the Great Powers to such an arrangement, "they were ready to submit to a foreign Dictate," though not from Prussia.

Palmerston's urgent recommendation of the Oldenburg prince had no appreciable effect in Copenhagen. Nobody had any real desire to swallow this pill so bitter to the nation. Wynn in his dispatch of the 12th of March characterized the answer to the English note which he received, as no answer.⁴ Therefore he made Moltke recall the answer and make an addition in which that combination [the Oldenburg prince] was mentioned to which, it was said, England had called the attention of the Danish Government. In his opinion it was now unobjectionable, but he regretted that the Government "should, in its first Version, have

¹ F.O. 22/182: 26/2, No. 31. – Printed – with a single omission – in *Correspond. resp. the Affairs of Denmark*, p. 4.

² Cf. Bloomfield's dispatch 8/3, No. 72. F.O. 65/376.

³ F.O. 22/182: 25/2, No. 30. – Extract printed in *Correspond. resp. the Affairs of Denmark*, p. 4.

⁴ *Ibid.*: 12/3, No. 41. – Moltke to Wynn 11/3. U.Min. Gehejmeregistratur. – Order 10/3, No. 9, to Reventlow. – Reventlow's dispatch 19/3, No. 23. – *Correspond. resp. the Affairs of Denmark*, p. 6 f.

given another proof of their disinclination to bind themselves in writing to any course." Indeed, Moltke cannot be said to have done so by his addition.

Near the end of March Wynn reported that according to Bille's statement Reventlow had given Palmerston too definite information about the question of the succession.¹ On the 6th of April Wynn handed over the management of the Legation to Peter Browne, as he went to London himself. Some days later Browne touched on the importance of the question of the succession before Moltke, who, however, said that the arrangement would require the time needed.² The Danish Government in general and Moltke in particular, wrote Browne, "never think of doing to-day what can be put off till tomorrow." On the last day of April he ascertained that "Nothing has lately transpired as to the Succession Question. It goes on like every thing here, as slowly as possible."³ The Danish indolence obviously made a strong impression on Peter Browne.

When Wynn towards the end of May returned to his post, he again, pursuant to Palmerston's order, urged upon Moltke "the necessity of immediate and direct measures being taken respecting the succession."⁴ But as stated by Moltke, the arrangement would require the time needed! When after the simple Peace the question of the succession was again taken up for consideration, it was, as mentioned above, to obtain another solution than the acceptance of the Oldenburg prince as Successor.

16. The London Protocol of the 2nd of August 1850.

Just as Meyendorff had been originator of the Oldenburg candidature, he originated the negotiations resulting in the London Protocol of the 2nd of August.⁵

¹ F.O. 22/182: 28/3, No. 46. — Correspond. resp. the Affairs of Denmark, p. 9. — Cf. Reventlow's statements to the Belgian Minister Van de Weyer, that the question of the succession would be solved when a German prince became Successor. Weyer's dispatch 31/3, No. 161.

² F.O. 22/182: 8 (12)/4, No. 2.

³ *Ibid.* 30/4, No. 18.

⁴ F.O. 22/183: 25/5, No. 49. — Cf. Reventlow's dispatch 10/5, No. 39.

⁵ Lundqvist, p. 314 ff. — *Krigen 1848–50*. III, pp. 280 ff. and 1397 ff. — As will appear from my following account, Lundqvist's hypothesis in his paper "Palmerston och London-Protokollet av år 1850" (*Svensk Historisk Tidsskrift* 54. årg. 1934, p. 329 ff.) is considered untenable.

In Article 5 of the Peace Preliminaries it had been decided that the parties, when the peace was concluded, would request the Great Powers to guarantee the correct implementation of it in Slesvig. In one of his dispatches Meyendorff had touched on this question, and on the 19th of March Nesselrode replied that he shared Meyendorff's opinion that the negotiations about it should be conducted in London with the mediating power.¹ He would give Brunnow the necessary instructions: "Dieu veuille seulement que la Paix soit bientôt conclue."

Already on the 23rd of March Nesselrode wrote to Brunnow and requested him to initiate negotiations with Palmerston.² On the 6th of April Brunnow sent Nesselrode's dispatch to Palmerston, asking him to deliberate its proposal at Broadlands: "Cette proposition me paraît utile, en principe, parceque *l'accord* entre nos Cours a été et sera toujours pour moi la Seule politique, à mon avis, raisonnable en pratique," – in spite of the disagreements between England and Russia as to Greece. When Palmerston returned to town he would like to speak to him "de tout cela."

Reventlow probably did not receive the first information about the Russian initiative from Brunnow, but in a letter of the 11th of April from Reedtz,³ who informed him that Brunnow either had received or would receive orders from St. Petersburg to negotiate about the way in which the Great Powers might guarantee the peace between Denmark and Prussia. As mentioned above, Brunnow had already received such an order.

It must be left an open question whether the information from Reedtz brought about the conversation between Reventlow and Drouyn de L'Huys which the latter summarized in his dispatch of the 13th of April.⁴ Reventlow in this expressed his intense wish that France, Russia, Austria, England, and Sweden would guarantee the coming Peace Treaty between Prussia and Denmark. Palmerston, indeed, objected to it, he said, but Brunnow was favourably disposed. Drouyn de L'Huys remarked in his dispatch that he was inclined to advise against such a guarantee.

¹ Nesselrode. IX, p. 293.

² Lundqvist, p. 315. – Copy of Nesselrode's dispatch of 11[23]/3 to Meyendorff and Brunnow enclosed with Schleinitz's dispatch of 18/4 to Bunsen. – F.O. 65/385: letter of 6/4 with enclosure from Brunnow to Palmerston.

³ Reventlow's dispatch of 17/4, No. 31.

⁴ Dispatch of 13/4, No. 206.

Three days later Brunnow spoke to Reventlow as well as to the French Ambassador about the question, but not yet to Palmerston.¹ Drouyn de L'Huys stated that he had had no instructions. In his dispatch he said that Palmerston "m'a exprimé ce matin sa répugnance pour un tel engagement." – To Reventlow Brunnow did not make a secret of his view that it would be very difficult to persuade Palmerston to agree to a guarantee, but it was in the interest of England as well as that of Russia that Denmark was not weakened.

On the 21st the French Government gave their Ambassador the necessary instructions to participate in London in the collective guarantee.² In his reply dispatch he remarked that the Austrian chargé d'affaires, Baron August von Koller, had not yet been instructed by his Government as to the question.³ As to Brunnow, he said that he thought Brunnow would like him to take the initiative and explore the possibilities: "Il semble douter de l'efficacité de ses seuls efforts, mais il m'a répété plusieurs fois, que la Russie et la France seront presque toujours écoutées ici, lorsqu'elles parleront le même langage." But Palmerston, as regards a collective guarantee, showed "le peu de goût."

At a conference with Palmerston on the 25th Brunnow then submitted to him a draft of protocol for a guarantee composed by himself.⁴ On the 27th Palmerston informed Drouyn de L'Huys of the draft and asked him what he thought about it. The French Ambassador replied that his Government would no doubt be favourably disposed, and he was ready to participate in conferences about it. He tried to refute the misgivings professed by Palmerston. For that matter Palmerston, according to Drouyn de L'Huys's dispatch highly stressed the necessity of putting an end to the ambiguous policy of the Prussian Government by means of a collective declaration. Wynn, who at the time stayed in London, also, wrote the Ambassador, stamped this policy in the most acrimonious words. He ended by asking whether he would be

¹ Drouyn de L'Huys's dispatch of 16/4, No. 210. – Reventlow's dispatch of the 17/4, No. 31.

² Order of 21/4, No. 44. – Reventlow's dispatches of 22/4, No. 32, and of 23/4, No. 33.

³ Dispatch of 24/4, No. 221.

⁴ Reventlow's dispatch of 26/4, No. 35. – Dispatch of 27/4, No. 223, from Drouyn de L'Huys.

authorized to sign the protocol *with* or *without* the modification wanted by Palmerston.

On the 29th the Government gave him the special powers wanted by him, though in the way that the protocol should contain the Palmerstonian modification, viz. that the word *guarantee* should be replaced by *l'accession*, *l'adhésion* or a similar term.¹ Palmerston stated that he was very satisfied when Drouyn de L'Huys informed him of his instructions.² He said that he thought all the powers mentioned in the draft would lend their support to the plan, perhaps with the exception of Prussia, "qu'il faudra, m'a-t-il-dit, conduire doucement entre nous deux comme un éléphant sauvage entre deux éléphants apprivoisés, afin de la diriger vers le piège où nous voulons la prendre pour son plus grand bien." The French Ambassador thought that Palmerston before he applied to Bunsen about the question, would instruct Westmorland to make a direct application in Berlin. Brunnow, too, wrote Drouyn de L'Huys, was anxious about the effect of Bunsen's advice. In order to meet any objection Brunnow in the draft for the protocol would replace the word "guarantee" with "en confirmant par une transaction Européenne, le principe de l'intégrité de la monarchie Danoise."

Drouyn de L'Huys fully approved of this proposed amendment and motivated his support by referring to the competence of the French National Assembly. As stated in his dispatch, he took good care not to say anything to Brunnow which might be interpreted as if France's behaviour was determined by that of England, or as if France was less well disposed towards Denmark than Russia was. As Reventlow had not been informed of the proposal by Palmerston, Drouyn de L'Huys had not any scruples about informing him.

As mentioned above, Bunsen was kept out of it for the time being. But Schleinitz had by Meyendorff been informed of Russia's plan, and on the 18th of April he had told Bunsen,³ who was instructed confidentially to negotiate with Palmerston and then perhaps participate in negotiations, which, however, must only be of a preliminary character. Not until a positive result of

¹ Order of 29/4, No. 47.

² Dispatch of 1/5, No. 227, from Drouyn de L'Huys.

³ Cf. Lundqvist, p. 315 f.

the peace negotiations had been reached, the question might assume a more practical form.

Palmerston submitted Brunnow's draft for the Protocol to the Prime Minister, John Russell, and on the 27th of April received Russell's written approval of it – with the modification “accession to the Treaty instead of a guarantee.”¹ He asked Palmerston to inform the Queen in writing, communicate Brunnow's proposal to her, “and to say that with my concurrence you mean to act upon it.” Besides, Russell remarked in his letter that as it had now been decided that the same person (the Oldenburg prince) was to inherit both Duchies, he did not see why the union between Holstein and Slesvig could not remain “on its old footing.” “There seems no good in toiling thro' this labyrinth when there is no good to be obtained at the end of it. – But Denmark cannot, of course, consent to the insertion of any word by which Germany may hereafter (or Prussia in the name of Germany) claim a right to interfere in Slesvig. – However, Brunnow and Drouyn may perhaps see some way out of this difficulty, and a General agreement that we would all be parties to the Treaty of Peace will help us to a conclusion.” He feared that it would be almost hopeless to conclude a peace on the basis of the Preliminaries.

Two days later Palmerston laid Brunnow's proposal before the Queen.² In the Preamble the powers – Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, and Sweden – were mentioned which were presupposed to agree in the fact that “le maintien de l'intégrité de la Monarchie Danoise, lié aux intérêts généraux de l'équilibre Européen” was most important for the preservation of peace, for which reason they had decided to demonstrate this agreement as to “l'inviolabilité de ce principe” in the following declaration. Article 1 contained the statement that it was the unanimous wish of the powers “que l'état des possessions actuellement réunies sous la Couronne de Danemark soit maintenu dans son intégrité.” In Article 2 the Danish King was praised for his intention of possibly arranging the succession “dans Sa Royal Maison” in a way which could facilitate the arrangements by which “les liens politiques qui attachent les Duchés de Holstein et de Slesvic à la Monarchie Danoise demeurent intacts.”

¹ P.P.

² R.A.W. I 19/104–105.

According to Article 3 the powers would jointly endeavour to make the peace negotiations in Berlin as soon as possible lead to a result, on the basis of the Preliminaries. When this had happened, it said in Article 4, the powers would negotiate about giving the results of the peace “un gage nouveau de stabilité en plaçant l'intégrité de la Monarchie Danoise sous une garantie Européenne.” These negotiations were to take place in London.

At his presentation of the proposal Palmerston stated that Drouyn de L'Huys, whom he had confidentially shown Brunnow's proposal, had said that France was perfectly ready to join in some such arrangement, if it was sanctioned by Great Britain.¹ Russell, with whom he had communicated, agreed with him that “some arrangement of this kind would be very desirable omitting always the Guarantee proposed at the End of the Protocol and substituting for it, a mere Engagement to accede to any Treaty which might result from the negotiation.” A procedure like that proposed by Brunnow would, Palmerston emphasized, be the best means to prevent disturbance of the peace of Europe in case of a renewed outbreak of hostilities in the Duchies. He asked for the Queen's permission “to take the necessary steps at Vienna, Berlin, Stockholm and Copenhagen for obtaining the concurrence of Austria, Prussia, Sweden and Denmark to such a course.” He pointed out that the details of the arrangement would be the object of the negotiations; Brunnow's draft for a Protocol was only a proposal.

The same or the following day Palmerston had a conversation with Prince Albert in which the latter proved quite averse to accepting Brunnow's proposal; for Palmerston felt called on by a letter of the 30th to give prominence to an argument in favour of the proposal, which he thought that he might not in the conversation have placed “with sufficient distinctness.”² The Danish blockade the preceding year had, he wrote, caused great economic damage to Great Britain. If the blockade would be renewed again this summer because the English mediation did not lead to any result, and if Great Britain declined the help offered by “France and Russia, and probably of Austria and Sweden also,” and in this way threw away a fresh possibility of a peaceful arrangement,

¹ R.A.W. I 19/104.

² R.A.W. I 19/110.

Palmerston was afraid that "it would be very difficult for us to give to the Parliament and the Country such Reasons for the Rejection of those overtures, as would be accepted as sufficient and satisfactory." Evidently Palmerston tried to bring it home to Prince Albert that the view of Parliament must be decisive of the politics of the country.

The Prince undoubtedly discussed Palmerston's statement with his German friends, for on the 2nd of May Stockmar wrote to him: "Noch ein Wort über Schleswig-Holstein."¹ He mentioned France's, England's, and Russia's "Gewalthandlungen", but although his heart was bleeding for it, it was his advice that Prussia refrained from further armed intervention in the Slesvig-Holstein affair. But "the brutal dictatorship" which the three powers mentioned intended to exert upon Slesvig-Holstein, would, although only indirectly, wound "die besten Rechte und Interessen Preussens als selbständiger Staat." Stockmar would advise the Prussian Cabinet to send somebody to England in order to tell Palmerston that it would not shrink back from a general war if anybody touched its honour in the Slesvig-Holstein question. Such a messenger would, Stockmar concluded, at any rate by you and the Queen be given an honourable reception.

The following day Prince Albert returned the draft for the Protocol to Palmerston, with a number of objections.² The Queen had on the 1st of May given birth to a son and thus during those days was prevented from occupation with the government. The Prince offered three or four objections: (1) the German Confederation ought to be mentioned as party to the project. (2) the expression "de l'inviolabilité de ce principe" cannot be applied to a subject which in the Project itself is said to be only a "Political desideratum." This desideratum could only be obtained by a friendly arrangement between the parties concerned and of the conflicting rights. (3) In Article 3 it was assumed, remarked the Prince, that the negotiations in Berlin still were carried on on the basis of the Preliminaries, although Prussia had declared herself unable to do so as a consequence of Denmark's unwillingness to accept "and of *England to recommend*" a Treaty of Peace with the independence of Slesvig as a reality. If Article 3 was adopted,

¹ R.A.W. I 20/3.

² R.A.W. I 20/4.

this meant a threat on the part of the signatories "to *force* Prussia (and the German Confederation) to resume the negotiation as desired by Denmark." But if Prussia refused, would England be prepared "to engage Russia and France to a joint declaration of war?" And who was, if necessary, to force Slesvig to obey? Denmark was unable to do so. Prussia "can clearly not do it. England will, I hope, not be disgraced by forcibly abrogating the well established constitutional rights of the original Anglo Saxons (who are the people of Slesvic)." (4) Indeed, Palmerston had himself rejected the guarantee as inadmissible.

Finally Albert, with reference to Palmerston's letter of the 30th of April, sharply denounced Palmerston's policy. It was *he* who would be to blame for a possible blockade, as he prevented the separate peace proposed by Prussia. Denmark's knowledge of Palmerston's inclination "to join in the policy of Russia, is the real cause of the failure of our Mediation." Instead of solving the problem by following "the principles of Equity and Justice in the real original point of dispute, you are now inviting the other Powers to join in the quarrel, and to begin at once by taking side with one of the Parties." This would offer no guarantee against the possibility of a European war, and England would be exposed to the hatred of the German nation.

It was "eine grausame Salbe" to which the leader of British foreign politics was exposed. Although it did not make him deviate from his road, it may have been the cause why he did not answer Brunnow at the appointed time.¹ On the 10th of May Wynn left London in order to go to Berlin and from there return to his post in Copenhagen.² Wynn brought Brunnow's draft for a protocol along with him to Berlin. In the morning of the 10th of May the French Ambassador had a conversation with Palmerston and in his dispatch about it motivates Palmerston's delay in the protocol affair by stating that the latter wanted to await Westmorland's peace negotiations in order, if possible, to be able to say that England's mediation had given a first result, "sans le concours d'autres Puissances."

After his arrival at Berlin Wynn handed Westmorland a private

¹ Reventlow's dispatch of 4/5, No. 37.

² Reventlow's dispatch of 10/5, No. 39. — Dispatches of 9/5, No. 235, and 11/5, No. 237, from Drouyn de L'Huys.

letter of the 10th of May to him from Palmerston as well as a copy of the Protocol.¹ Westmorland discussed the question with Wynn, Meyendorff, and Pechlin; they agreed not to apply to Schleinitz before the result of Below's mission was known. Westmorland also found that he would have to await an official dispatch with possible instructions from Palmerston. In a conversation with Schleinitz on the 16th of May the latter, however, asked Westmorland whether England, France, and Russia, as it was rumoured, had signed a Protocol concerning the relations of the Duchies to Denmark. Not yet, replied Westmorland, but it is intended to sign such a Protocol by the Great Powers interested in the question. Palmerston was, said Westmorland, "most anxious, that She [Prussia] should take a leading part" in it. Westmorland supposed that he could submit the draft for the Protocol to Schleinitz "either tomorrow or the next day."

It came to nothing. On the 20th of May Westmorland informed Palmerston that as his promised dispatch had not arrived, he had omitted to submit to Schleinitz "the draft of that Protocol."²

In the dispatch which Reventlow sent home on Monday the 13th, he wrote optimistically that after conversations with Palmerston and Eddisbury on the Saturday, he expected that the Protocol would be signed in that week.³ But there was a hitch.

In Athens a British subject, Don Pacifico, had claimed damages from the Greek Government for a mob attack on his house. The affair developed to the effect that Palmerston vigorously took the side of the British citizen and through a naval demonstration forced Greece to yield. Palmerston's high-handed behaviour in this case created a strong tension with France, who about the middle of May recalled her Ambassador Drouyn de L'Huys, and with Russia as well.⁴ Brunnow demonstratively at the last moment cancelled an invitation to dinner at Palmerston's and for some time kept completely passive as regards the question of the Protocol, although according to Reventlow "the next move" fell to him.⁵

On the 25th of May, however, Reventlow could report that he

¹ Copy of Palmerston's letter of the 10th in P.P. – F.O. 64/317: 16/5, No. 179.

² F.O. 64/317: 20/5, No. 184.

³ Dispatch of 13/5, No. 40.

⁴ Cf. The Letters of Queen Victoria. II, p. 287 ff.

⁵ Reventlow's dispatches of the 16/5, No. 41, and 17/5, No. 42.

had just spoken to Brunnow, who had shown him a dispatch from Nesselrode. The latter praised Brunnow highly for his zeal in the matter of the Protocol.¹ Brunnow authorized Reventlow to speak to Palmerston about the draft and possible amendments in it. During the following days there were negotiations between the three about the elaboration of the draft, also occasioned by a proposed amendment from Copenhagen.² Reventlow kept the French chargé d'affaires, Marescalchi, posted, but the latter had no influence on the amendments.³ In a dispatch of the 13th of June Marescalchi reported that Reventlow had told him that he and Palmerston, Russia and Sweden were ready to sign; there was some uncertainty as to Austria's attitude, and the four powers would not allow the matter to be stopped by a refusal on the part of Prussia. On the 14th Marescalchi was authorized by his Government to sign, only that in the Preamble "Gouvernement de la République", etc., should be replaced by "Président de la République."⁴

On the 10th of June Palmerston submitted to the Queen the draft, which had now been finished and which France, Russia, Sweden, and Denmark would sign, "and the Cabinet are willing with Your Majesty's sanction to propose it to Austria and Prussia."⁵ He pointed out that it was not proposed to interfere with the negotiations which were conducted in Berlin under English mediation. The chief purpose of the Protocol was to establish the wish of the powers in question for the maintenance of the Danish Monarchy and for an arrangement of the Succession which secured this. The commitment contained in the latter part of the Protocol was "confined to an agreement that the Powers . . . will when Peace shall have been made between Denmark and Germany concert together with a view to give to that peace, and also to the order of succession which may be established for Denmark an additional Stability by an European acknowledgement." Finally it said in Palmerston's letter that he had informed Bunsen that the Queen would receive him at Osborne (the Queen's residence in the Isle of Wight) on the Thursday (the 13th).

¹ Reventlow's dispatch of 25/5, No. 45.

² Reventlow's dispatches of the 28/5, No. 46; 3/6, No. 48; and 7/6, No. 49.

³ Marescalchi's dispatches of 30/5, No. 12; 2(?) /6, No. 15; 5/6, No. 19; 7/6, No. 22; 13/6, No. 25.

⁴ Order of 14/6, No. 62. — Marescalchi's dispatch of 17/6, No. 26.

⁵ R.A.W. I 20/66.

On the 14th Russell wrote to Palmerston that he wished to speak to him about the Protocol as the Queen wanted the German Confederation to be invited to participate (cf. p. 228).¹ Occasioned by this letter, Palmerston – but not until the 21st – sent a letter to the Queen, who was now staying at Buckingham Palace.² He pointed out that the German Confederation had no central organ at the time, and neither Russia, France, nor England, and probably not Sweden, either, had official diplomatic relations with Germany “as a Body Politic.” Furthermore, the Protocol did not contain anything “which would require the intervention of the German Confederation.” Then he mentioned the contents of the Protocol and stated that the purpose was not to remove the peace negotiations from Berlin. As in Austria and Prussia they had privately learnt about the Protocol, the feeling had begun arising that “the absence of any direct communications on this subject to those Governments from the Government of Your Majesty is a want of due attention to them.”

This last statement must have been due to the negotiations which Palmerston had just conducted with Bunsen.³ With reference to a dispatch of the 16th from Schleinitz, Bunsen on the 20th and 21st had conferences with Palmerston on the Protocol and raised objections. If England, he said, would not make the negotiations with Russia and France have the character of a European arbitration directed towards Germany, more especially Prussia, it was necessary immediately to inform them. In a report to Friedrich Wilhelm IV. Bunsen wrote that Russell as well as Palmerston since his conversation with them on the 5th of May had answered his questions about the Protocol by stating that the negotiations with Brunnow were suspended. This was correct until a fortnight ago. Now Bunsen, however, had said to Palmerston that the Protocol looked like a declaration of war, and that it would make Denmark still more obstinate at the peace negotiations: “*Ein jeder schneller und nicht schimpflicher Friede ist besser, nach meiner Ueberzeugung, als ein europäisches Protokoll.*” At worst Palmerston could be made arbitrator as to his proposal of November 1848.

¹ P.P.

² R.A.W. I 20/87.

³ Lundqvist, p. 332. – R.A.W. I 20/88–90. – Bunsen’s dispatch of 22/6 to Schleinitz. – Bunsen. III, p. 134.

The Queen did not feel convinced by Palmerston's letter, as she stated on the 22nd.¹ Her objections and exaggerations do not strike one as being particularly logical, considering the state in Germany at the time. A Protocol about the integrity of Denmark, she wrote, "is a direct attack upon Germany, if carried out without her knowledge and consent." It was "an act repugnant to all feelings of justice and morality" if three powers disposed of other people's property, "which no diplomatic etiquette about the difficulty of finding a proper Representative for Germany could justify." It did not surprise the Queen that Austria and Prussia would complain of Palmerston's "agreeing with Sweden, Russia, Denmark and France" about the Protocol before they were informed about it. As appears, this statement is without logical relation to Palmerston's remark on the subject.

Palmerston received the Queen's letter through Russell,² who wrote³ that he thought that Austria and Prussia could be informed "that if there is any organ of the German Confederation with whom we can treat we shall be happy to communicate to that organ the Proposed Protocol or that otherwise Austria and Prussia may act in their name."

On the 23rd Palmerston in a long letter to Russell countered the Queen's objections.⁴ The Queen had, he wrote, completely misunderstood the purpose and effect of the Protocol. It did not decide anything regarding the fate of Holstein and was not an attack on Germany; it only expressed the signatories' "Wishes and opinions." After a mention of the articles of the Protocol he asked: "How does any part of this decide the fate of Holstein or attack Germany?" – The Confederation was undoubtedly to watch over the rights and interests of Holstein, but the place for that was at the negotiations in Berlin. Palmerston, however, was not aware that anything about Holstein was discussed there, "except as far as its interests may be involved in the arrangements to be made as to Slesvig."

Palmerston hit the actual purpose of the Queen's letter by the following statement: "But is not the Queen requiring that I

¹ R.A.W. I 20/92. – Printed in *The Letters of Queen Victoria*. II, p. 295 f.

² R.A.W. I 20/91.

³ P.P. 22/6.

⁴ R.A.W. I 20/96. – Printed in part in *The Letters of Queen Victoria*. II, p. 296 f. – Gooch. II, p. 26.

should be Minister not indeed for Austria, Russia or France, but for the Germanic Confederation. Why should we take up the cudgels for Germany" when inviting the two leading powers, Austria and Prussia? If these countries found it necessary – as they probably did not – they would "put in a Claim for the Confederation."

Palmerston did not think that the German Confederation in treaties after 1815 acted as a European power. And at present there was "no existing Authority at Frankfort acknowledged by the whole of Germany." To whom were they to apply?

Next he – rightly – protested against his "having *agreed* with Sweden, Russia, Denmark and France" before informing Prussia and Austria. The proposal originated from Brunnow; it was he who had communicated it to the French Ambassador [cf., however, p. 224], to Reventlow and Rehausen. He had himself sent it privately to Westmorland in order that he could inform Schleinitz confidentially, but as Russia's proposal and with the remark that something in it must be altered. He could not send it officially to Berlin and Vienna until Brunnow "had agreed to such a Wording as I could recommend the Government to adopt, nor until I received the Queen's Sanction to do so."

The question of the German Confederation, "whose Guardians we are not, but whose Guardians Austria and Prussia are," make it difficult to know what to do. But important British interests require that we shall help to hasten the conclusion of the peace, "a conclusion which Prussia, for objects of her own, is violently desirous of delaying."

The only practical proposal which Palmerston could think of was, so it says towards the end of the letter, to tell Austria and Prussia that if they would also sign in the name of the Confederation, that would be excellent. But it could not be made a condition of the working-out of the Protocol, any more than the sanction of Austria and Prussia. The Protocol would be signed by those who sanctioned it, but it was "only a record of opinions and wishes, and does not decide or pretend to decide anything practically." – The last statement perhaps was theoretically correct, though probably an intended (?) depreciation of its importance in order more easily to obtain the Queen's approval.

Russell sent Palmerston's long letter to Lord Lansdowne, President of the Council, with a request for a statement.¹ Lansdowne in so far approved of the Queen's view that if there had been a recognized German Federal authority, it ought to be invited to accede to the Protocol.² But as there was not at present such an authority, and as England's interests required a quick conclusion of the conflict, it must be sufficient to invite Austria and Prussia to accede "on behalf of the whole." Fortified with this statement Russell on the 25th sent this and Palmerston's letter to the Queen and declared that he agreed with Lansdowne.³ Indeed, it would be possible, he added, to promise Austria and Prussia that "the Confederation would be duly consulted in all that concerns them, as soon as they have a constituted organ."

The Queen would not yet throw up the game. The same day she wrote to Russell again.⁴ The "*misconception*" of which, according to Palmerston's assertion she was guilty, consisted, she stated, in her taking "the essence of the arrangement for the mere words;" for the only purpose of the Protocol was to decide the fate of Holstein, which view was further developed. Then [somewhat exaggeratedly] she referred to the fact that Denmark's attempt at incorporating Slesvig "into her polity" by the Federal Diet in 1846 was characterized as "a declaration of war against Germany *merely* on account of its intimate connexion" with Holstein. The Queen did not, she retorted to Palmerston's statements, want her Minister to be Minister "for Germany, but merely to treat that Country with the same consideration which is due to every Country on whose interests we mean to decide." Finally she demanded that the correspondence concerning this affair was submitted to the Cabinet, after which she would "abide by their deliberate opinion." Presumably she had no other alternative.

The Cabinet Meeting took place on the 26th and naturally the Ministers agreed with Palmerston.⁵ The following day Russell wrote a letter to the Queen, but first sent it to Palmerston for his approval. In this letter it said: "Upon the whole it appeared to the

¹ R.A.W. I 20/94.

² Ibid. I 20/97.

³ Ibid. I 20/95.

⁴ Ibid. I 20/98. — Printed in *The Letters of Queen Victoria*. II, p. 297 f.

⁵ On what follows see R.A.W. I 20/105–106–110.

Cabinet that the Protocol does nothing more than recognize and approve certain acts to be done by competent authority," viz. signing of the peace under the mediation of England and a suitable arrangement of the Succession Act according to a proposal by the Danish King. Still, it was desirable that the Confederation obtained knowledge of the Protocol, but under the circumstances this could only happen by Austria and Prussia being invited to sign it. "Your Majesty is therefore advised to sanction the further proceeding in a matter which has been urged upon us by Russia, and to which France and Austria appear ready to consent."

Palmerston was in no hurry to return the letter to Russell. Perhaps the explanation of this is his irritation at Prince Albert's interference with his domain. But besides he was in those days much occupied by the debates in Parliament about the Government's policy. On the 25th he made in the House of Commons his famous five-hour apology of especially his conduct in the Greek affair and in this won a great personal victory. "The cheering was frequent and enthusiastic," Russell wrote to the Queen on the 26th.¹ A few days later the Government received a vote of confidence in the House of Commons. But Prince Albert gave expression to just the opposite in a letter to his brother: "You and all Europe certainly feel with us in the unhappy combinations of circumstances that granted our immoral one for foreign affairs [Palmerston] such a triumph in the Commons."²

On the 2nd of July Prince Albert pressed Russell for information about what had happened at the Cabinet Meeting, for he understood, he wrote, that Palmerston was going on with his Protocol without paying regard to the Queen's objections. Russell answered the same day and stated what had been decided and that he had sent Palmerston his letter to the Queen. "I have not yet received it back. But I have twice spoken to Palmerston on the subject, and hope to get my letter back this evening." The following day he could send it to the Queen. He then remarked that Palmerston suggested some amendments of the Protocol "to suit present circumstances;" for telegraphic information about

¹ The Letters of Queen Victoria. II, p. 300.

² The Prince Consort and His Brother. Two Hundred New Letters ed. by Hector Bolitho (London 1933), p. 117: 4/8.

the conclusion of the Peace in Berlin on the 2nd July had been received.

As mentioned in Russell's letter to the Queen it was taken for granted that Austria would be co-signatory to the Protocol. Her chargé d'affaires, von Koller, seemed personally favourable to it, and in Copenhagen it was assumed that Schwarzenberg would instruct him to do so.¹ On the 27th of June Reventlow spoke to Palmerston about the Protocol, and the latter said that he would invite all the interested parties to sign as soon as von Koller had been authorized to do so from Vienna. Two days later Reventlow, however, had to inform Palmerston that von Koller had been ordered to await a formal invitation from England to sign. When Reventlow on the 1st of July met with Palmerston, the latter promised on Thursday the 4th to assemble the representatives of the respective powers "pour concerter la démarche en vue."²

On the 2nd of July Brunnow requested Palmerston provisionally to print "notre petit protocol Danois. Cela lui donnera l'air d'un commencement de signature."³ The same day Palmerston sent Bunsen the draft for the Protocol, which he would discuss with him at a conference on the Thursday.⁴ As the Protocol only expressed a wish and a purpose, he very much hoped that Bunsen could participate in the Protocol. At the same time he would not keep back from him "that there is growing up in this Country an impatience for a settlement of these matters which Her Majesty's Government cannot overlook; and moreover that there is a general impression that the Prussian has shewn a disposition to postpone rather than to accelerate the conclusion of Peace and that instead of wishing to keep together the states which compose the Danish Monarchy, Prussia from views of Commercial and political aggrandizement aims at a dismemberment of the Danish Body politic."

Bunsen was ready with an answer to Palmerston.⁵ In one of his long letters he on the 3rd of July informed Palmerston that he had compared the draft with his instructions and without a

¹ Order of 21/6, No. 25 to Reventlow. – Reventlow's dispatches of 27/6, No. 55, and of 29/6, No. 56.

² Reventlow's dispatch of 2/7, No. 57; cf. dispatch of 3/7, No. 58.

³ P.P.

⁴ P.P. – Printed in German translation in Bunsen. III, p. 133 f.

⁵ F.O. 64/324: 3/7. – Corresp. resp. the Affairs of Denm., p. 12 f. – Printed in German translation in Bunsen. III, p. 134 ff.

moment's delay could declare "*that I am not at liberty to join in the Protocol.*" He highly complained of the fact that neither Prussia nor Austria had been consulted in the matter. Holstein was a German state, and it could not be laid down that it should remain with Denmark, "with which, as such, it has *absolutely* nothing to do." "Is the world to see, *for the first time*, a triple coalition against Germany headed by England? . . . Are the two German powers to be slighted by England, whose traditional allies they have been, and with whom she has fought for the independence of Europe?" As the Peace had been concluded, the Protocol was superfluous; a new conference about the question of the Danish Succession would have to be held, and Germany's rights to be reserved. To little pleasure of Palmerston he finally promised him a confidential memoir! — On the 4th Palmerston replied in a few lines that he absolutely disagreed with Bunsen, but that they might discuss this more closely at the conference in the Foreign Office at two o'clock.¹

Bunsen did not, however, appear at the conference. He informed Palmerston on the 4th in a confidential letter with an energetic protest against the Protocol, which in his opinion was in conflict with Germany's dignity and all public right in Europe, "*hostile à toutes les libertés nationales existantes, et contenant le germe des incalculables complications et guerres futures.*"² Besides, he maintained again, the Peace made the Protocol superfluous.

The next day Bunsen sent Palmerston two memoirs for consideration and for justification of the fact that he had omitted to participate in the conference.³ Palmerston did not engage in a controversy with Bunsen, but informed him on the 6th of the signing of the Protocol.⁴ On the 10th of July Bunsen's behaviour was approved of by Schleinitz.⁵

Thus on the 4th of July at two o'clock Brunnow, Drouyn de L'Huys, who on the 1st had returned to London, Koller, Rehau-

¹ Bunsen. III, p. 136.

² F.O. 64/324: 4/7. — R.A.W. I 20/111. — Corresp. resp. the Affairs of Denm., p. 14. — Bunsen. III, p. 137 f.

³ F.O. 64/324: 5/7. — Corresp. resp. the Affairs of Denm., p. 16 ff. — Bunsen. III, p. 138 f.

⁴ F.O. 64/324.

⁵ Bunsen. III, p. 139 f. — R.A.W. I 20/119.

sen, and Reventlow met with Palmerston at the Foreign Office.¹ Not until the evening was the Protocol provisionally signed by all those mentioned with the exception of Koller, who was still waiting for instructions. At the conference there was some discussion about the form of the Protocol, and Reventlow informed his Government that it was Brunnow and Drouyn de L'Huys who at Palmerston's suggestion had attended to the wording of it. The chief honour of having negotiated the Protocol naturally falls to Brunnow, who, indeed, as stated by Drouyn de L'Huys, was "très content de son œuvre." On the other hand, the French Ambassador remarked on the 9th, Bunsen proved "toujours fort monté. Il blame le fond et la forme. . ."

Among the alterations made in the signed Protocol as compared with Brunnow's draft (p. 226 f.), the following are to be mentioned. In the Preamble "l'inviolabilité de ce principe" was replaced by the weaker "au maintien de ce principe." In Article 1, as a courtesy to Germany, an addition was made after *intégrité*: "sans préjudice aux relations du Duché de Holstein avec la Confédération Germanique." In Article 2 the mention of Holstein and Slesvig was omitted, and the "arrangements" intended were only characterized as "au moyen desquels l'intégrité de la Monarchie Danoise demeurera intacte." Article 3 was of course to be altered after the Conclusion of the Peace and now expressed joy at this. In Article 4 the word "guarantee" naturally had to be omitted in accordance with Palmerston's demand, and with a view to the coming Conference in London the reference was now to "un gage additionel de stabilité par un acte de reconnaissance Européenne."

On the 5th of July Palmerston could send Brunnow "Printed Copies" with the Draft of Protocol annexed to it.² The following day Brunnow wrote to Palmerston that now that the Peace had been concluded, he hoped that nothing more would prevent Prussia from participating in "notre petit protocole, que je trouve, en le relisant, très obligeant envers le Cabinet de Berlin."³ As mentioned above, Bunsen did not agree with him. Nor did the

¹ Reventlow's dispatches of 5/7, No. 59, and of 6/7, No. 60. — Dispatches from Drouyn de L'Huys of 4/7, No. 1, of 6/7, No. 2, and of 9/7, No. 4. — Corresp. resp. the Affairs of Denm., p. 14 f.

² F.O. 65/385: 5/7.

³ P.P.

Queen, from whom Palmerston found a "memorandum" when after the weekend he returned to London on the 8th.¹ So he had to apologize to the Queen because the Protocol signed on the Thursday had not been submitted to her. It was due to "an inexcusable omission at the Foreign Office." He had reprimanded the persons responsible. Was he among them himself?

It must probably be taken for granted that the negotiations about the Protocol in London hastened the conclusion of the Peace in Berlin. This view appears from Drouyn de L'Huys's dispatch of the 6th of July, and Bunsen's above-mentioned letters to Berlin from the end of June are highly indicative in that direction. But after the Conclusion of the Peace it was found that the articles of the Protocol did not quite correspond to actual fact. Thus Reventlow in a dispatch of the 12th wrote that Brunnow and himself considered some alterations of Article 3 necessary. He had talked over the problem with Palmerston.² Even though it was not possible to obtain Austria's support, he stated, Russia and France had decided to urge Palmerston to make the formal signing of the Protocol.

However, it proved impossible to obtain Austria's agreement. The reason probably was that Schwarzenberg during the Prussian-Austrian struggle for power in Germany found it necessary to act as guardian of the interests of the German Confederation. But on the 29th of July Palmerston invited the Ministers to meet at the Foreign Office on Friday the 2nd of August at five o'clock in order to consider the Draft of Protocol "altered so as to adapt it to the altered circumstance of the present moment."³

Bunsen was again conspicuous by his absence. As a motivation he had sent Palmerston a long memoir which the latter

¹ R.A.W. I 20/117. – Ibid. I 20/115 there is a report "Zur Geschichte des English-Französisch-Russischen Protocols sur l'intégrité de la Monarchie Danoise nach einem vertraulichen Berichte Mons. V de W's [Van de Weyer] (mit angefügten Bemerkungen)." In a different hand it is denoted as a "Memorandum (Dr. Meyer)" and referred to "July? 5/50." – To judge from the severe criticism of Palmerston in the "angeführte Bemerkungen" it can hardly have been this "memorandum" which the Queen sent Palmerston. – The remarks are of course based on information from Bunsen. Thus it is stated that he [Bunsen] had tried to induce Koller not to appear at the conference on the 4th, and that Brunnow at an audience with the Prince of Prussia in the morning of the 4th had tried, but in vain, to make the Prince induce Bunsen to sign.

² Dispatch of 12/7, No. 62.

³ Copy of P.'s letter of 29/7 to Reventlow enclosed in his dispatch. – F.O. 64/324: 29/7 to Bunsen. – F.O. 65/385: 29/7 to Brunnow.

characterized as “nonsense”, the other participants as “galimatias”.¹ The conference lasted three hours and a half, which, as reported by Reventlow, were used for attempting to make Koller sign the Protocol, perhaps by making some modifications. The attempt failed. In the morning Drouyn de L’Huys had a conversation with Reventlow and tried to make him approve of “quelques modifications insignifiantes.” Reventlow, however, maintained his opposition to the words “*ne pourront porter préjudice aux droits de la Confédération Germanique.*” At the conference Palmerston for a moment, according to Reventlow’s report, seemed inclined to accept Schwarzenberg’s reservation as to the “droits” of the German Confederation, but it was pointed out to him that this would be to open the door to everlasting German claims. Reventlow in Article 1 agreed to replacing “sous la couronne de Danemark” by “sous la domination de Sa Majesté Danoise” and in return obtained omission of the words “sans préjudice.” Brunnow proposed the words “sans altérer”. The sentence in question was moved from Article 1 to Article 2. In Article 3 the definite hope was expressed that the Peace Treaty of Berlin would cause “le rétablissement de la paix.”

Space was left open in the Protocol for signing by Austria and Prussia.² As mentioned above, Koller did not sign, although his opposition was moderate and he was not glad to keep company with Bunsen. Brunnow had in vain suggested that he should express his reservation in a note to Palmerston. Russia’s influence in Austria, however, resulted in Schwarzenberg’s giving new instructions to Koller. After long discussions a kind of additional Protocol was drawn up on the 23rd of August. Koller declared Austria’s approval of the principles expressed in the Preamble and of Articles 1, 2, and 4 (Article 3, of course, dealt with the Peace, with which Austria had had nothing to do), but made reservations as regards the rights of the German Confederation, while Reventlow declared that these rights could only concern Holstein and Lauenburg.³

¹ Reventlow’s dispatch of 3/8, No. 66. — Dispatch of 3/8, No. 24, from Drouyn de L’Huys. — Corresp. resp. the Affairs of Denm., p. 28 f. — Bunsen. III, p. 140 f.

² Danske Traktater efter 1800. I, p. 217 f. — Correspond. resp. the Affairs of Denm., p. 30 f.

³ Reventlow’s dispatches of 22/8, No. 71; 23/8, No. 72, and 24/8, No. 73.

In a letter to Stockmar written two days later¹ Prince Albert gave vent to his aversion to the "Protocol politics", but recognized that there was nothing to do about it. "Die Idée fixe ist, Deutschland wolle nur Holstein mit Schleswig vom Dänemark losreissen, um es selbst zu inkorporieren und dann vom englischen ins preussische Handelssystem zu ziehen. Dänemark werde dann ein zu kleiner Staat werden, um sich mehr halten zu können. . . ." In this way the balance of power would be shifted.

17. Prussia's Temporary Abandonment of her Ambitions.— England's Role Only That of the Mediator.

In the Danish-German conflict in 1848–1850 English public opinion had predominantly sided with Denmark. The English Government also considered Prussia's and Germany's intervention in support of the Slesvig-Holstein revolution to be unjustifiable aggression against Denmark. As the Danish Government in the spring of 1849 gave notice to terminate the armistice, Mellish, Clerk in the Foreign Office, wrote to Cowley, "I think the Danes act unwisely but they are in their *right*, while the other party is merely continuing in the unprincipled aggression to which they lent themselves last year. . . This is what we think here at the Foreign Office to a man Secretary Under Secretaries and humble clerks."²

The evaluation of the conflict by the Court was quite different. As mentioned above, Prince Albert called it an "Idée fixe" that the policy of Prussia intended to sever the Duchies from Denmark in order to incorporate them in Prussia. The same somewhat naïve view appears e.g. in Harry Verney's pamphlet "Some Observations on the Affairs of Germany . . ." (1849). He wrote: Germany has a population of 40 millions, who "have no objects of aggrandizement or extension of territory, who desire peaceful commercial intercourse with us, in whose national character prevail the same principles of truthfulness and honour as in our own. . . ."

The opinions of the English Court were formed by men like Baron Stockmar and Bunsen. Prince Albert mentions Bunsen as

¹ Kurt Jagow, Prinzgemahl Albert. Ein Leben am Throne, p. 217.

² F.O. 519/159: Letter of 28/3 1849. — Cf. my article in „Berlingske Aftenavis“ 7/2 1966.

an oracle, Lady Westmorland once in 1848 wrote to her husband.¹ She did not do so herself. When Bunsen in June of 1848 after the opening of the Frankfurt Parliament overexcitedly unbosomed himself to her about the coming power and glory of Germany, she wrote: "He seems quite mad upon this idea of a great nation that is to rule Europe."² "What a splendid Empire they would have!" he exclaimed. "They would rule Europe, for who would think of resisting United Germany?" In order to extend the frontier it would be necessary to seize Alsace, also "probably before long, incorporate the whole of Denmark with Germany," unless the Government adopted his idea of forming "a Scandinavian kingdom of the three federal kingdoms under King Oscar; but if we meet any difficulties with him, we must take Denmark. Germany will never give up Slesvig. . . As to the King of Denmark, he must be done away with."

One of Bunsen's English friends, the politician George Douglas Campbell, Eighth Duke of Argyll, maintained that Palmerston "had the worst opinion of the motives of Prussian statesmen. They were playing a game for the hegemony of Germany and not at all for the establishment of constitutional liberty amongst the German people."³ The term "the worst" ought to be replaced by "the correctest". For that matter, the lust for power, not only in Berlin, but also in the men who assembled in the Paulskirche in Frankfurt, was a strong incentive.⁴

In my account I have quoted statements from leading Prussian statesmen about the disintegration of the Danish Monarchy as Prussia's political aim and object of her ambiguous politics during these years. Far from being interested in a reconciliation between the national contrasts in the Monarchy that had arisen during the 1830'es and 1840'es, it was important for Prussian politics to keep the discord alive. It was due to Russia that Prussia did not at that time reach her objective, as well as the fact that Austria thanks to the Tsar Nicholas's support forced Prussia to give up her union policy and acknowledge the re-establishment of the old German Confederation. When the Slesvig-Holsteiners after

¹ The Correspondence of Priscilla, Countess of Westmorland, p. 132.

² *Ibid.* p. 123 ff.

³ George Douglas Eighth Duke of Argyll (1823-1900). *Autobiography & Memoirs . . . I* (1906), p. 333.

⁴ See Dahlmann's statement on the 22nd of January 1849, quoted as motto in my book "Treitschke und Schleswig-Holstein."

the Peace between Prussia and Denmark invaded Slesvig, they were defeated by the Danish army, which drove them from the Duchy and beat off later attacks.

In order to restore the King's authority in Holstein Denmark according to the Peace Treaty might apply to the German Confederation. At the beginning of 1851 the revolutionary authorities in Holstein were removed by the German Great Powers, and the "Slesvig-Holstein" army was disbanded. Not until a year or so later Holstein was again governed as part of the Monarchy. In order to obtain this, the Danish Government had to give up the Eider programme in favour of the United Monarchy programme of January 1848 and by agreements with the Great Powers of Germany had bound themselves not to attach Slesvig more closely to the Kingdom than Holstein.¹ In May 1852 the Succession to all parts of the Monarchy was arranged by the London Treaty, of which Prussia was also co-signatory, for the benefit of Prince Christian and his male heirs.

The maintenance of the integrity of the Danish Monarchy seemed secured. But as prophesied by Radowitz (see p. 203) Prussia could very well wait ten years for the disintegration of the Monarchy. A few more years passed, however, before Bismarck succeeded in incorporating the Duchies in Prussia. In 1864 the first step was taken towards the expansion of power which was the background of Germany's later wars for a world hegemony. Russia had then given up her resistance to what an English biographer of Prince Albert termed Germany's "justified ambition".²

In a conversation in the spring of 1850 between Wynn and the Danish diplomat Bille the latter said, "We must of course thankfully accept the assistance of Russia, but dislike and fear it, tho' we cannot say so; we should infinitely prefer England's making a demonstration in our favour with one single ship to a similar Demonstration from Russia with her whole Fleet."³ As appears from what precedes, England did not during the years

¹ See my paper "Carl Moltke og dannelsen af helstatsministeriet i januar 1852" (H.T. 11. ser. V, p. 245 ff.) and Erik Møller, *Helstatens Fald*. I (1958).

² Theodore Martin, *The Life of His Royal Highness the Prince Consort*. II, p. 311 f.

³ F.O. 22/182: 19/4, No. 8.

of war 1848–1850 demonstrate with one single ship for the benefit of Denmark. Denmark received actual support from Russia – and from Sweden-Norway – and whether we disliked it nor, Denmark had any reason to be grateful.

The Danish appeal to England in the spring of 1848 for support with reference to the Guarantee Treaty of 1720 remained ineffective. It was only Russia's intervention that made Prussia accept the mediation offered by England. Palmerston's two proposals of the summer of 1848 were favourable to the demands of Slesvig-Holstein and Germany, who had influential spokesmen in Bunsen and Prince Albert, and the English Government was in itself favourably disposed towards Prussia and her German policy.

The rejection by the Danish Government of Palmerston's proposed compromise was followed by the proposal for Slesvig's "independence" and separation from Holstein, a proposal that had a natural motivation in the new German Reich constitution, which, indeed, was never implemented. The principle was laid down in the Peace Preliminaries of the 10th of July 1849, and the following negotiations came to turn on its elaboration in practice.

Prussia demanded that the principle should be interpreted to the effect that Slesvig, if anything, became a state independent of Denmark, although having foreign politics and war and peace in common with the Kingdom. Furthermore, Prussia upheld the assertion that the Succession in Slesvig was male. According to the Danish view the Kingdom and Slesvig had the same Succession, and the Government maintained that the political union between them meant that they had a number of important matters in common (army, right of citizenship, etc.). The "independence" of Slesvig in Danish quarters was interpreted as extensive provincial self-government.

In his role as mediator Palmerston insisted definitely that the proposal made by him and accepted by the Central Power could not be interpreted as Prussia intended – for that matter not with so "restricted" an independence either, as the Danish Government at first had imagined. As has been shown above, Palmerston early and late exhorted the Danish Government to be more compliant and obliging to the Slesvig-Holsteiners and Germany.

Palmerston rendered Denmark a real service by making England appoint an arbitrator for the Administrative Commission for Slesvig set up by the Convention of the 10th of July 1849. The fact that its activity in the case of South Slesvig was not carried into effect, was not due to the Arbitrator, Hodges, but to the perfidious politics of Prussia. The English envoys rightly wondered that Palmerston put up with it.

Palmerston's strong point was his vigorous, clear, and well written dispatches. But he did not suit the action to the word. As Bunsen clearly emphasized, they were warning shots. Palmerston's most important means of pressure on Germany was the Russian troops. Only rarely did he venture to come out with statements to the effect that England might think of giving up the mediation – a warning directed towards both parties – or with a hint unpleasant to Germany that England might take her place among the guaranteeing powers (France and Russia).

The initiative with respect to the London Protocol so much disliked by the English Court as well as Germany was not taken by Palmerston, but by Brunnow, Russia's representative. The fact that Palmerston agreed to it, after first having the term "guarantee" removed and replaced by more non-committal terms, was due to the view that the maintenance of the Danish Monarchy was a natural political interest to England as well as Russia. Palmerston was not, as he had to point out to the Queen, the Foreign Minister of the German Confederation, but of Great Britain.

The champion in London of Prussia-Germany and the Slesvig-Holsteiners, Bunsen, ardent and itching to write, found that Palmerston, as regards the Slesvig-Holstein question, distinguished himself by an "arrogant ignorance". According to his well-known statement Palmerston did not think so. Indeed, he refused to enter into discussions with Bunsen about the figments of the Slesvig-Holstein theoreticians concerning an existing sovereign state "Slesvig-Holstein". But he was fully aware of the fact, which Orla Lehmann also considered most evident to normal brains, that Slesvig did not belong and never had belonged to Germany. Again and again it was repeated in his dispatches: what have German troops to do in Slesvig, and with what right does the German Confederation intervene in the constitutional conditions of Slesvig or, as it was called in the old days, South Jutland (Sønderjylland)?

Index to Parts I-II.

The names of the following persons have been omitted from the Index: the heads of the states of England, Denmark, Prussia, and Russia; Lord Palmerston and the British diplomats at Copenhagen, Berlin, Frankfurt, and St. Petersburg; the Danish Ministers for Foreign Affairs Knuth and Moltke, and Danish diplomats (and negotiators) Reventlow, Reedtz, and Pechlin; the German diplomats Bunsen, Alex. v. Schleinitz, and Guido v. Usedom; and finally Count Nesselrode, Russian Chancellor, and the Russian Ambassadors (Ministers) Brunnow, Meyendorff, and Ungern Sternberg.

- Abeken, Heinrich, Prussian Under-Secretary of State, II 24, 150, 168 f., 173.
- Aberdeen, George Hamilton Gordon, British statesman, 214, 216, II 105.
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ERRATA

Part I, Page 29, Line 5 from above For „Second Earl” read „Eleventh Earl”.

Page 51, Line 9 from above For „Fr. Reedtz” read „Holger Chr. Reedtz”.

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